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VOL. XIII • APRIL 1961 • No. 3

CONTENTS

The Teaching of International Relations in the United States — *William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox* 339

The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process — *Morton H. Halperin* 360

Consensus and Conflict in Indian Politics — *Susanne Hoeber Rudolph* 385

Security of Supply and Energy Policy in Western Europe — *Harold Lubell* 400

A Case Study in the Diplomacy of Social Revolution — *Douglas E. Ashford* 423

RESEARCH NOTE

Sources for the History of World War II — *Louis Morton* 435

REVIEW ARTICLES

Welfare Economics and the Military Decision — *Robert E. Kuenne* 454

Political Realism and Foreign Policy — *Robert W. Tucker* 461

Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in Western Germany — *Lewis J. Edinger* 471

A View of Soviet Business—Through Window or Mirror? — *Edward Ames* 485

The Contributors ii

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THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES*

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX and ANNETTE BAKER FOX

INTERNATIONAL relations, as a subject of instruction, has flourished more in the United States than elsewhere and more in recent years than ever before. What forces explain its growth and its present shape? How have methods of teaching it been affected by the goals of the teacher, by his relation to research, and by the formal organization of international studies in American colleges and universities? To what extent is the American experience so rooted in uniquely American conditions that it is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere? These questions will be considered in turn.

I

Professor Alfred Grosser, in a penetrating review of a number of international relations works of ambitious scope, has asked if the study of international relations is not an American specialty.[1] Americans who are teaching, researching, and publishing in the field of international relations are so numerous and so ubiquitous that it is not easy to escape that impression.[2] There are about twenty general textbooks on international relations of American origin currently in print. In addition to *Foreign Affairs* and the specialized journals, *International Organization, American Journal of International Law*, and those devoted to the problems of particular geographic areas, there are three journals pri-

* This article is based on a paper prepared for discussion at the Conference on International Relations in the University, convened by the Atlantic Treaty Association, Paris, September 5-10, 1960.

[1] "L'étude des relations internationales, spécialité américaine?" *Revue Française de Science Politique*, VI, No. 3 (July-September 1956), pp. 634-51. Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (2nd ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), are reviewed at length. There are briefer comments on seven general textbooks.

[2] Much of the ferment, vigor, and variety, however, in the American study of international relations has come from men whose origin and, in many cases, entire scholarly training were European. It was not only in atomic physics that the traumatic European events of the 1930's and the beckoning opportunities in the United States combined to make it easier for many scholars to go to America than to go to another European country. John Herz, Hans Kelsen, Hans Morgenthau, Sigmund Neumann, Stefan Possony, Hans Speier, Nicholas Spykman, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Arnold Wolfers had all put down new roots in American soil before World War II. Postwar appointments at Harvard of Stanley Hoffmann, at Yale of Karl Deutsch, at Notre Dame of Stephen Kertesz, and at American University of Michael Lindsay are demonstrations of a continuing receptivity to scholars of transatlantic origin.

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marily addressed to the professional student of international relations: *Conflict Resolution*, *Orbis*, and *World Politics*.

The American study of international relations reflects a "voluntaristic" attitude toward questions of foreign policy: a belief that Americans can, by the foreign policy choices they make, be masters of their own destiny.[3] Arnold Wolfers, writing about the attitude in our handling of foreign affairs, has described an Anglo-American "philosophy of choice," which he contrasts with a Continental European "philosophy of necessity."[4] It certainly used to be true that insular location, a naval defensive screen, and great war potential combined, prior to our own century, to permit Britain and the United States a genuine freedom to maintain low levels of peacetime defense mobilization, to eschew defensive alliances, and to postpone both decisions to intervene in European wars and decisions to mobilize to make that intervention effective. In this former era of insularity, American students of international relations could write in time of peace as if the imperatives of national security set few limits on American freedom of action. Many of them did not view the European "balance of power" state system as a legitimate order to be lived with and adapted to. They saw in that order the focus of infection for the war disease—a disease to be cured or, if that were not possible, to be quarantined.

The great transformations of twentieth-century world politics have drastically changed the focus and content of the typical international relations course without essentially modifying the reformist or, at any rate, meliorist attitudes of the teachers and writers.[5] It is now accepted that loss of insularity has taken away from the American people their freedom to choose to remain aloof from the politics of Europe, Africa,

[3] Reinhold Niebuhr has written of "the error of excessive voluntarism" of those who assume that "it would be a fairly easy achievement for nations to abridge their sovereignty in favor of a new international authority" (*The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, New York, Scribner's, 1944, p. 169). Voluntarism can also be "excessive" in a nationalist direction, as was shown by the emotion-charged debate as to which Americans brought about the loss of mainland China to the Communists. Presumably, there is a degree of voluntarism which Professor Niebuhr would not regard as excessive.

[4] "Political Theory and International Relations," introductory essay in Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds. *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956, pp. ix-xxvii.

[5] The key concept in a notable teaching experiment in international relations at San Francisco State College has been "transformations." Materials compiled and edited for this teaching experiment, and published as "Chandler Studies in International and Intercultural Relations," include three specifically dealing with transformations: Charles A. McClelland, *Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, and Future War*, DeVere E. Pentony, *The Underdeveloped Lands*, and Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., *Nationalism and International Progress*, San Francisco, Calif., Howard Chandler, 1960.

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and Asia. There remains, however, the conviction that what the United States does or does not do makes a difference. American professors of international relations, no matter how little policy-oriented their intellectual interests may be, generally believe that deeper and more widespread knowledge of international relations will somehow result in better public policies and therefore in a better world for Americans to live in. They now know that even a superpower does not have unlimited choice,[6] but they by no means see the future as wholly predetermined.

A list of these great transformations would include: (1) the expansion of the European state system into a world system, with the superpowers peripheral to Europe playing unprecedented roles in a bipolar system; (2) the diffusion outward from Europe to the Afro-Asian world of nationalism and of demands for rising living standards and the dignity of participation in the political process; (3) the democratization of the control of foreign relations at the same time that the widened sphere of state activity has made the conduct of foreign relations ever more complex and difficult; (4) the sudden emergence of science and technology as great and semi-independent variables in the equations of world politics; (5) the drawing-together of the old states of Europe and the transoceanic states of European culture in varying forms of association, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, the British Commonwealth, and NATO; and (6) the new necessity, especially for the superpowers, to do things in peacetime which many states formerly did only in war—maintain a high level of defense mobilization, engage in coalition military planning, finance a massive foreign aid program, and develop a vigorous psychological strategy.

The study of international relations has been reshaped in an effort to clarify American choices as to how to counter, or adapt to, or give direction to these transformations.[7] The bipolar system and the con-

[6] Former members of the policy-planning staff of the Department of State have produced a series of books stressing the "realities" and therefore the limits of choice in American foreign policy. See Louis J. Halle, *Dream and Reality*, New York, Harper, 1959; George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1955; Charles B. Marshall, *The Limits of Foreign Policy*, New York, Henry Holt, 1954.

[7] See William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1956), for a survey which explicitly relates the relatively unchanging goals of American policy to changing American capabilities and transformations in world politics in order to clarify policy choices made in the decade surveyed and to be made in the years that followed. This was a logical development of Brookings Institution emphasis under Leo Pasvolsky on formulating problems for analysis so that the result would approximate a "position paper" such as might have been prepared inside the Department of State on one of these problems.

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cern for the new policy problems of the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa have caused a tremendous upsurge of area studies. Typical leading American universities have each developed programs for the intensive study of one or more areas formerly thought exotic.[8] There is new interest in regional organization and the conditions under which the leaders of sovereign states most readily permit decisions to be made by regional organizations which the state has joined.[9] There is also an intensified interest in the international social forces which are operating in the turbulent half of the world now in a state of constitutional flux.[10] The inappropriateness of the new instruments of mass destruction for any socially acceptable purpose but deterrence has had two quite separate impacts: study by the civilian student of international relations of questions of military strategy and even of pure strategic theory,[11] and a renewed interest in finding technically well-founded bases for arms limitation which would lend added stability to the "balance of terror" and lessen the threat of the accidental or the catalytic war.[12] Finally, with the recognition of the importance of lengthened lead-times in arms production, the enhanced role of force in peace and of limited-war capabilities, and the need for military policies to be continuously co-ordinated with economic policies and information policies, there is sharply increased attention to national security policy, civil-military relations, and the interplay of domestic and foreign politics.[13]

[8] Columbia University, for example, has a Russian Institute, an East Asian Institute, and a Near and Middle East Institute. Each has meant a permanent expansion of the faculty by several professorships, and in each case one of the added professors has specialized in the international relations of the area.

[9] E.g., Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958; and Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kahn, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957.

[10] Dankwart Rustow is, for example, an "associate professor of international social forces" at Columbia University. In the Columbia University Bulletin his course of lectures in that subject is described as "a comparative examination of cultural, social, and ideological forces of political change in their international setting. Modernization, nationalism, recruitment of political leadership, the multiplication of sovereignties, and the problems of new states."

[11] Cf. Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959; William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956; and Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper, 1957.

[12] Although the division of labor is not entirely logical, armament policies are usually analyzed in courses on "international politics," while arms limitation policies are dealt with in courses on "international organization." See Joseph Nogee, "The Diplomacy of Disarmament," *International Conciliation*, No. 526 (January 1960); and the symposium issue on "Arms Control" of *Daedalus* (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Fall 1960.

[13] See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957; and Walter Millis (with Harvey C. Mansfield and

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The American study of international relations has been modified not only in the light of the great transformations of twentieth-century world politics but also in the light of emerging trends and changing fashions in social science, and particularly political science, research. Scholars in international relations have shown the same concern as scholars in domestic politics in endeavoring to make their subject more "scientific,"[14] the same enthusiasm for empirical, behavioral, and quantitative research,[15] the same effort to discover uniformities in state or national behavior,[16] and the same interest in choosing for investigation problems whose study would clarify questions of public policy.[17] This last interest is not a threat to objectivity so long as the preferences of the disciplined scholar are permitted to operate only in the selection of the problem and not in the mode of observation and analysis.

One development in the postwar study of international relations which has occupied the foreground of the attention of the casual observer has been the so-called "Great Debate" between the realists and the idealists. Pivotal figures on the realist side in this discussion have been Hans J. Morgenthau and his former Chicago colleague, Kenneth W. Thompson.[18] As Dwight Waldo has already commented, *within* the group of international relations and political science scholars, genuine anti-realists are hard to find.[19] "Power" was already enthroned

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Harold Stein), *Arms and the State*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. The Social Science Research Council has for several years had a Committee on National Security Policy Research.

[14] For a discussion of the distinction between scientific and other scholarly writing in international relations and a survey of the former, see Harold D. Lasswell, "The Scientific Study of International Relations," *Yearbook of World Affairs*, XII (1958), pp. 1-28.

[15] See Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, John Wiley, 1953; and Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, I, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 102-19.

[16] Thus, Rupert Emerson writes in his preface to *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960): "I have thrown my scruples to the winds and joined in a search for uniformities on the grand scale." Two recent books which describe uniformities of state behavior observed in a series of case studies are Annette B. Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959), and Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958).

[17] E.g., Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959; and Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1956.

[18] Their most recent contributions to the discussion are H. J. Morgenthau, *Dilemmas of Politics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958; and K. W. Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960.

[19] Dwight Waldo, *Political Science in the United States of America*, Paris, UNESCO, 1956, chap. 5. See William T. R. Fox, "Les fondements moraux et juridiques de la politique étrangère américaine," in *La politique étrangère et ses fondements* (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 55, Paris, A. Colin, 1954, pp.

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in the 1930's as the central concept in the study of political science at the University of Chicago, where Frederick L. Schuman published the first edition of his pioneering text in 1933[20] and Harold D. Lasswell wrote *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* in 1935.[21] It was equally accepted at Yale, where Nicholas J. Spykman published *America's Strategy in World Politics* in 1942.[22] E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis*, which appeared in 1939, enjoyed at least as great a vogue in the United States as in England.[23] Thus, there has been, at least since the 1930's, wide acceptance of the proposition that prescriptions for national policy and definitions of the national interest ought to be appropriate for the world we live in rather than for the one we wish we lived in.

Putting "power" rather than "the state" at the center of political science makes it easier to view international relations as one of the political sciences.[24] So conceived, it is possible for some scholars to move effortlessly along the seamless web which connects world politics and the politics of such less inclusive units as the state or the locality, and to emphasize the political process, group behavior, communications studies, conflict resolution, and decision-making.

The nation-states are only contingent units of international relations. The postwar world has seen the emergence of new "bloc actors" in world politics, especially in Western Europe and the North Atlantic community, and new "national actors" with the continued fragmentation of colonial empires. Thus, analysis of the changing group structure

278-90), for a distinction between the doctrinal realist position and what is there called "empirical realism," which is said to characterize most present-day American international relations research. In the idealist-realist debate, Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos (*Power Through Purpose*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1954) are two political scientists on the idealist side.

[20] *International Politics*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933.

[21] New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935.

[22] New York, Harcourt Brace, 1942.

[23] New York and London, Macmillan, 1939.

[24] The phrase "one of the political sciences" is used in order to avoid discussing whether the study of international relations belongs more to political science or to sociology, if it is not a separate discipline. Certain scholars distinguish between "direct action" and "political action." They reserve the latter term for action taken through or with a view to controlling the action of governments. The study of direct action would lie in the province of sociology and the study of the structure and functioning of international society would be a species of sociology. See N. J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1942, p. 13. *The Policy Sciences*, edited by Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1951; translated into French as *Les sciences de la politique aux Etats-Unis*, Paris, A. Colin, 1951), stresses the unity of the studies of which international relations is a part. The content of the study of international relations is not automatically affected by a decision to call it a species of political science, a species of sociology, or something separate from either.

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of world politics has been one focus of international relations research. Interest in group behavior is not confined, however, to the emergence of new actors. Description and analysis of the behavior of influential elites in the making of foreign policy have been a related interest.[25]

The study of international communications has been something of a specialty of a group now in the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[26] Conflict resolution has been a unifying concept in the study of international relations at the University of Michigan, where both a journal and a research center have been established.[27] Conflicts and their resolution have also been a central theme of students of international organization. The Carnegie Endowment has in course of preparation a series of conflict studies to prepare the way for a comparative analysis, and Leland Goodrich's study of the Korean conflict has clarified the role of the United Nations in this greatest of all efforts to implement the principle of collective security.[28]

A number of not very closely related intellectual efforts are described as having "decision-making" as the focal concept. There is the effort to convey a vicarious sense of participation in the policy-making process by the detailed recreation of a series of events which taken together constituted a "decision."[29] There is the effort to codify the perspectives and behavior patterns of key groups of participants in making foreign policy and national security policy.[30] There is the effort to correlate the expectations of decision-makers in particular cases with the ascertainable consequences of their choices in order to judge the rationality of the action taken.[31] Finally, there has been the rigorous effort by theoretical analysis to break down the decision process into its

[25] See Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1950; and Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," *American Political Science Review*, LII, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 725-44.

[26] Cf. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1958.

[27] *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution.

[28] E.g., Leland M. Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.

[29] See the forthcoming collection of case studies of civil-military relations by Harold Stein, to be published by the Twentieth Century Fund, New York, N.Y.

[30] See Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953. The Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University has commissioned a group of case studies emphasizing civilian and military perspectives in the making of national security policy.

[31] Cf. Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957.

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constituent parts to permit orderly data-collecting by processes that another investigator could reproduce.[32]

In international relations, as in other political sciences, there has been an increasing interest in such theoretical considerations as the choice of the significant questions to be investigated, the clarification of the ordering and integrating concepts in the study, and the construction of abstract models. The "system" in David Easton's *The Political System*[33] and the "process" in David Truman's *The Governmental Process*[34] find an echo in the title of the abstract book by Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*.[35] The most ambitious integrating effort has been Quincy Wright's *Study of International Relations*. Kenneth Waltz has recently performed a useful service in inventorying, classifying, and analyzing the resources of classical Western political philosophy for comprehending and coping with the phenomenon of war.[36] His analysis is a salutary reminder for at least a few of today's scholars that it is a voyage of rediscovery on which they are frequently engaged. The Waltz study is, however, exceptional. Most scholars in the last decade with an interest in various theoretical aspects of international relations have not consciously built on the foundations Waltz describes.[37] It would be more accurate to say that they have been making large excavations on the various sites on which they plan shortly to put in new foundations and hope ultimately to erect large structures.

The fifteen years since the end of World War II have seen a more systematic use of sociology, social psychology, demography, anthropology, and histories of diplomatic and military affairs.[38] The interest in tensions and their alleviation, and in conflicts and their resolution, has brought the international relations scholar into contact with the sociologist and social psychologist.[39] So has the interest in psychological

[32] E.g., Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Relations*, Princeton, N.J., Foreign Policy Analysis Project, 1954.

[33] New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1953.

[34] New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

[35] New York, John Wiley, 1957.

[36] *Man, the State, and War*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.

[37] Cf. "Symposium on the Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations," Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan, May 12-14, 1960 (mimeographed).

[38] Cf. Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy*, New York, King's Crown Press, 1956; and A. F. K. and Katherine Organski, *Population and International Relations*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf (forthcoming).

[39] Cf. Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1950; and Hadley Cantril, ed., *Tensions That Cause War*, Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1951.

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strategy and international communications generally.[40] With Africa and Asia moving to the center of the scholar's attention, the work of the anthropologist has had a new meaning for the student of international relations. The international relations scholar and the historian of diplomacy and military policy have been brought closer together, for the latter has always been studying national policies.[41] Because of his command of the documentary sources and his acceptance of the prevailing multiple-sovereignty system as the natural order, the historian brings to the study of international relations a kind of spontaneous and practical realism which he has not felt needed any grounding in an elaborate theoretical foundation.

Students of international politics, international organization, and international law are being drawn together by their converging efforts to develop their respective specialties as intellectual tools for implementing widely shared values and clarifying choices to be made in national policy.[42] None of these specialists now regards his particular sub-field as an end in itself or as a wholly autonomous specialty. Percy Corbett's *Law in Diplomacy*[43] and the long section in Inis Claude's *Swords into Plowshares*[44] entitled "Approaches to Peace Through International Organization" are examples of this unifying approach oriented to basic values and their realization through the rational selection of national policies.

The Yale Institute of International Studies, beginning in 1943, pioneered in sponsoring a memorandum series addressed to policy-makers and others influential in foreign affairs. Its successor organization after 1951, the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, has continued the practice. In recent years, Congress, and especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has called for reports on broad

[40] Cf. the Hoover Institute Studies by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and others, bearing the common title, *Revolution and the Development of International Relations*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1951-1952; and Harold D. Lasswell, "Communications as an Emerging Discipline," *Audio-Visual Communication Review*, VI, No. 4 (Fall 1958), pp. 245-54.

[41] Two indispensable volumes for the study of World War II are those dealing with United States foreign policy in 1937-1941 by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation* and *The Undeclared War* (New York, Harper, 1952 and 1953).

[42] The studies of Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal are examples of effective collaboration between a political scientist and a lawyer. See, e.g., McDougal and Lasswell, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," *American Journal of International Law*, LIII, No. 1 (January 1959), pp. 1-29.

[43] Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959.

[44] New York, Random House, 1956.

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aspects of policy from academic experts.[45] These reports are widely distributed and promptly reach university students as well as the legislators who are the official consumers of the product. The enhanced prestige of the social scientist today seems to have made his advice more welcome, and his war and postwar experience in government may have developed his taste for prescribing for national policy and strengthened the tendency to concentrate on policy-relevant research.

II

Let us now turn from a consideration of the forces that have been reshaping the American study of international relations to a description of the subject as now taught. Perhaps even more than in political science generally, self-scrutiny has continuously characterized American scholarship in international relations.[46] The survey by Grayson Kirk was the first book-length survey in the postwar period and that by Richard Swift the most recent.[47] The changes in research interest noted in the first section of this essay find their counterpart, though usually only after an interval, in the teaching materials for general courses offered in international relations. National security policy, regional organizations, and international relations theory are all being given increasing attention.

Of the 750 or more accredited American universities and colleges, about 300 have separate departments of political science or of international relations. Only these institutions are likely to offer international relations courses. John Gange estimates that nearly all the significant international relations research comes from forty or fifty of them.[48]

[45] E.g., the sixteen studies on *United States Foreign Policy* prepared by different research institutions for the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1959-1960.

[46] For surveys of political science generally, in addition to Waldo, *op.cit.*, see *Goals for Political Science* (New York, William Sloan Associates, 1951), a report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching of the American Political Science Association; also Charles S. Hyneman, *The Study of Politics* (Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1959), and Roland Young, ed., *Approaches to the Study of Politics* (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1958), two analyses growing out of a detailed examination of the political science curriculum at Northwestern University. The essay by Heinz Eulau in Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., *A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences* (Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1959), contains many suggestive comments.

[47] Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947; and Richard N. Swift, *World Affairs and the College Curriculum*, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1959. The latter is the culminating volume in a series sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which examines various aspects of the study of "world affairs" in American colleges and universities.

[48] John Gange, *University Research on International Affairs*, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1958, p. 12.

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This is only a little larger than the number offering the Ph.D. degree in either political science or international relations. For most of the rest, the scope of the international relations courses is largely dictated by the content of the available general textbooks.

The content of the subject, especially in undergraduate courses, is sharply affected by the goals of the teacher. Although training for citizenship is probably as much of a goal in undergraduate international relations teaching as in the teaching of American government, few professors today see their function as the preaching of salvation via the adoption of some particular grand design for world organization or for American foreign policy. Converting the unwashed isolationist masses to the secular religion of internationalism is not the dominant teaching goal of the international relations scholar. His public service motivation and his voluntaristic predispositions do, however, affect his selection of topics for teaching and research.

Whether because the subject is new or because the world is changing so rapidly, there are few acknowledged classics which every serious American student of international relations will be expected to have read; there are as yet no Paretos or Durkheims, no Marshalls or Keyneses, no Bagehots or Diceys. With no core of acknowledged classics and no system of central examinations, each teacher is free to choose his own approach to a general course in international relations. The large number of introductory textbooks is perhaps one indication of the dissatisfaction which most of their writers have felt with the books written prior to their own. Even the size of the American market cannot by itself account for the continuing production of such books and of collections of annotated readings to supplement or to substitute for them.

Several attempts have been made to classify approaches to international relations teaching and research. In Vernon Van Dyke's 1956 summer seminar on the teaching of international politics, four approaches to the study were identified: the institutional, the historical, the philosophical, and the behavioral.[49] It is noteworthy that the social scientists cited to illustrate these four approaches were as often outside the field of international relations as inside. Heterogeneity of approach is apparently characteristic not just of international relations but of the whole of American social science.

Arnold Wolfers has distinguished the "states as actors," "minds of

[49] Vernon Van Dyke, ed., *Some Approaches and Concepts Used in the Teaching of International Politics*, Iowa City, State University of Iowa, 1957.

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men," and "corporate actors" approaches.[50] The first takes the nation-states as given and concentrates on the multiple-sovereignty system as an interaction system;[51] it finds the richest materials for study in diplomatic history. The second stresses the unity of intranational and world politics, and makes more use of sociology and social psychology.[52] The third puts "government" rather than "politics" at the center of the study and gives more emphasis to international organization.[53] There are no pure examples of any one of these three approaches at the general textbook level, but the books do differ significantly in their relative emphases.

Still another way of characterizing approaches to the study of international relations is to distinguish the "principles," the "country-by-country," and the "transformations" approaches. Most of the general textbooks exemplify the "principles" approach, although those with a strong historical or geographical emphasis[54] illustrate the second. The experiment at San Francisco State College has emphasized the third, as does the recent text by A. F. K. Organski.[55] These three approaches are complementary rather than incompatible, but the study of such "transformations" as are being wrought by bipolarity, atomic age technology, and the rise of the Afro-Asian nations will receive increasing attention.[56]

[50] Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in William T. R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, pp. 83-106.

[51] E.g., Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations.*

[52] E.g., Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935; and Frederick S. Dunn, *War and the Minds of Men*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1951.

[53] E.g., Clyde Eagleton, *International Government*, 3rd ed., New York, Ronald Press, 1957.

[54] A recent example is Lennox A. Mills and Charles H. N. McLaughlin, *World Politics in Transition* (New York, Henry Holt, 1956), in which about half the text is devoted to the foreign policies of particular states; an influential earlier work is Harold and Margaret Sprout, eds., *Foundations of National Power* (2nd ed., New York, Van Nostrand, 1951).

[55] See "San Francisco International Studies Project" and "International Studies," San Francisco State College, 1959 and 1960 (mimeographed); and A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.

[56] Among the major transformations, that brought about by scientific and technological change has perhaps been least systematically analyzed. The short-run impact on military policy and strategic theory has been widely discussed, but non-military and long-run aspects have been generally neglected in both teaching and research. A few exceptions are John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959; Philip C. Jessup and Howard Taubenfeld, *Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959; "Science and World Politics" (a symposium), *Journal of International Affairs*, XIII, No. 1 (1959); and John G. Stoessinger, "Atoms for Peace: The International Atomic Energy Agency," in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age*, New York, New York University Press, 1959, pp. 117-233.

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Practical limits in approach are set by the gaps in the students' previous historical or social science training.[57] Sometimes this leads the teacher to "do-it-yourself" efforts to be his own historian,[58] his own student of comparative politics, his own sociologist,[59] his own geographer,[60] his own demographer,[61] his own political philosopher,[62] etc. Extensive digressions to make up for the students' presumed deficiencies make it difficult in many cases to discover the integrating approach and sometimes create doubt that the unexplicated approach is even implicit.[63] Texts with a sustained point of view and closely reasoned argument are likely to be addressed to and most suitable for students who begin their study of international relations at a more advanced stage in their educational careers and who have the factual and intellectual resources to evaluate the argument.

There are many subjects which appear in almost all the treatises and course syllabi we have examined, whatever the basic approach of the particular scholar. Grayson Kirk in 1947 identified "five ingredients" which appeared in almost all the treatises and syllabi: (1) the nature and operation of the state system; (2) basic power factors; (3) the special position and policies of the first-ranking powers; (4) the history of international relations since World War I; and (5) the building of a better world order.[64] Richard N. Swift has summarized the changes since 1947 in the following terms: "Courses today stress power and the complexity of world affairs rather than the state system: they probe deeper into the elements of national power, and in so doing take account of the theoretical and practical results of research in economics, psychology, and sociology. In debating the position of the realists and idealists and presenting the cold war, instructors now pay more attention to theoretical presuppositions; and in presenting accurately the picture of world politics today, they have had to give a larger place

[57] Cf. Kirk, *op.cit.*, p. 34: "All social studies are so interrelated that each can best be studied if the beginning student has already studied all the others."

[58] Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1st ed., 1933; 6th ed., 1960), is distinctive for its long historical introduction.

[59] Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1956), draws on both comparative politics and sociology.

[60] H. and M. Sprout, eds., *op.cit.*

[61] Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony, *International Relations*, 2nd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1954; and Organski, *World Politics*, *op.cit.*

[62] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960.

[63] Fred A. Sondermann, in "The Study of International Relations: 1956 Version" (*World Politics*, x, No. 1, October 1957, pp. 102-11), distinguishes the texts with a unified conceptual framework from those "strung together . . . in a more or less random fashion." The latter group often contains more factual data than the former.

[64] Kirk, *op.cit.*, pp. 27-29.

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than ever before to Africa and Asia."[65] Evidently, fashions in teaching have followed the fashions in research described earlier, but usually only after an interval.

In a student's field of undergraduate concentration, courses in international politics, law, and organization are commonly offered. In the more advanced work in the major, students may pursue a variety of courses in non-domestic aspects of economics, law, geography, and possibly other social sciences, and study European and American diplomatic history.

Beyond that, the student often takes special courses in the problems of non-European areas. So little even yet, however, is taught about the non-European world that it is difficult to fill the gaps in knowledge of the history, culture, economy, and politics of various parts of Asia and Africa to the point at which serious analysis becomes possible.[66] Acquiring expertness in any one area is so great a task that it is unusual for a student to be required to do special work in more than one of the areas of non-European culture.

A variety of teaching devices are used to bind together and apply some of the kinds of knowledge that the student has acquired from these varying combinations of courses in international relations, cognate subjects, and area studies. In one sense the course in American foreign policy, which ordinarily deals both with the conduct of American foreign relations and with the analysis of alternative American foreign policies, represents an effort to apply the knowledge previously acquired in courses presented from a "world" point of view. The student looks at the world as seen from Washington, at the situation in which the makers of American foreign policy find themselves, and at the choices which they have to make. Other teaching techniques also have this objective. For example, there are the recent experiments with political gaming as a teaching device in which the students play roles as representatives of various countries negotiating with each other under specified circumstances and do the research to enable them to play these roles.[67]

[65] Swift, *op.cit.*, pp. 118-19. 1959

[66] Enthusiasm for area studies sometimes goes so far that the task of filling in the gaps of knowledge about unfamiliar parts of the world may be mistaken for the whole study of international relations. This results from a genuine confusion between "foreign" and "international." If "international" were synonymous with "everything foreign," then one would only have to add up his knowledge of individual areas and call the sum total "international relations."

[67] See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in Political Gaming," *American Political Science Review*, LIII, No. 4 (December 1959), pp. 1105-15; and Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," *World Politics*, XII, No. 1 (October 1959), pp. 71-83.

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Another and more widely used method to promote a vicarious sense of participation is the staging of mock political meetings of various kinds. For example, a mock United Nations General Assembly or a mock disarmament commission or a mock Congressional committee hearing is held in which each student or group of students purports to represent a different country or a different point of view.

Only a relatively small proportion of American students are able to travel abroad and, of these, few in any way that is very helpful to their academic study of international relations. Only a small proportion have the opportunity even to visit Washington. Five institutions, with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation—Colgate, Columbia, Princeton, Rutgers, and Swarthmore—have developed a program to send undergraduate honors students to Europe for independent summer research. The results will be carefully watched for the light they throw on a difficult teaching problem.[68]

At the postgraduate level there are two kinds of programs of study in international relations.[69] One is the program which leads toward the Ph.D. degree and university teaching and research. The other is a quasi-professional program which leads toward a master's degree and employment in government or such private fields of international affairs as journalism, finance, or trade. The former program culminates in the writing of a dissertation to test the student's independent research abilities. The latter is likely to have a curriculum which is interdisciplinary and largely prescribed and calls for no comparable experience in independent research.[70]

[68] The difficulty of teaching undergraduate students with no foreign travel experience, no direct observation of politics in the national capital, and no simulated international relations experiences in mock meetings and political gaming may be lessened by the rise in standards of television news reporting on world affairs. Documentary presentations on such topics as "The Population Explosion" or "The Munich Crisis" and the showing in full of Nikita Khrushchev's two-hour press conference on the occasion of the abortive summit conference of May 1960 are examples. Harlan Cleveland, "The Real International World and the Academic Lag," in Roy A. Price, ed., *New Viewpoints in the Social Sciences* (28th Yearbook, Washington, D.C., National Council for the Social Studies, 1958, pp. 172-88), emphasizes the importance of immersion in some foreign culture as a "necessary modern supplement" to the education of every American, not just the student with a specialized concern in the field of international relations.

[69] Cf. C. Dale Fuller, *Training of Specialists in International Relations*, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1957.

[70] It is possible to earn a Ph.D. specializing in international relations and an M.A. as a way-station on the road to the Ph.D. in most of the leading universities, whether in political science or under a separately organized international relations program. The University of Chicago and Yale University were among the first to develop a separately organized Ph.D. program in international relations. The quasi-professional terminal master's degree is offered in a smaller number of institutions. There are separately organized programs for training specialists, for example, at American

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The two types of postgraduate training are not so separate that there are no "cross-over" points. A substantial fraction of the terminal master's degree candidates develop a deeper scholarly interest and become candidates for the Ph.D. degree. On the other hand, many of the Ph.D.'s find careers in government; this appears to be especially true of those with scarce skills in foreign area studies and those with intensive training in economic aspects of international relations.

The traditional three-year period for earning the Ph.D. degree has not ordinarily proved long enough. For the international relations student, all kinds of social science disciplines seem to have tantalizing relevance. More often than not, at least a fourth postgraduate year is required. For the student who is simultaneously pursuing a second program of specialized studies in the problems of some Asian or African or Russian area, it seems to be physically impossible to prepare for the general subjects examinations and to complete a dissertation within the allotted three-year period.

There is no apparent correlation between the organization of international studies within a given university and the availability of courses in special aspects of international relations. Probably, the independent department of international relations or the interdepartmental supervising committee offering a Ph.D. in international relations requires fewer supporting graduate courses in comparative government and political theory and more supporting graduate courses in diplomatic history and the other social sciences. In either case, the choice of options in specialized sub-fields is wide. Each of the leading graduate schools is accordingly turning out men and women of widely varying interests.

One practical consideration may have tended to keep the graduate student in international relations anchored in an established department —usually political science. That consideration is the practical necessity of being employable as an instructor in a department of political science. With the American pattern of requiring the beginning instructor to teach some sections of the introductory course and with that course normally "American Government" if his is a political science department, the prudent graduate student has often combined his international relations studies with enough other political science to compete with political scientists for the available academic vacancies. If there is an increase in the number of independent departments of

University, Columbia University, Johns Hopkins University, Princeton University, and Tufts University (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy).

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international relations, prudence may not operate in exactly the same way.

This article does not deal directly with formal university organization as it relates to the optimum development of the study of international relations. It would, however, be a matter of concern if formal organization within the university limited free exchange among professors with related intellectual interests and made it difficult for a student of one of these professors to indulge his curiosity about the intellectual output of all the others.

Many universities have developed special research institutes focusing on international relations. These institutes have had an impact on the growth of the subject disproportionate to the number of scholars involved. Special financing has facilitated more ample staffing to the point at which intellectual "chain reactions" can more easily occur and at which a few post-doctoral fellows and research assistants can have an apprentice relation with senior professors for which formal teaching is no substitute.[71] Membership in an institute creates an obligation to do research and an immediate environment receptive to it, to say nothing of providing the free time to engage in it. The research institute in international studies has the virtue of its vice, a preoccupation with program planning. The vice is distracting concern with discovering a continuing basis for financial support; the virtue is that the periodic necessity for making advance explanations to justify a special allocation of funds involves a self-conscious emphasis on "research design."[72] For international relations research, which often involves the co-operation of scholars from several disciplines, the research institute is of particular importance.

In a less hectic period of less crowded lecture halls, it may have been easier to combine full-time teaching with the research necessary for an international relations scholar to maintain his full intellectual vigor. The drain on professorial energies involved in advising students is very great for the teachers of both undergraduates and graduates in the United States. In the former case, a classroom teaching schedule of

[71] Gange (*op.cit.*, pp. 27-28) comments on the decline in the use of the pre-doctoral research assistant and the increase in the number of fellowships for which no service is expected and no special research training is received.

[72] The RAND Corporation is *sui generis*. Although an outstanding example of "operations research" with unmatched government financial support and access for its staff to classified information and to the decision-making levels of government, it has many of the characteristics of an academic research organization. Social scientists on the RAND staff have increasingly been a source of leadership in international relations research. Their contributions to the study of military policy and strategic theory have already been cited, but they are influential in other fields, too.

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twelve or even fifteen hours a week is not uncommon. In the latter case, the burden of supervising an increasing number of doctoral dissertations can be heavy. The proliferation of research institutes, post-doctoral fellowships, travel grants, and *ad hoc* arrangements for financing summer and sabbatical leave research in part offsets the factors which otherwise would make it difficult to combine teaching and research in this field of increasing student popularity.

Discussions about the use of "the case method," "the problem approach," "the decision-making focus," etc., reflect the vitality of the international relations teacher's concern with effective intellectual communication. Some of these discussions, however, have an air of unreality because they imply a prior and largely non-existent consensus —or, if existing, an infrequently explicated consensus—as to what is to be taught. A case of what? An approach to what category of problems? A focus on what kind of decisions? Individuals have sought to provide explicit answers to these questions,[73] but a consensus as to a preferred teaching method is artificial unless it rests upon a consensus as to the subject to be taught.

These more fundamental questions are not easily answerable except by persons whose sense of conviction as to the significant questions is rooted in perspectives formed as they have made choices regarding their own research. Research grows out of a conviction as to what are significant questions. So does a sustainable point of view about the scope and organizing concepts of such an emerging discipline as international relations. An intellectual climate favorable to research appears to be essential to good teaching.

III

These comments on the teaching of international relations in the United States may be brought into sharper focus by comparing the situation of the American teacher with that of some of his colleagues in Europe and certain parts of the British Commonwealth. The teacher-researcher requires free time in isolation, but he cannot be totally isolated from his fellow scholars of related interests. In a country of continental size, it is almost as difficult and expensive to come from the West Coast to Washington and New York as it is to go from the East Coast to London and Paris. Professional contacts, therefore, have to be planned. In less decentralized countries, the national capital is the focus of intellectual as well as of political life, and the need for

[73] E.g., Snyder *et al., op.cit.*

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*intra*national arrangements for maintaining an academic communications network by formal organization is much less. The United States already has within itself some of the characteristics common to the whole NATO coalition, and indeed also common to the non-NATO countries of Western Europe and to much of the British Commonwealth outside NATO—shared intellectual interests and closely related cultures, but with wide regional variations and great decentralization. It is logical to find emerging within this broader community, on a *trans*national basis, some of the functional equivalents of the associations of professional scholars,[74] the Social Science Research Council,[75] the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,[76] *ad hoc* conferences to discuss common problems of teaching and research,[77] all of which had to be brought into being to give what coherence there is to the American study of international relations.

In the next decade some of the problems which have emerged in the United States will be seen as problems of the extended North American-West European-British Commonwealth family of scholars in international relations. As this extended family of scholars becomes more closely knit, it too will struggle to find unity in the diversity of its intellectual approaches and teaching methods. Adjusting the subject matter to the great transformations in contemporary world politics is a problem for European and Commonwealth as well as American scholars. Increases in numbers of students, such as have engulfed the American teacher of international relations, will pose similar problems

[74] Although membership in the International Political Science Association is open to scholars throughout the world, active participants come mainly from the North Atlantic community. The Association has probably done much more to strengthen contacts within this regional community than between the North Atlantic group of scholars and those in other parts of the world.

[75] In addition to the Committee on National Security Policy Research already cited, the Social Science Research Council has had a series of committees on the study of various foreign areas and on the comparative politics of underdeveloped areas which have also brought together scholars with international relations interests. Nearly thirty years ago, an SSRC committee under James T. Shotwell called for the creation of an Institute of Atlantic Affairs. The SSRC formerly had a committee on international relations research, out of whose work grew two general analyses—Frederick S. Dunn, "The Present Course of International Relations Research, " *World Politics*, II, No. 1 (October 1949), pp. 80-95; and William T. R. Fox, "Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience," *ibid.*, pp. 67-79.

[76] The Carnegie Endowment has for many years had an office in Europe as well as its main office in New York. Formerly in Paris, it is now in Geneva.

[77] Participants in the meetings of the International Studies Conference, founded in 1929, have been drawn almost entirely from North Atlantic countries. Thus, except for the Australian chairman, Professor W. R. Crocker, the whole membership of the Windsor meeting on the university teaching of international relations in March 1950 was from these countries. See Geoffrey L. Goodwin, ed., *The University Teaching of International Relations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1951.

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in Europe. There will be a call on both sides of the Atlantic for the same searching examination of the value patterns which are the common property of the Western constitutional democracies for their relevance to the definition of the national interest and to a shared definition of interests of the North Atlantic and British Commonwealth nations.[78] The body of social science out of which the study of international relations has sprung is also the common property of the Western scholarly community, and the American interest in ordering data-collecting processes by analysis of fundamental theoretical concepts is in response to a common intellectual impulse.[79]

Meanwhile, the current of ideas will continue to move both ways across the Atlantic Ocean. The universities of America will continue to appoint to their faculties European scholars. The European members of the fraternity of international relations scholars will no doubt continue to be constructively critical of what one of them has described as "too audacious a synthesis,"[80] at least at the present stage of research and analysis. They will continue to question the existence of a distinctive method or focus in the American study of international relations. They may be skeptical of the compatibility of voluntaristic civil zeal and unrestrained scholarly curiosity as motives for developing the subject. They may be impatient with an overconcentration of American scholarly attention upon Soviet-American relations. Some of them may even see this as an effort to endow the bipolar world order with a new legitimacy; they will certainly view it as detracting attention from problems presently capable of constructive solution. Finally, Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States is like Northern Italy in the time of the first incursions of the great powers from across the Alps. Like Machiavelli at the end of the fifteenth century, the scholars of Western Europe may bring to their analyses of world

[78] E.g., Eulau, *loc.cit.*; Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics*, XI, No. 3 (April 1959), pp. 346-77; and Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1960.

[79] L. F. Richardson, "Generalized Foreign Politics," *British Journal of Psychology* (Monograph supplement, Vol. XXIII, Cambridge, Eng., 1939), and Maurice A. Ash, "An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics" (*World Politics*, III, No. 2, January 1951, pp. 218-37), are examples of theoretical analyses by English scholars which have aroused the interest of American scholars with comparable theoretical concerns. Richardson's work on the mathematical theory of war was the subject of a symposium issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (I, No. 3, September 1957). His posthumous works, *Arms and Insecurity* and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* have recently been published (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1960).

[80] Grosser, *loc.cit.*, p. 639.

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politics qualities of perception and objectivity difficult for either Soviet or American scholars to achieve.[81]

There is one direction in which the American study of international relations has not moved and for which there does not yet seem to be much call on either side of the Atlantic. This is the comparative study of multiple-sovereignty systems. After all, the present state system is only one among many which have existed or may exist in the future.[82] If the student of international relations is to fulfill the voluntaristic aspirations suggested in the preceding pages, he must be able to transcend his own time and culture. Only then can he gain understanding as to what aspects of our state system are inherent in any multiple-sovereignty system and what aspects are capable of transformation into a system which will more efficiently implement the values of our free Western society.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 651. Professor Grosser also comments on the advantage enjoyed by European scholars in "not belonging to a country which plays such a decisive role in world politics. . . ."

[82] Morton A. Kaplan, in *System and Process in International Politics* (*op.cit.*, chap. 2), identifies six types of international system: the "balance of power" system, the loose bipolar system, the tight bipolar system, the universal system, the hierarchical system, and the unit veto system. He does not claim to be able to cite historical examples of each of the six types.

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THE GAITHER COMMITTEE AND THE POLICY PROCESS*

By MORTON H. HALPERIN

DESPITE the extensive government apparatus for policy-making on problems of national security, the American President in the postwar period has, from time to time, appointed groups of private citizens to investigate particular problems and report to the National Security Council.[1] Some of these groups have performed their task without the public's ever becoming aware of their existence; others have in one way or another come to public attention. Among the latter are those which have become known under the names of their chairmen: Finletter, Gray, Paley, Sarnoff, Gaither, Draper, Boechenstein, and Killian. President Truman made use of such groups, and the variety of tasks for which they were appointed grew steadily during the Eisenhower Administration.[2]

Some analysts have seen in this development an indication that the government is exploiting all possible sources of policy recommendations, and have praised the use of such private groups.[3] Others have argued that their use reflects the bankruptcy of the NSC procedure.[4] There is agreement that the committees have often made imaginative and valuable recommendations, but the degree to which such advice can and should be fitted into the Executive decision-making process has been the subject of some dispute.

Perhaps the most publicized and controversial of such groups was the Gaither Committee, which, in 1957, presented a report on the

* I am indebted to the following for comments and criticisms: Gabriel Almond, Paul Hammond, Paul Nitze, Harry Ransom, Henry Rowen, Thomas Schelling, Warner Schilling, and H. Bradford Westerfield.

[1] The first such Presidential Commission was appointed by President Truman in January 1948 to make a general survey of foreign intelligence activities (see U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, *Organizational History of the National Security Council*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 10).

[2] See the following articles by former NSC staff members reprinted in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, *Organizing for National Security, Selected Materials*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960 (cited hereinafter as *Selected Materials*): Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formation for National Security," p. 32; Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," p. 58; and Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formation of National Policy," p. 65.

[3] See the articles by Bowie, Cutler, and Gray in *ibid.*

[4] See the articles by Kissinger, Nitze, and Jackson in *ibid.*

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nation's defense requirements. The Report remains a classified document but the effects of the Committee and its work continue to be mentioned in the nation's press. The Gaither Report was probably the most general study of the nation's defense effort to be undertaken by an *ad hoc* civilian group. Much of its contents and the events surrounding its drafting and presentation have become public, shedding a good deal of light on the national security decision-making process.

In this article I will attempt to trace and analyze the series of events connected with the Gaither Report. While explicating an important political incident, I will use the Gaither episode to generate hypotheses about the use of civilian study groups, about the Executive decision-making process, and about the role of information in the public debate about national security policy.

I. Drafting the Report

In the spring of 1957 the Federal Civilian Defense Administration (FCDA) submitted a report to President Eisenhower recommending that the government spend 40 billion dollars over a period of several years to erect shelters which would provide protection against the blast-effect of nuclear weapons.[5] The FCDA proposal was discussed by the National Security Council, and the President ordered a study to be made by an *ad hoc* committee of private citizens. The sense of the NSC meeting had been that before the Administration considered spending a sum equal to its annual military expenditure, it should investigate other possible uses of the 40 billion dollars. It was argued that if the government were prepared to increase spending for defense, it should explore the advantages of increasing its active defense effort.

The Eisenhower Administration had come to rely on the use of private consultants and this was the type of situation in which an *ad hoc* group was likely to be most helpful. An alternative would have been to set up a committee of the interested Executive agencies, but such a group would either have been unable to agree or would have drafted a "compromise" split of the proposed 40 billion-dollar expenditure. A committee of private citizens might be expected to take an unbiased look at the situation. The FCDA proposal was too serious to be rejected out of hand and it was too expensive to be adopted. Forma-

[5] *New York Times*, December 21, 1957, p. 8:4; Chalmers M. Roberts' article in the *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 20, 1957, reprinted in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, XV (December 27, 1957), pp. 1328-30, and in the *Congressional Record*, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 858 (Roberts citations hereinafter refer to the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*).

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tion of an expert committee was an effective way of handling the proposal.

Reflecting the NSC discussions, the directive asked the committee to evaluate the shelter-building proposal as part of a study of American active and passive defense capability. It anticipated that the committee would find it necessary to explore other aspects of national security as they impinged on the nation's defense effort. The committee was titled the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee to the FCDA, but in fact it was directly subordinate to the NSC and its members were considered NSC consultants.

The President, acting with the advice of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, called in H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., a West Coast lawyer and chairman of the boards of the Ford Foundation and The RAND Corporation, and asked him to head the Committee. Robert C. Sprague, an industrialist and an expert on continental defense, was asked to serve as co-director of the study. Together they recruited an eleven-man panel which included experts on various aspects of military policy.[6] In addition to Gaither and Sprague, it included William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and an expert on defense organization; James A. Perkins and William Webster, who had studied civil defense extensively; and, as staff director, Jerome Weisner, an expert on weapons systems evaluation who is now President Kennedy's science advisor. Supplying additional technical competence for the panel were Robert C. Prim and Hector R. Skifter, and rounding out the group were Robert Calkins, John J. Corson, and James Baxter, who provided some of the expertise of the social scientist, particularly in economics and history.

The panel met briefly in the spring of 1957 and set in motion a series of technical studies by the large scientific staff which it had brought together.[7] Much of this work was completed over the summer and the Committee members arrived in Washington in the fall to devote full time to a study of defense policy. At this point the Committee appointed as special advisors Colonel George A. Lincoln of West Point and Paul H. Nitze, a former head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and now Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).[8]

No public announcement had been made of the existence of the

[6] The membership of the Gaither Committee and its advisory panel was released by the White House and printed in the *Congressional Record, loc.cit.*

[7] A part of this staff was supplied by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). See *IDA Annual Report II*, March 18, 1958, pp. 6-7.

[8] Also serving as advisors to the panel were Albert C. Hill, General James McCormack, and Edward P. Oliver of The RAND Corporation.

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Committee as it set to work in the old State-War-Navy Building on the study which was, in a few months, to come to public attention as the Gaither Report.[9] The first decision taken by the group was to broaden the scope of its inquiry to cover the whole range of defense problems facing the country.[10] This is a phenomenon which seems to typify such *ad hoc* studies. In the absence of agreed American policy on most aspects of national security, it is difficult for any group to evaluate a proposal in any one area without considering other problems. In this case the panel had been asked in effect how the United States could best spend an additional sum for continental defense. But clearly defense is only one part of the deterrence strategy and hinges on how well other parts function. It might very well be true that the greatest payoff for continental defense would come, for example, from investing in ballistic missiles. In the absence of any priority plans for spending additional sums for various systems, the Committee was forced to study the whole problem. In addition, the members were so prominent and had such definite opinions on the problems of American military policy that it was natural for them to decide to use the rare opportunity of drafting a paper for the NSC to present their views on a wide range of topics.

Just as the Committee was beginning its study, Gaither was taken ill and was hospitalized for several weeks.[11] Direction of the study fell to Sprague and Foster, who became co-directors.[12] Each member of the Committee took responsibility for a particular section of the Report, but they all met frequently as a group to discuss each other's work. The Committee drew on the technical studies which had been prepared for it and had clearance to reports of the Defense Department and other agencies concerned with national security.[13] It also held frequent sessions with high military officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it consulted with a number of private experts on national security policy and with quasi-public experts, including members of The RAND Corporation.

An advisory panel for the Gaither Committee, appointed by the

[9] The only leak regarding the Gaither study had come in August when Stewart Alsop reported that the President had asked Gaither to study the possibility of employing new technological means of defense against atomic attack. He noted that the Committee was attracting "top level" talents, but he warned that "it remains to be seen whether anything solid comes of Gaither's assignment, in the present national mood of complacency" (*New York Herald Tribune*, August 26, 1957, p. 12:7).

[10] Interview with Gaither, *New York Times*, December 25, 1957, p. 24:6.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 24:5.

[12] *Ibid.*, December 21, 1957, p. 8:4.

[13] Press release by Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty, *ibid.*, December 22, 1957, p. 4:1.

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President, met periodically with the Committee members to fill in gaps in their expertise. Among the panel's eleven members were retired military officers; Frank Stanton, the president of CBS; two prominent Republican financiers, Robert Lovett and John J. McCloy, now head of the United States Disarmament Agency; and I. I. Rabi and Ernest O. Lawrence, two of the nation's top scientists.[14]

As the Committee members sifted through this mass of material, it became clear to them that the top echelons of the government did not fully appreciate the extent of the Soviet threat as it was described by the Pentagon and the CIA.[15] With a real sense of urgency, the Committee set to work to draft a summary report based on the individual studies prepared on various aspects of military policy. Just as the Report was being completed, the nation was shaken out of its complacency by the Soviet Union's announcement on October 4, 1957, that it had launched Sputnik. This event gave the Committee greater hope that the Administration would accept its recommendations.[16] A week later the Report was finished and presented to the President for discussion at an NSC meeting.[17]

II. Presenting the Report

On November 7, 1957, the President presided over one of the largest NSC meetings in history. Over forty people gathered in the White House for the presentation and discussion of the Gaither Report. In addition to the dozen top officials who regularly attended, the civilian secretaries of the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff joined members of the Committee and its advisory panel and other top government officials. Almost everyone present had read the Report in the three weeks between its completion and the meeting, and chief interest was focused on what the reaction of the President would be.

The briefing on the contents of the Gaither Report was opened by Sprague, and in turn Weisner, Foster, Corson, and Webster came up to the podium to discuss different sections of the Report. Graphs and charts were used extensively to illustrate the points that it made.

[14] The other members of the advisory panel were Admiral Robert C. Carney, General James H. Doolittle, James B. Fisk, General John E. Hull, Mervin J. Kelly, and James R. Killian.

[15] Testimony of Dr. James R. Perkins in U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, *Hearings*, Part II, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 293 (cited hereinafter as *Jackson Hearings*, Part II).

[16] Roberts, *loc.cit.*, p. 1328.

[17] Perkins testimony, *Jackson Hearings*, Part II, p. 294.

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The Report presented to the NSC was in many ways not a typical NSC document. Unlike most NSC papers, the Gaither Report did not result from a compromise of the views of a number of departments and agencies. It did not represent an amalgam of considerations, including those of domestic finance. Furthermore, it was not bound by previous government policy decisions and specifically was not within the framework of budgetary limitations laid down by the President. The Report was thus able to call for measures which the Committee thought to be necessary and to present them in a dramatic fashion to the President and his top advisors. It deviated from government policy in a number of ways, but most fundamentally in the estimation of the danger facing the country and the amount of money which the United States should spend for defense.[18]

The Report began with an analysis of Soviet and American capabilities. It compared the economic situation in the two countries, pointing out that the Soviets devoted 25 per cent of their GNP to defense, while the United States invested only 10 per cent. This meant that both countries were spending the same absolute amount and suggested that, given the faster Soviet growth rate, Russia would soon be devoting much larger sums to defense.[19] Tables were presented comparing Soviet and American industrial capability and military forces, and projecting relative strength into the future on the basis of present growth rates.[20] The Report contrasted America's armed forces of two and one-half million men equipped and trained only for general nuclear war with the larger Russian army supplied with weapons for both nuclear and conventional warfare.

After drawing this rather grim picture of comparative capabilities, the briefing moved on to an analysis of the situation and a series of policy proposals. The major danger facing the country, according to

[18] The text of the Gaither Report has not been made public. This account relies entirely on published sources. It draws heavily on Roberts' article (see note 5 above), about which Senator Clark declared on the Senate floor: "The importance of the article arises from the fact that it is well known by many Members of this body, including myself, that this newspaper account accurately and clearly states the major findings and conclusions of the Gaither Report" (*Congressional Record, loc.cit.* p. 859). The information in the Roberts article has been supplemented and checked with news and news analysis articles in the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, as well as columns by Arthur Krock, James Reston, Drew Pearson, and Stewart Alsop, and various magazine articles. In addition, speeches by members of the Committee and its Advisory Panel after the Gaither Report was presented, and their testimony at the Jackson Hearings, provided confirmation of the major points made in the Report.

[19] Cf. testimony by Robert Sprague, *Jackson Hearings*, Part I, p. 50.

[20] Roberts, *loc.cit.*, p. 1329.

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the Committee, was the vulnerability of the American strategic force.[21] The briefing dwelt at length on the problems of maintaining an effective second-strike force. It was pointed out that what must deter the Russians was not the force which the United States had, but the force which was capable of surviving an all-out Russian attack. The vulnerability of SAC was stressed. The planes of America's strategic force were exposed and concentrated in a way that made it extremely unlikely that they could survive a nuclear attack. The Committee warned that by the early 1960's, when Russia had an operational ICBM, she would be capable of destroying the American retaliatory force.[22]

The Gaither Report argued that the United States must give overriding priority to the development of an invulnerable second-strike force. It urged that for the short run everything possible be done to enable SAC to survive an attack.[23] It also called for an acceleration of the IRBM program.[24] For the longer run the Report urged that the missile production program be greatly accelerated. It warned that there was little value in acquiring missiles which were difficult to fire and which were exposed to enemy bombing. It urged therefore that American missiles be hardened and dispersed.

The Report laid the greatest stress on this point, reflecting the feeling of the Committee members that top Administration officials did not have a complete understanding of the problem of effectively deterring a Russian strategic strike.[25] The Report stressed the need to look at the problem in terms of the vulnerability of the force rather than its initial destructive capacity.[26] This was the problem which most bothered the Committee and gave its members the feeling that the government was dangerously underestimating the gravity of the Russian threat.

The Committee Report reflected the feeling that the vulnerability of the American strategic striking force was *the* great danger facing the

[21] The Committee's proposals on strategic vulnerability were heavily influenced by a classified RAND report prepared under the direction of Albert Wohlstetter. For a discussion of the RAND report, see Joseph Kraft, "RAND: Arsenal for Ideas," *Harper's*, CCXXI (July 1960), pp. 71-73.

[22] Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, November 25, 1957, p. 18:7, and *ibid.*, November 23, 1957, p. 1:8; Claude Witze, "Classified Report Says Soviets Can Neutralize SAC by 1960," *Aviation Week*, LXVII (December 2, 1957), p. 28.

[23] Such a program would presumably include dispersal of SAC, some planes in the air, and a ready alert for the rest of the command.

[24] Drew Pearson, "Gaither Report Release Sought," *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 18, 1957, D, p. 11:5.

[25] Cf. the testimony by Sprague, Baxter, and Perkins in *Jackson Hearings, passim.*

[26] For an unclassified but well-informed discussion of the problem of maintaining a stable strategic balance, see Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), pp. 211-34.

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country, but it also indicated that this was not the only military danger. The Report advised that, once the United States had recovered its full retaliatory capacity, the military develop a capacity to fight limited wars.[27] The establishment of a nuclear balance would mean that local aggression would be the likely form of warfare. The Committee found that the American military force was unprepared to engage in limited wars. The Report suggested that the Middle East and Asia were the most likely areas in which local wars might erupt and it discussed the importance and the problems of keeping a war limited.[28] The second recommendation of the Committee was therefore that the United States train and equip its forces for conventional local warfare.

The Gaither Committee had considered the FCDA proposal to spend 40 billion dollars for blast shelters, and while conceding that such shelters would save some lives in the event of war, it assigned a very low priority to such construction. In making policy proposals to the NSC, the Committee ranked its suggestions, giving top priority to the need to revitalize the strategic force and improve America's limited-war capability. In the civil defense field, the Report gave first priority only to a comparatively modest proposal to spend several hundred million dollars in the following few years for research on various aspects of shelter construction and other non-military defense measures.[29] The Committee assigned secondary priority to a proposal to spend approximately 22 billion dollars for the construction of radiation (rather than blast) shelters. It was anticipated that any construction program would follow the research phase.

Foster briefed the NSC gathering on the defense reorganization proposals contained in the Gaither Report. He urged that the military command structure be organized to place primary reliance on joint and specified commands. The Report urged that a joint limited-war command be established. It suggested that most planning and research be carried on directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Orders, it was argued, should go from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs to the commands, and the services should concentrate on logistics and training operations. The Report also urged that the layers of Pentagon

[27] "Leak—and a Flood," *Newsweek*, L (December 30, 1957), p. 14; *New York Times*, November 23, 1957, p. 8:3; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 23, 1957, p. 1:8.

[28] Krock, *New York Times*, December 22, 1957, IV, p. 3:2.

[29] The Committee's analysis of the civil defense problem reflected the influence of Herman Kahn of The RAND Corporation. The alternative civil defense proposals sketched here are elaborated in *Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense*, RAND, R-322-RC, July 1, 1958.

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committees be eliminated and the Secretary of Defense be given his own military staff.[30]

Although it was only forty pages long,[31] the Gaither Report also touched briefly on other subjects. It urged the government to increase spending for basic scientific research and stressed the importance to military policy of other areas of foreign policy. It also discussed the potential immediate impact on the American economy of the proposed increase in defense spending. The Report did not provide an exact estimate of the cost of all of its recommendations, but it indicated the need for rapid increases in the military budget to about 48 billion dollars per year in the 1960's.[32]

The entire NSC paid close attention during the presentation of the Report. The President had a copy of the written text balanced on his knee and alternated between following along in the Report and watching the speaker.[33] When the briefing was concluded, a general discussion followed. The President thanked the group and indicated that he was impressed with the arguments contained in the Report and wanted to implement them. However, he expressed a nagging fear that the American people would not be willing to pay the bill.[34] For reasons which I shall explore in the next section, none of the department heads present was willing to give support to the proposals as a whole. In fact, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke out strongly in opposition to the Report's recommendations. Support came from some members of the Committee's advisory panel. John J. McCloy and Robert A. Lovett, both prominent members of the American financial community as well as former Defense Department officials and active Republicans, argued that the American economy could afford to pay for the vitally needed measures outlined in the Report. They predicted that the people as a whole and the business community in particular would support the President if he urged increased spending for defense.[35]

The session broke up without any sense of the meeting having been arrived at. According to standard NSC procedure, the Report was for-

[30] That the Gaither Report included proposals on defense reorganization was indicated by Defense Secretary McElroy (*New York Times*, January 22, 1958, p. 15:4). The proposals were spelled out by Foster in a speech before the Student Conference on United States Affairs (SCUSA), IX, printed in *Proceedings of the Conference*, West Point, N.Y., 1957, p. 9.

[31] Cutler testimony in *Jackson Hearings*, Part IV, p. 594.

[32] *New York Times*, December 21, 1957, p. 8:4.

[33] Charles J. V. Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," *Fortune*, LVII (January 1958), p. 230.

[34] Roberts, *loc.cit.*, p. 1328; *Newsweek*, L (December 30, 1957), p. 14.

[35] Roberts, *loc.cit.*, p. 1328.

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mally sent to the departments concerned for their information and comments. In general, with reports of this nature nothing further happens. The reports are either used or rejected at the departmental level and the consultants return to their civilian jobs. However, in the case of the Gaither Report, there were significant further developments which throw considerable light on the policy process. Some of the Committee members made a determined effort to have their proposals implemented and at the same time they joined with others in seeking to have the Gaither Report made public.[36]

III. The Effect of the Report

Even in the early stages of their work on the Gaither Report, the members of the Committee were aware of the great discrepancy between the danger which was being described to them by the CIA and the military, and the sense of complacency at the top levels of the government. At least some of the Committee members became convinced that they had an obligation to make a strenuous effort to obtain the implementation of their proposals. Even as they worked on the Report, they were concerned with how best to proceed to secure its adoption by the Administration. In discussions with top civilian and military leaders, the Committee sought support for the types of recommendations it was considering. In the office of the President it attempted to make clear the nature of the problem facing the country.[37]

In seeking to influence national security policy-making at the Executive level, the Committee was dealing with a complex and bewildering decision-making process. It was clear, however, that in seeking to influence policy in a number of agencies, the most direct route was through the President. Some days before the NSC presentation, several of the most prominent members of the Committee and its advisory panel, including Gaither (who had just rejoined the group), Sprague, and Foster, met with President Eisenhower to discuss the content of the Report.[38] Again, at the NSC meeting the Committee members had several hours in which to present him with their views.

The difference in tone of two speeches delivered by the President suggests that these briefings had at least a momentary impact on his thinking. On the evening of the NSC meeting of November 7, he gave

[36] Some of the Committee members, including Gaither, returned to their civilian jobs and took no part in the campaign discussed below.

[37] Sprague testimony, *Jackson Hearings*, Part I, pp. 49-51.

[38] Murphy, *op.cit.*, p. 230; Cutler testimony, *Jackson Hearings*, Part IV, p. 594.

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the first of two scheduled addresses on the state of the nation's security.[39] The tone of this speech was one of reassurance. President Eisenhower stressed the present military strength of the United States:

> It is my conviction [he declared], supported by trusted scientific and military advisers, that . . . as of today the over-all military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the Communist countries.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> It misses the whole point to say that we must now increase our expenditures on all kinds of military hardware and defense. . . .[40]

The President recognized the need "to feel a sense of urgency," but he was determined that the United States not "try to ride off in all directions at once." The speech stressed the need to support a sound economy and to keep down the level of defense expenditure.

A week later in Oklahoma City the President delivered the second part of his talk, entitled "Future Security."[41] While this speech did not directly contradict the first, its tone was completely different. He discussed again the problems of balancing expenditures and receipts and keeping the budget low, but this time he asserted: ". . . now, by whatever amount savings fail to equal the additional costs of security, our total expenditures will go up. Our people will rightly demand it. They will not sacrifice security to worship a balanced budget."[42] The President recalled one of his statements of the previous week, but made a significant addition: "I assure you, as I did last week, that for the conditions existing today they [U.S. military forces] are both efficient and adequate. But if they are to remain so for the future, their design and power must keep pace with the increasing capabilities that science gives both to the aggressor and the defender."[43]

In spelling out the strategic requirements for the future, the President showed most clearly the effect which the Gaither Report was having, at least momentarily, on his thinking. He seemed to be recognizing that the country *did* have to ride off in many directions at once. The first requirement was, he declared, to maintain a nuclear retaliatory force such that an attack by the Soviets "would result, regardless of damage to us, in their own national destruction." In addition, forces were needed to deal with any form of local aggression, and home defense had to be improved. And, the President continued, more money must be spent on SAC dispersal and an acceleration of the missile program. "The

[39] Reprinted in *New York Times*, November 8, 1957, p. 10.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 10:3, 8.
[41] Reprinted in *ibid.*, November 14, 1957, p. 14.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 14:6.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 14:2.

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answer," President Eisenhower asserted, "does not lie in any misguided attempt to eliminate conventional forces and rely solely upon retaliation. Such a course would be completely self-defeating."[44]

The members of the Gaither Committee quickly realized that the incorporation of some of their ideas into a Presidential speech did not mean that their proposals were about to be adopted by the Administration. The President might forward the Report to his writers with the suggestion that they use some of its ideas, but he was not likely to impose policy decisions on the operating agencies. Under the staff system used by President Eisenhower, policy proposals had to come up through the regular channels before he would act upon them. The Gaither Report had not sufficiently impressed or convinced the President for him to seize the initiative. He was not only reluctant to upset routine staff procedures, but also not eager to embark on the large-scale spending programs urged in the Report. The President was anxious to maintain his image as a man of peace and had no wish to approve a major expansion in the American military forces. He sought from his advisors assurance that the problems were being met rather than programs for new action.

After the failure of the initial attempt to alter Administration policy, the Gaither Committee, led by Foster, considered and to some extent implemented three courses of action. These were: further attempts to reach the President directly, efforts to enlist the support of operating agencies, and measures to arouse the American public and elite groups to the dangers facing the country. The operating agencies were perhaps the most likely allies of the Gaither Committee, and the failure to gain the support of a single department suggests the built-in forces for stability in the process.

The Gaither Report had recommended across-the-board increases in spending. While assigning some priorities, it had not made any really hard choices among weapons systems. Here was seemingly a document which might have been acceptable to everyone. Why then was no support forthcoming?

The Gaither Committee had taken seriously the question which, in effect, had been put to it: how the government should spend vastly increased sums of money. It was clear, however, to the operating agencies who were at the time wrestling with limitations imposed by the Budget Bureau that the "pie" was, in fact, not going to get bigger. The military services, the AEC, and the FCDA could only look upon the

[44] *Ibid.*

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Report as a proposal to redivide the pie.[45] As such, they were naturally highly suspicious of its recommendations. The civil defense proposals caused the most difficulty. The FCDA was unwilling to accept a report which rejected its major proposal for blast shelters and which accepted implicitly the notion that civil defense spending should be weighed against possible military uses of the same funds. The military services were unwilling to support a plan which recommended a further splitting of the military-spending pie by including civil defense spending. The Report had given secondary priority to a 20 billion-dollar spending program within the next few years. The military could not have been expected to advocate such spending when their assumption was that it would come out of their funds.

In terms of individual proposals, the Committee members found some support within the services.[46] The Army, for example, was eager to endorse the proposals for a limited-war force. However, the individual recommendations were not new and only provided some additional leverage for the service viewpoints.[47] In addition, the services were reluctant to endorse a paper which suggested that they had been derelict in their duty of keeping the country militarily strong. Although the Army would continue to argue for larger limited-war forces, it would never be ready to agree that it was not in a position to win a limited war. Similarly the Air Force was not willing to concede that its forces were as vulnerable as suggested by the Gaither Report. The military services could not admit the extensive deficiencies outlined by the Report. The formal comment of the Joint Chiefs was reportedly that the study did not contain any new proposals, but was "largely a summation and endorsement of steps under way or under consideration."[48]

[45] In considering the reaction of Executive agencies, it should be kept in mind that the Administration placed very tight restrictions on access to the Report. For example, NATO Supreme Commander General Lauris Norstad did not see it (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1958, p. 2:2).

[46] The recommendations of the Gaither Committee were broken down into groups. The agencies concerned prepared papers on these proposals and they were discussed at a series of NSC meetings. See Cutler testimony, *Jackson Hearings*, Part IV, p. 594.

[47] Cf. General Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, New York, 1959, *passim*. Taylor, in discussing policy papers drafted for the NSC while he was Army Chief of Staff, makes it clear that most of the strategic concepts and recommendations of the Gaither Report were discussed frequently by the Joint Chiefs and the NSC before and after the Gaither Report was presented, although he does not mention the Report itself.

[48] *New York Times*, December 21, 1957, p. 8:3. This phenomenon clearly needs greater study. The strait jacket which has confined the military chiefs, preventing them from admitting extensive weakness even while pressing for more funds, has surely been an important restraint on the flow of information to the White House and to Congress. A comparison of the statements to Congress made by Army Chiefs of Staff on, for

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The military services were also reluctant to commit themselves to what was in effect a new, more "rational" method of splitting up the defense pie. Under the "political" method the services could pretty well predict what their per cent of the defense budget would be. There was no way to tell just what budget-making by outside experts would look like. There is a general distrust among operating officials of this type of advice. In discussing the weakness of private expert committees, Nitze explicated one of the problems facing the Gaither group: "The most serious of these disadvantages is the possibility that the committee may be too far removed from executive branch responsibility to be fully effective. Those members of the executive branch who are actually responsible for carrying out policy . . . feel, perhaps rightly, that such groups are out of touch with the real problems with which the officials, in the end, must always deal. In any case, it is obvious that the committee, once its report has been presented, is in a poor position to help fight its recommendation through the decision stage. *Both of these difficulties characterized the reception of the Gaither Report* two years ago. . . ."[49]

This fear of civilian expertise and the inability of the Gaither group to put any influence back of its recommendations combined with the motives discussed above to explain the failure of administrative agencies to support the Gaither proposals. There were, however, two men in the government who might have been expected to take the over-all view necessary to endorse the recommendations of the Report. For vastly different reasons, however, neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense was prepared to do so. Defense Secretary Neil McElroy viewed his job as that of an administrator. He refused to be drawn into strategic discussions or debates about the level of defense spending. He felt that he had been appointed because of his ability to run an organization efficiently and refused to deal with subjects about which he had no expertise.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was in no sense reluctant to discuss military matters. He had in fact become closely associated with the policy of massive retaliation which the Report indirectly, but clearly, challenged. Dulles was not prepared to endorse a program which called for large-scale spending and which committed the United States to

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example, the adequacy of our capability for limited war and the statements they make after retiring indicates vividly the reality of this phenomenon. (I am indebted to Paul Hammond and Louis Kushnick for bringing this point to my attention.)

[49] Paul H. Nitze, "Organization for National Policy Planning in the United States," *Selected Materials*, p. 168 (italics added).

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local defense in the peripheral areas. In addition he felt that a shelter program would frighten America's allies. He feared that the Gaither proposals would use funds that otherwise could be used to increase foreign aid.[50] Dulles' influence with the President on foreign affairs suggests that his opposition must have been a major stumbling block in the efforts to convince the President to implement the Gaither proposals. Both the Treasury and the Budget Bureau were of course opposed to the Gaither recommendations because of the large-scale increase in spending proposed. With the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Director of the Budget opposed to them and the Secretary of Defense refusing to express an opinion, the Gaither group members had to try either to influence the President directly[51] or to arouse American public opinion.

Following the presentation of their Report, the members of the Gaither Committee discussed possible courses of action among themselves and with experts on American foreign policy and defense. Following these weeks of informal discussions, a dinner meeting was held in Foster's Washington home in mid-December. Joining Foster were Frank Stanton and Paul Nitze, who had worked on the Gaither Report, and others, including Laurance Rockefeller and Elmo Roper.[52] Vice-President Richard Nixon attended on his own initiative but, according to one report, with the approval of the President.[53] Part of the evening was taken up with a further briefing of the Vice-President. In addition, Foster made two proposals to the group. He suggested that it aim at publication of a "sanitized" version of the Gaither Report.[54] He also urged the formation of a committee which would seek to convince the American people of the need for greater sacrifices in light of the grave Soviet threat. Foster argued that the release of the Report was essential to mobilize public opinion to support new programs. At the same time that it was trying to arouse public opinion, Foster suggested that his proposed committee continue the fight within the Executive for the implementation of the Gaither proposals.

[50] Cf. Dulles' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *New York Times*, January 10, 1958, p. 1:5.

[51] For an excellent discussion of the kinds of problems that President Eisenhower would have faced in seeking to impose the recommendations of the Gaither Report on the operating agencies, see Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, New York, 1960, *passim*.

[52] *New York Times*, December 11, 1957, p. 8:6; *New York Herald Tribune*, December 11, 1957, p. 1:3.

[53] *New York Times*, December 12, 1957, p. 11:1.

[54] Krock, *ibid.*, December 13, 1957, p. 26:5.

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In the discussion that followed, a general feeling was expressed of the need to do whatever was possible to alert the Administration and the people. Although Foster's proposal to set up a committee was received with much sympathy, the consensus was that the crucial problem lay with the President. If President Eisenhower could be convinced of the need to take bold action, he would have no difficulty arousing the American people. On the other hand, without the leadership of the President, it was felt that no group, whatever its composition, could reach the public.[55] Other members of the Gaither Committee shared this viewpoint. In testifying before the Jackson Committee, Sprague expressed his own opinion and in effect summed up the feeling of the meeting at Foster's home. In answer to a question as to what could be done to arouse the public, Sprague replied: "Senator, a citizen like myself, *or a group of citizens*, can do very little about this. I think there is one man in the United States that [*sic*] can do this effectively, and that is the President. I do not think there is anybody else."[56] Sprague's testimony reflected the bewilderment of the Foster group as to the position of the President. The Gaither Committee members were not sure whether the problem was to convince the President that their analysis was correct, or to get him to act on the basis of the information which he now had. As Sprague explained it: "I believe . . . that the danger is more serious than the President has expressed himself to the American public. I do not know whether he feels this or whether he does not. But I do not believe that the concern that I personally feel has as yet been expressed by the President to the American public. This is a complicated matter."[57]

The gathering at Foster's home broke up without a firm decision on whether or not to form a committee, but with a commitment on the

[55] This feeling that the President constituted the key to the problem was reflected in a report by Samuel Lubell on a field trip made soon after Sputnik II. Lubell reported that "one thing I found especially striking was how closely the public's reactions corresponded to the explanatory 'line' which was coming from the White House. Relatively few persons repeated the criticisms which were being printed in newspaper editorials or were being made by members of Congress or by scientists. In talking about sputnik, most people tended to paraphrase what Eisenhower himself had said. . . . The public generally tended to follow the President's lead. In no community did I find any tendency on the part of the public to look for leadership to anyone else—to their newspapers or radio commentators, to Congressmen or to men of science. Nor, with some exceptions, could people be said to be in advance of the President, or to be demanding more action than he was." (Samuel Lubell, "Sputnik and American Public Opinion," *Columbia University Forum*, 1, Winter 1957, p. 18.)

[56] *Jackson Hearings*, Part I, p. 55 (italics added).

[57] *Ibid.*

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part of those present to work for release of the Gaither Report to the public.[58] The efforts of members of the Gaither Committee[59] to have their Report released coincided with the demand of other groups.

IV. The Public Debate

The Gaither Committee had drafted its Report for the President without Congress' or the public's being aware of its existence. When the Report was presented to the NSC on November 7, 1957, the *New York Times* simply stated that an extraordinary meeting of the Council had been held and that members of the President's Science Advisory Committee were in attendance.[60] On November 9 the *New York Times* indicated that a special committee headed by Rowan Gaither had presented a report.[61] The contents of the Report leaked out slowly to the press. On November 23, 1957, the *Herald Tribune* published a fairly complete account of the contents of the Gaither study[62] and on December 20 the *Washington Post and Times Herald* ran a story by Chalmers Roberts which contained the most accurate report of the study's contents that had appeared to date.[63] As the nature of the Report and its sober conclusions came to the attention of the public,[64] a number of groups called for release of the official text. Thus, when the group meeting in Foster's home decided to press for publication of the Report, they were echoing the demand of others.

The group's desire to have the Report released coincided with a similar request from Congressional Democrats and some Republican Senators, including Styles Bridges.[65] The debate over making the Report public attracted wide interest in the press and among the attentive elites. As Senator Clark made clear on the Senate floor, those demanding release of the Report were not concerned with learning its contents.

[58] Ultimately no committee was set up reflecting the view expressed by Sprague. A leak to the press about the gathering and its purpose made further action by the group more complicated and, in addition, embarrassed the Vice-President.

[59] Not all of the Gaither Committee joined in this effort. Gaither, for example, told a news conference that "a report like this to the Security Council and to the President is never made public. If all or part of it is made public, it would be an exception, and the first time such a thing was ever done." (*New York Herald Tribune*, December 25, 1957, p. 3:1.)

[60] *New York Times*, November 8, 1957, p. 10:8.

[61] *Ibid.*, November 9, 1957, p. 11:6.

[62] *New York Herald Tribune*, November 23, 1957, p. 1:8.

[63] See note 5 above.

[64] The leaks apparently came both from within the Administration and from members of the Gaither Committee.

[65] *New York Herald Tribune*, December 13, 1957, p. 1:3; *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 21, 1957, p. 1:6.

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Anyone with this goal had only to turn to one of several newspaper and magazine accounts. To make this task easier, Clark inserted in the *Congressional Record* the Roberts article and assured the readers of the *Daily Record* that it was accurate.[66]

Congressional Democrats, particularly those Senators who had been advocating higher defense spending, viewed the Report as a vindication of their views. The declaration by a group of distinguished citizens, including a number of prominent Republicans, that the Eisenhower Administration had failed to act in the face of a grave danger to the survival of the country was excellent political ammunition. The Democrats had been trying to paint a picture of an inactive President failing to respond to the challenges of the time. Since it would be difficult to publish the Report without creating the impression that its findings were valid, release of the Report by the Administration itself could not fail to bolster this image, with important political advantages for the Democratic Party in the next Congressional election. Apart from the partisan political advantage which they saw in publication of the Report, the Senate Democrats were concerned about the state of the nation's defenses. The Preparedness Subcommittee was conducting extensive hearings and an official request for the Report came from Senator Lyndon Johnson, the majority leader and chairman of the Subcommittee. The Johnson Subcommittee was briefed on the substance of the Report[67] but nevertheless pressed for its publication, apparently feeling that it would aid its case regarding the need for the nation to make greater sacrifices.

The Senate debate over release of the Gaither Report followed the presentation to Congress of the President's budget message. The proposed spending for national defense had greatly disappointed those who held the views outlined in the Report. In his State of the Union Address on January 9 the President had declared that the United States must act "wisely and promptly" to maintain the capacity to deter attack or defend itself, and he had added: "My profoundest conviction is that the American people will say, as one man: No matter what the exertions or sacrifices, we shall maintain that necessary strength."[68] But while the budget message had called for some increase in spending, it was not enough in the opinion of those demanding release of the Gaither Report. The budget called for modest acceleration of the missile and

[66] *Congressional Record*, *loc.cit.*, p. 858.
[67] *New York Times*, December 23, 1957, p. 6:4.
[68] Paul Zinner, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958*, New York, 1959, p. 2.

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SAC dispersal programs but, while recognizing the need for conventional forces and civilian defense, it called for a curtailment of these programs to save part of the amount needed for the expanded activities. It specifically ruled out a substantial increase in the defense budget.[69]

Once again there was a sharp contrast between what was included in the President's speech and the actual policy position of the Administration. Any possibility that the President would have overruled his subordinates on this issue was eliminated by Eisenhower's stroke. He was not working during most of the period between presentation of the Gaither Report and the submitting of his budget to Congress.

Senators and Representatives urging release of the Report felt it would strengthen their hand in trying to convince the Congress to increase defense expenditures substantially and to generate pressures on the Administration to spend the money which was appropriated. As Senator Clark declared on the Senate floor: "That [Gaither] report should have caused this Administration to have a far greater sense of urgency than it presently gives any indication of having."[70] He urged a reading of the Roberts article in order to "have an understanding of the very critical situation which confronts our country, and which I must say in all good conscience the President's budget does so little to remedy."[71]

Echoing this Congressional demand for release of the Report were newspapers and magazines which argued that the public was entitled to read this study by a group of distinguished citizens.[72] It was pointed out that various distortions had appeared in print, including one that suggested that the Committee had advocated preventive war.[73] Only

[69] Portions of the budget message relating to national security are printed in *ibid.*, pp. 15-23.

[70] *Congressional Record, loc.cit.*, p. 860.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] See, for example, the editorials in the *New York Times*, December 13, 1957, p. 26:2; *New York Herald Tribune*, December 23, 1957, p. 16:1; and *Washington Post and Times Herald*, December 30, 1957, p. 14:1.

[73] In his column in the *New York Times* on December 20, 1957 (p. 26:5), Arthur Krock inferred from what he knew about the Gaither Report that it recommended a "first strike" strategy and speculated that this was why the Report was being kept secret. Two days later he was able to write that "it is authoritatively stated that this point was not included in the report" (*ibid.*, IV, p. 3:2).

The Communists sought to exploit this and other distortions of the Gaither Report. On December 26, Moscow and Peking broadcasts monitored in London charged that the "authors of the report are proponents of a limited war which would be fought with all types of modern nuclear weapons" (*New York Times*, December 27, 1957, p. 4:5). Then Soviet Premier Bulganin in a note to President Eisenhower on March 7, 1958, wrote that "the American press has been discussing for the past few weeks the idea of 'preventive war' against the U.S.S.R. which, according to such well-known American commentators as Hanson Baldwin, Arthur Krock and Drew Pearson, was advanced in a secret report to the National Council of Security [*sic*] by the so-called Gaither Committee" (*ibid.*, March 8, 1958, p. 2:8).

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the full publication of the Report would stop the rumors and give the people an opportunity to evaluate this Report which, it was stressed, had been written by an extremely able group of private citizens. Members of the Gaither Committee pressed for publication of the "sanitized" version of the Report which Foster had offered to prepare. Publication would indicate that the Administration took the Report seriously and was prepared to implement it. It also would be an effective first step in what they hoped would be a Presidential campaign to arouse the American people to meet the crisis facing the nation. Those within the Administration who favored more spending for defense were pressing for release of the Report for the same reasons and leaked its contents. Private citizens concerned about the nation's defense effort were also seeking publication of the Report.

Despite these intense efforts, the President refused to yield. The official Administration position was set forth in a letter to Senator Johnson: ". . . From time to time the President invites groups of specially qualified citizens to advise him on complex problems. These groups give this advice after intensive study, with the understanding that their advice will be kept confidential. Only by preserving the confidential nature of such advice is it possible to assemble such groups or for the President to avail himself of such advice."[74] To publish this Report, the letter concluded, would violate the privacy of this relation and also the standing rule that NSC documents are not made public.[75]

Earlier, at a press conference, the President had made it clear that he considered the Report confidential and had no intention of making it public.[76] A Presidential press release noted simply that "the report is, of course, a highly classified document."[77] James Reston, analyzing the Eisenhower Administration's refusal to publish the study, termed the Report an indictment of Eisenhower's policy and noted that publication would have weakened the President as well as the Republican Party.[78] The desire to withhold political ammunition from the Democrats undoubtedly played a part in the decision not to release the

[74] *Ibid.*, January 23, 1958, p. 10:4.

[75] This was not an unimportant consideration. It undoubtedly heavily influenced the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, who argued against the release of the Report. Cf. Robert Cutler, "Organization at the Policy Level," *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, II (January-March 1959), pp. 12-13. For a general discussion of this problem, see Francis E. Rourke, "Administrative Secrecy: A Congressional Dilemma," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (September 1960), pp. 691-93.

[76] *New York Times*, January 16, 1958, p. 14:6.

[77] *Ibid.*, December 22, 1957, p. 4:1.

[78] *Ibid.*, January 22, 1958, p. 10:5.

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Report, as did the need to maintain the tradition of privacy for such reports. Probably more important, however, was the President's oft-repeated fear that the American people, if panicked, would ride off in all directions and demand spending which would be unwise and would damage the economy.[79] Thus, after Sputnik the President moved to calm the nation and ultimately rejected the fundamental assumption of the Gaither Report that the country was in grave danger. To take the unusual course of releasing the Report would imply that it presented an accurate picture and would increase pressures, which the Administration was fighting, to step up defense spending substantially.

The Eisenhower Administration continually denied that the Gaither Report showed the United States to be weak at the time the document was being written. It asserted that the government was already dealing with the problems outlined in the Report and that adequate measures were being taken on the basis of this and other reports to assure the nation's survival.[80]

Although they failed to have their Report released, many of the Gaither Committee members spoke out in an effort to alert the nation to the imminent dangers. Foster, in particular, appeared before numerous groups to argue the need for greater sacrifices. Sprague told the Jackson Committee that he had spoken to thirty or forty groups since serving on the Gaither panel, but, he continued, "I do not think this is very effective. I have done all that I can."[81] After a while the Committee members gave up the effort to arouse the public, with the realization that they could not compete against the President's words of reassurance.

V. Conclusion

The dispute about releasing the Gaither Report was a short episode in the continuing political debate over American defense strategy and the level of military spending necessary to implement the foreign and military policies of the United States. While the Report did not substantially alter the course of the struggle, it helped to bring some of the issues and pressures more sharply into focus. The fight over the release of the Report reflected almost exactly the larger dispute over defense spending. The American political process may be viewed as a struggle between clusters cutting across governmental structure, political parties, and interest groups and forming and reforming around various causes

[79] Krock, *ibid.*, December 22, 1957, IV, p. 3:1.
[80] *Ibid.*, December 29, 1957, p. 1:3.
[81] *Jackson Hearings*, Part I, p. 56.

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or specific proposals.[82] The defense debate which followed the launching of the Russian earth satellites brought into action two groups. One, which included the President, members of his Cabinet, some Congressional leaders, and members of the attentive elite, reacted to Sputnik with programs for modest increases in national security spending but continued to assert that no large increase in spending or re-evaluation of strategy or governmental structure was needed. The other group, which included members of the Gaither Committee, Congressional Democrats and some Republicans, directors of mass media, and national security experts, saw in the Sputniks an affirmation of its belief that the United States was faced with a grave threat to its survival and an opportunity to have its views prevail. Its members urged substantial increases in government spending and an awakening to the serious military, economic, and political challenge facing the United States and its allies. The Gaither Committee included a number of men who even before Sputnik had been arguing for substantial increases in defense spending. The other members of the Committee were won over to this view by the intellectual climate of the Committee as well as their review of the military situation. The Gaither Report provided a guide for the "pro-spending cluster,"[83] presenting a rationale for its position and a blueprint for the expenditure of the additional sums which were to be made available. It hoped that the Administration could be pressed to accept the Report drawn up by a committee of the NSC as a guide for a substantially increased military effort.[84]

[82] For a similar model spelled out, see Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), pp. 361-82. I am indebted to H. Bradford Westerfield for the model used here.

[83] The term "pro-spending cluster" is not meant to imply that its members favored spending for its own sake. While some people supporting the Gaither proposals were willing to back any plan for larger government spending, others (notably Sprague) were reluctant to endorse any spending programs; most of this cluster supported the Gaither proposals without being influenced by the spending implications.

[84] NSC 68 provides some interesting parallels to the Gaither Report and suggests the role it might have played if Sputnik had led to an Administration decision to increase the defense budget substantially. NSC 68 was drafted by a joint State Department-Defense Department committee, but it was, like the Gaither Report, prepared without considering domestic economic or political factors and without regard to the budget level set by the President. It included a complete review of the national security situation and called for a large increase in defense spending—providing a blueprint for the use of the funds. The Report was presented to the NSC just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. It was initialed by President Truman just after the war started and served as the government's rationale for the expanded defense effort. It enabled the Administration to assert that spending was being guided by a long-range plan drafted prior to the war. See Paul Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," to be published in a volume sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University.

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The Gaither Report was valuable to the pro-spending cluster in a number of ways. Within the Administration it provided an excuse for a further review of the American defense position, and brought before the President and his top advisors in a dramatic fashion the arguments for spending substantially larger sums of money. It contributed to an awareness, on the part of the President and his top advisors, of the vulnerability problem and of the crucial importance of the dispersal of SAC and the development of mobile, hardened missile systems. The Report was instrumental in convincing the Air Force of the need to develop invulnerable second-strike forces. In the longer run it was probably partly responsible for the acceptance by both the Eisenhower Administration and the Air Force of programs for SAC dispersal and missile hardening. It also undoubtedly contributed to the growing acceptance by the Administration of the need to have forces for limited war (although it did not alter the failure to implement this decision in the military budget). It contributed to the pressure which raised military spending slightly.

By leaking the Report, those in the Administration arguing for higher spending aided those with similar views in the legislature and the attentive public. For these groups the Report provided substantiation from a source with access to all government intelligence of the arguments frequently offered by critics outside the government.[85] The Report made it clear that Executive optimism was based not on additional information but on a different reading of the facts available to the public. The data and reasoning of the Gaither Report could be used to bolster the case for increased spending, the need to overcome the missile gap and to develop a limited-war force. In addition, the struggle over publishing the Report was dramatic and helped to publicize the somewhat technical arguments over military strategy and the demands for greater expenditure on defense. Their service on the Gaither Committee substantially increased the prestige and influence of its members. Some continued in advisory capacities in the Eisenhower Administration, and all are looked to as experts on national security problems.

The Report had a significant influence on the analysis of strategic problems by national security experts. The recent emphasis in the military policy literature on the problems of vulnerability and second-

[85] For example, in the Rockefeller Brothers study on defense problems, whose recommendations closely parallel those of the Gaither Report; see Special Studies Report II, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *International Security: The Military Aspect*, Garden City, N.Y., 1958 (reprinted in *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*, Garden City, N.Y., 1961, pp. 93-155).

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strike forces stems partly from the impact of the Gaither Report and the members of the Committee and its advisory panel.

While the Gaither Report served temporarily as a rallying point for those favoring increased spending, the anti-spending cluster was quick to recognize the danger which the Report posed. The President, battling the pressures for greater military expenditures, refused to make the Report public and stressed that it was just one of a number of reports made to him. Senate Republicans opposed to large spending urged that the Report be kept secret, noting with alarm the influence it had already had in increasing the pressures on the Administration. Had the Report been made public, it would have represented a significant victory for the pro-spending cluster and would have probably indicated that that group was gaining the upper hand in the Administration.

The complexities of military planning and strategy are such that public debate (and even the Congressional appropriations process) plays a limited role in making critical decisions. The failure of Congress to have the Gaither Report published indicated the ability of the Executive to limit Congress' role by cutting off vital information. Insofar as Congressional and public debate play a role in the process of national strategy, the Gaither incident was of some value. The public debate had an important educational function in bringing to the attention of the Administration an analysis of the situation different from that provided by operating agencies. By calling attention to problems of vulnerability and limited war, the Gaither Report increased public understanding of these crucial questions.

In part, Congressional activity on defense matters can be viewed as a massive lobbying effort to influence the political decision-making process of the Executive branch.[86] The analysis of the Gaither Committee added to the ability of Congress to influence the process and to press for increased and more rational spending. If the public dispute over the Gaither Report contributed to the political climate which has influenced President Kennedy, it may well have made a vital contribution to the nation's security.

Although when the contents of their reports are leaked or released, the work of civilian *ad hoc* NSC committees is of value to Congressmen and private citizens, such groups are primarily instruments of the President and need to be evaluated in terms of their possible contribution to the Executive decision-making process. Within the Executive

[86] Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs,* XXXVII (January 1960), pp. 285-99.

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the Gaither Report provided a fresh look at the nation's defense posture. It served as an effective communication procedure to bring before the attention of the President and his principal advisors concerns which were being felt at the middle and upper levels of the operating agencies but which had not filtered through to the White House.

The Committee Report provided clear, well-reasoned statements of the problems of vulnerability and limited war, of the role of dispersal and hardening, and of the problems and opportunities of civil defense. It undoubtedly made a major contribution to the understanding of these problems by top officials. The panel was able to point out serious deficiencies where it found them because it was not responsible for past policy action, and the President could receive such advice because he anticipated being able to keep it private. The Committee also advanced a number of new policy proposals, particularly in the field of defense reorganization, which were not likely to come from the armed services themselves.[87]

Having made its proposals, the Gaither Committee found that it lacked the power base to fight for their implementation. But clearly the value and activity of such a group are not measurable in terms of its political influence on the decision process. The Committee furnished the President with a program, which, while perhaps not very precise or well thought-out in detail, could have served as a guide for action. The Committee thus fulfilled its primary purpose of providing an additional source of information for the President, unencumbered by future and past policy responsibility. The operating agencies can only view such committees as threats to their prerogative. But to a strong, vigorous President they could prove to be a powerful tool for overcoming bureaucratic and political opposition to the implementation of new, vitally needed programs.

[87] Some of its proposals were adopted in the 1958 reorganization of the Defense Department.

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CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT IN INDIAN POLITICS*

By SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH

I

SEVERAL hours before his assassination in 1948, Mahatma Gandhi submitted his proposal for revisions in the party constitution of the Indian National Congress. He suggested that the Congress dissolve, since partisanship appeared to him wrong, and convert itself into a Lok Sevak Sangh, an apolitical people's service association.[1] The Congress did not in the event obey the testament, but no one thought the proposal funny or outrageous. More recently, a General Secretary of the Congress reiterated the non-partisan point of view underlying this proposal when he questioned whether the role of an opposition party was meaningful in India, and when he supported the idea of "a common national programme acceptable to all political parties, on the basis of which the administration of the country could be carried on." "The Panchayat system in India," the Secretary said, "was essentially based on this very principle of synthesis rather than antithesis. Economically underdeveloped countries like ours can hardly afford the luxury of opposition only for the sake of opposition."[2]

These statements express a hope which is appealing to many Indians, the hope that government might be conducted without politics—that is to say, without partisan conflict. This hope has a certain universal appeal: a year or so ago, when Congress convened, Mr. Eisenhower offered a prayer that the session might be conducted without politics and in the interests of the people. Mr. Eisenhower, however, expressed this sentiment within a political culture that, despite recurring attacks on them, accepts politics and partisanship and believes them to be good. Gandhi, on the other hand, expressed his views within a political culture which not only doubts that political partisanship is a good thing, but also affirms culturally, philosophically, and practically that consensus, whether found or made, is the most desirable context for the conduct of politics.

* This article is based on remarks delivered at the American Political Science Association meetings in New York, September 1960. I am indebted to the George A. and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation for the opportunity to work on this question.

[1] N. V. Rajkumar, *Development of the Congress Constitution*, New Delhi, All India Congress Committee, 1949, Appendix III.

[2] Shriman Narayan, *A Plea for Ideological Clarity*, New Delhi, Indian National Congress, n.d. (probably 1957), pp. 23 and 25.

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Resistance to the notion of conflict arises partly from the romance and reality which surround the image of the village in the Indian mind. When the council of five, the panchayat, speaks as one, it is said to be the voice of God; it gives expression to the consensus of the traditional moral order. The apotheosized village republic, representative, deliberative, and harmonious, rests on the moral basis of *dharma* and *karma*, of sanctified custom, in which rank and distance, privilege and obligation, rights and duties, are acquired at birth and legitimized by religion.

Anthropologists have in recent years added immensely to our understanding of how village decision-making operates in India today and has operated in the recent past. Studies concentrating on both governmental and legal processes, hard to separate in traditional societies where "legislation" consists more in finding law than in making it, document the resistance to the emergence of an adversary process in both realms.[3] The consensus context, unlike the adversary, assumes that some traditionally recruited body, like the general panchayat dealing with village affairs, or the caste panchayat dealing with the affairs of a single caste, will reach a decision after all who should be have been heard and discussion has revealed what most, if not all, agree is the proper disposition of the problem. "Discussion," according to one village study, "continued until a satisfactory consensus could be arrived at or, in the event of a standoff between two powerful elements, until it was obvious that no agreement was possible."[4] "In its [the meeting's] ideal form there remains no opposition for all have been convinced of the wisdom and necessity of the particular decision."[5] Support is determined not by a show of hands, but by weighing the participants' sense of the moral fitness of things. Village consensus grows out of the belief that there is one right answer to a problem, that testimony and deliberation are important in finding it, and that the

[3] I am indebted to Herbert J. Spiro for his discussion of the adversary process in politics. See his *Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy*, New York, 1959. The consensus process in law is also well discussed in Bernard S. Cohn, "Some Notes on Law and Change in North India," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*," VIII, No. 1 (October 1959), pp. 79-93.

Henry Orenstein, Alan Beals, William McCormack, R. Bachenheimer, and Edward B. and Louise G. Harper all bear witness to an increase in factionalism traceable to processes of modernization in Indian villages. See their articles in Richard Park and Irene Tinker, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Princeton, N.J., 1959. While there is every reason to believe that factionalism is nothing new in Indian villages, there are indications that new factions are emerging and that they are not manageable by the old methods.

[4] Ralph Retzlaff, "A Case Study of Panchayats in a North Indian Village," Center for South Asia Studies, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., p. 8 (mimeographed).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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applied moral sense of the group's members partakes of their common traditional culture.

Partisanship, the adversary process in politics, government, and law, on the other hand, assumes that a problem may have a number of answers and that the best one will emerge from the conflict of alternatives. The better each side mobilizes its arguments and resources, the better will be the solution approximated. The psychological quality of adversary relationships is contentious; in election, legislature, and court, one side wins and the other side loses. The relationship between opponents, at a certain level, is meant to be critical and combative, not conciliatory and accommodating; the arm's-length relationship is an aspect of the adversary mode. Compromise, while it is often resorted to, is not the primary objective. In determining support, the edges of disagreement are not blurred by the impalpable weighing of the participants' sense of moral fitness. There is a final accounting, a choosing between alternatives, and disagreement is exposed and emphasized by quantification.

To many Indians, finding a consensus appears to sustain and foster community solidarity and mutual accommodation, while adversary proceedings appear to sacrifice community harmony because they establish only partial statements of community purpose and interest. This is too extreme a juxtaposition, because adversary proceedings usually rest upon substantial if latent community agreement on values and procedure, while finding a consensus often involves latent partiality and coercion. But the matter of appearance is important, for it reflects the moral standard by which the processes are judged; many Indians see the traditional way as moral and the modern as evil.

The only intimate and intensive study of political processes in an Indian village so far available to me—political processes have been studied only by the way by other anthropologists—is an excellent account by Ralph Retzlaff, a political scientist formerly with Morris Opler's Cornell team.[6] His account of two panchayat elections in "Kalhapur," a village in Uttar Pradesh, traces the desperate attempts made to shore up community consensus against the challenge of partisan politics while the moral and material conditions which supported it were fast disintegrating. The elections were, so to speak, "forced" on the village by post-independence local government legislation meant to "revivify" village self-government. Under British aegis, the panchayats (village councils) and the *lambardars* and *mukhiyas* (village officers) had been selected by the collector—the administrative

[6] *Ibid.*

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officer appointed by the province to take charge of a district; the post-independence act made them elective. Faced with the necessity of holding an election and of doing so in a setting substantially changed by modern ideas and technology, the villagers made desperate attempts to avoid the partisan conflicts which the elections inspired and to preserve the form, if not the substance, of the traditional consensus.

The first of the two elections for village *pradhan* (president) which Retzlaff describes revealed that the authority of the upper castes in the village was already heavily undermined. The opportunity to use democratic authority, the authority of numbers, to overturn the traditional authority of the dominant Rajput caste was instantly seized upon by the lower castes. They found a Brahman candidate willing to stand in their interest; the Rajputs, hoping to avoid too clear and sharp a contrast, recruited another Brahman who would stand in their interest. Two candidates, both Brahmans, one backed by the most numerous single caste, the high-status landowning Rajputs, and the other by the numerous lower castes, entered the field.

But when, well before the election, it became clear that the Rajput-backed candidate would win, a contest was avoided; not a single voice or hand was raised against him at the election.[7] When Retzlaff interviewed the villagers subsequently, they praised the occasion as having been in accordance with the good old way in its unanimity. Yet the "peasant party" opposition, which believed that it had been badly dealt with during the pre-election maneuvering, was sufficiently angry to refuse its regular services to the Brahmans who were thought to have been responsible for the defeat. Here was a village in fact deeply divided along caste lines, yet able to preserve for a time the form of traditional consensual harmony.

In the second election six years later, form followed substance—that is, the consensus disintegrated, but not before demonstrating the extraordinary hold it had upon the village mind. Retzlaff documents an extended series of conferences and meetings, including one heavily attended gathering of the entire village, at which attempts were made by men of influence to persuade the contenders to withdraw in favor

[7] Panchayat elections in the state of Uttar Pradesh, as elsewhere, are by a show of hands. This procedure undoubtedly increases the chances of coercion by the upper castes, who can mobilize both economic and physical sanctions. The patterns here described are in many ways similar to those in eighteenth-century English rural constituencies, which also showed a preference for uncontested elections and achieved this effect the more readily owing to *viva voce* voting, which served to increase the influence of the nobility and squirearchy. These processes are described in Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Party in Search of Legitimacy: The Politics of Status and the Politics of Opinion in Eighteenth-Century England and America" (forthcoming).

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of a candidate agreeable to all of them. The issue, says Retzlaff, was "not so much the merits of the individual candidates, as it was the holding of an election."[8] At the last and most desperate of these meetings, a speaker who suggested abandoning the search for consensus and submitting to the contested election was shouted down.[9] The attempt to find a candidate upon which all could agree eventually failed. Despite the protracted efforts to stave off conflict, elections were held and the result was a splintering of the vote which contrasted sharply with the unanimous result of six years earlier. A Rajput won, but an untouchable Chamar followed him closely.[10] The elections represented a crisis of the traditional moral order; its consensual harmony and the legitimacy which it lent to Rajput hegemony were no more.

What is the significance of the breakdown of consensus? Are the villagers of Kalhapur, as well as other Indians, justified in fearing the breakdown as they do? Consensus rested upon *dharma*, *karma*, and caste, the traditional moral and social order, sanctified by time and religion, immutable, eternal. Change was gradual, evolving out of the application of traditional ways to changing circumstances; villagers viewed change microscopically, not macroscopically. It did not occur to them that their environment could or should be reconstructed on the basis of new values or technology. But this world view and the consensus based on it, remembered by Indians suspicious of the adversary process as a web of idyllic harmonious relationships, are both waning.[11]

Modern technology, economies, and ideas have undermined them. In a contemporary perspective, consensus is the product of a parochial world, a world of narrow horizons, where man and nature are one in being tied to fate. Anthropologists, writing about the contemporary village, have found that upper landholding castes dominate the general panchayat and often abuse its authority in their own interest. An Indian administrator concerned with community development describes the old leadership as "tainted." Consensus was possible where limited horizons sustained a fairly homogeneous and unilateral moral order which legitimized the authority of dominant castes in most areas of life.[12] It is with the expansion of horizons, with the arrival of novelty

[8] Retzlaff, *op.cit.*, p. 89. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

[11] For a discussion of traditional legitimization, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "Indian Political Studies and the Scope of Comparative Politics," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVIII, No. 9 (September 1959), pp. 134-42.

[12] The dominance of higher landowning castes and their special role in determining the nature of the "consensus" is well documented. See, e.g., M. N. Srinivas' discussion of the numerically and economically superior Okkaligas in "The Social System of a Mysore Village," and E. Kathleen Gough's discussion of the Tanjore Brahmans in "The

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and variety, economic opportunity and political democracy, that men look beyond fate toward the possibilities of an environment never before conceived of; they come to realize that the moral and social order is neither sacred nor immutable. Viewed in this perspective, conflict arises from alternatives, choice, and new aspirations, consensus from the exploitation of a traditional order whose practical and moral basis has been undermined.

II

Indian diffidence about conflict in politics is also related to a philosophic suspicion of power.[13] Characteristic of Indian epic literature and popular sentiment is the belief that power is dangerous primarily because it corrupts character. This corruption, in turn, is feared not so much, as it was by Acton in his much-quoted axiom, for its public as for its private consequences. He who exercises power may be overwhelmed by desire, and become a slave to passions. His commitment to pride, honor, glory, reputation, and material things may endanger his achievement of perfect detachment. King Yudhishthira, of the warrior-ruler Kshatrya order, cries out in the epic *Mahabharata*: "Fie on the usages of Kshatryas, fie on might and valour, and fie on wrath, since through these such a calamity hath overtaken us! Blessed are forgiveness, and self-restraint, and purity, with renunciation and humility, and abstention from injury, and truthfulness of speech on all occasions, which are all practiced by forest recluses! Full of pride and arrogance, ourselves, however, through covetousness and folly and from desire of enjoying the sweets of sovereignty, have fallen into this plight!"[14]

The corrupting consequences which power has for individual moral character is an abiding concern of the Indian philosophic tradition. It is most clearly expressed today in the thought of Gandhi. But it is not the only view of power expressed in Indian culture. The philosophic and epic literature also stresses the moral duty of the Kshatrya to wield power: the political portions of the *Mahabharata*, for example, present

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Social Structure of a Tanjore Village," both in McKim Marriott, ed., "Village India: Studies in the Little Community" (Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations, No. 6), *American Anthropology*, LVII, No. 3, Part 2, Memoir No. 83, June 1955. These two studies make a useful contrast in that Srinivas' indicates that economic power and numerical strength are as important as ritual superiority in determining dominant caste status with respect to village affairs.

[13] See Myron Weiner's discussion of this issue in "Struggle Against Power: Notes on Indian Political Behavior," *World Politics*, VIII, No. 3 (April 1956), pp. 392-403.

[14] *The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa*, translated into English prose and published by Pratapa Chandra Ray, Calcutta, 1890, Vol. IX, "Canti Parva," 1, pp. 12 and 13.

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a dialectic between those who affirm the morality and necessity of exercising power and those who see its inevitable consequences for individual moral character, and in the classic political handbook, the *Arthasastra*, reason of state is upheld as the highest value. The Indian's obvious and committed pursuit of power both in classical times and today, and the British parliamentary view of power which has been assimilated to a large extent, support these conceptions.

But at the level of moral reflection, the dominant attitude toward power in Indian political culture, as it has been shaped by classic literature and modern ideas and practice, is fear of its corrupting and degrading influence. Only those who do not desire it, to whom it has come unsought, may use it without danger. The Kshatrya ruler exercises power as a duty of his order; the village headman does so by family inheritance. Gandhi was the Mahatma (great soul) who sought to transform individual character, including that of India's British rulers, even while pursuing the political objective of independence. Vinoba Bhave, the leader of the Bhoodan (land gift) movement, and Jayaprakash Narayan, the former Socialist leader, emulate him, eschewing the pursuit of power in their efforts to change society by changing men. Nehru, too, is honored because he renounced wealth and ease for prison in selfless devotion to the cause of independence. Those who seek power are suspect; they are suspect in the pursuit of power and in its exercise because in both they embrace what Yudhishthira feared: pride, willfulness, desire, expediency. This conception affects the Indian view of conflict: what is one to say of men who fight for power in an open election, display their desire for office, and attempt to defeat their opponents? Here is neither obedience to inherited duty nor the selfless pursuit of morality and truth.

Indian political culture then does little to legitimize the type of leaders who flourish in the context of democratic authority and adversary politics, men who live "off" politics, who make it a profession because they love the work for its own sake, who thrive on performing the necessary tasks of brokerage and accommodation and balancing of forces. The politicians of adversary politics, their character and style, are suspect.

This seems to be as true of the village as of the nation and of the unconscious as of the conscious. Leadership whose character and style are detached from conflict generates authority and commands respect. The almost legendary Sucheet Singh, former *mukhiya* (headman) of Kalhapur village, who has been described by several members of the Cornell team which studied the village, became within a generation

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the nostalgic symbol of a golden age. He was allied with no particular faction, rose above differences in a quarrelsome village, and in his person represented its consensus.

In his psychoanalytic study of the twice-born castes in a Rajasthan village, Morris Carstairs found two basic and interdependent patterns—one of mistrust and hostility which destroyed mutual confidence and often erupted into violence, the other of self-restraint which depended characteristically on the intervention of a third person who brought the antagonists back to their senses. Carstairs observes that "when feelings of ill-will *did* find open expression . . . the utter collapse of self-control [was] all the more remarkable for its contrast with the formality of normal exchanges." The participants ". . . abandoned themselves to anger with a completeness which previously had been familiar to me only in the temper tantrums of young children. . . . I was able to understand for the first time the epidemic of massacre and counter-massacre which had swept over this 'non-violent' country only a few years ago."

In Carstair's account, it was the peacemaker "who intervened between the disputants, reminding them how wrong it was to give way to anger, urging self-control and compromise." He found the third-party role of mediator to be so regular a feature of conflict in India that it recurred in dreams. It was considered better to be the "third party" to a dispute than the victor: "In time, the verb *samjhana* (to impart instruction) became recognizable as an element in everyone's experience, providing a counterpoint to the prevailing distrust. The role of moral adviser, counselling moderation and control of one's passions, is one which compels an impulse to obey, and at the same time, a surrender, however temporary, of one's customary suspiciousness. In this conflict, the mediator is allied with something very deep-rooted in the personality, the super-ego itself. In the end, he is always obeyed. . . ."[15]

Several years ago, my husband and I asked some twenty-eight state legislators in Rajasthan to describe for us the qualities a political leader ought to possess. Their answers bear out the preference for the non-political leader, the leader above conflict: the traditional virtues—simple living, service, sacrifice, discipline, unselfishness, sense of duty, independence, impartiality—appeared most frequently in their answers. But the answers were more startling for their omissions: the political virtues which would be required of a man attempting to gain or maintain power in the context of democratic authority and adversary

[15] G. Morris Carstairs, *The Twiceborn: A Study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus,* London, 1957, pp. 46 and 47.

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politics were almost completely absent; only three of the twenty-eight mentioned a "mixing nature," "contact with the public," "ability to win organizational strength."

Gandhi, who came to embody the Indian hope for a leader in the self-effacing mold, has described a decisive moment in his life, the moment at which he learned that he could transcend the conflict inherent in his role as a lawyer. It was a moment in which Gandhi triumphed over the adversary processes imposed on him by the discipline of the English law to re-embrace a version of the consensus mode. In the middle of his first major case, he reports: "I became disgusted with the profession. As lawyers the counsel on both sides were bound to rake up points of law in support of their own clients. . . . I felt that my duty was to befriend both parties and bring them together." He did eventually persuade both sides to go to arbitration and, when his client won, further persuaded him to accept the amount he had been awarded in installments to make it possible for the loser to survive financially. Afterward he wrote: "My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties driven asunder."[16]

Gandhi's way and Gandhi's appeal rested upon the belief that resolutions of a dispute should and would arise from a consensus to which all sides were party and to which they were brought by a mediator and conciliator who had nothing to gain personally.

This philosophic outlook represents a polarized view of political possibilities, pitting the ideal of the detached, selfless leader operating with or creating a consensus against the engaged and self-seeking politician struggling for power to further his own desires. Morris-Jones, observing something similar in his study of the Indian parliament, speaks of a "paradoxical or ambivalent attitude to authority." "Authority in India," he observes, "appears to be subject at once to much more abusive criticism and much more effusive adulation than one is accustomed to elsewhere. Due respect combined with due criticism is the exception rather than the rule."[17]

There is a certain moral remorselessness about this dichotomizing

[16] Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Gandhi, an Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, Boston, 1957, pp. 133-34.

John T. Hitchcock's paper, "Leadership in a North Indian Village: Two Case Studies," in the Park and Tinker volume, indicates that a traditional and a modern leader in the same village both based their effectiveness to a large extent on impartiality (p. 411). The principal described by Hitchcock evidently lost his influence after Hitchcock's departure owing to a loss of this vital quality. See also Retzlaff, *op.cit.*

[17] W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India*, London and New York, p. 34.

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of political possibilities into harmonious consensus and destructive conflict. It is as though Indians had before them as political texts only Plato's *Republic* and Machiavelli's *Prince*, but no Aristotle's *Politics* to put the case for men as they are and for the best practical state, or Mill's *Liberty* to argue for the proximate and tentative truths which emerge from contending alternatives.

III

I have spoken so far of the cultural and philosophic experiences which dispose Indians to suspect conflict. There are also some more immediate historical and intellectual experiences which contribute to this disposition. The birth of modern political consciousness in India is intimately bound up with the development of the nationalist movement. The need for unity in the face of the imperial government led early leaders to suspect all opposition as a form of treason to the incipient nation. Post-independence leaders retain traces of this attitude. Since independence, threats to the new national consensus and constitutional democratic state have emerged. If the nationalist period ended in some respects in disappointment when partition divided what many had hoped would be one nation, the present attempt to preserve national unity is threatened by right and left radicalism. The communal parties, particularly the Jan Sangh, still question the concept of a secular state in the name of a Hindu authoritarianism, and the Communists' present attachment to constitutional processes hardly eliminates the threat of left totalitarianism. The Socialist leader Asok Mehta spoke for many Indians when he wrote, "We cannot contemplate the possibility of either of them becoming a governing party."[18] At the same time, the demands of linguistic-cultural and tribal groups searching for political identities have threatened and continue to threaten order and unity. Under these perilous circumstances, it is not easy to distinguish between opposition that threatens state and nation fundamentally and opposition that does not. The line is difficult enough to draw in countries where national identity and state authority, developed by time and circumstance, have a more clearly established legitimacy.

Finally, there has been much discussion in recent years, both inside and outside India, concerning the extent to which the conventional role of the opposition in constitutional democratic states ought to be modi-

[18] Report presented to the First Conference of the Praja Socialist Party by N. G. Goray, General Secretary, Allahabad, December 1953. This report is reprinted in "Emergence of India and Pakistan into the Modern World," in University of Chicago, *Introduction to the Civilization of India*, Chicago, Syllabus Division, University of Chicago Press, March 1957, p. 208.

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fied in an era of nation-building and economic development. The "unity for nation-building" point of view has a variety of exponents. It is often heard from the bureaucratic Platonists, administrators and economic planners, who believe that purposes, goals, and means can be objectively identified; for them, adversary politics, opposition and conflict, are the products of ignorance and selfishness.[19] And it is heard from ideologues who believe that purpose and policy can and ought to be deduced from an ideological framework which points to the historically inevitable and scientifically correct path. The rationality of the bureaucratic Platonists and ideologues is politically aprioristic; they resent and tend to reject the consequences of political liberty and democracy, the somewhat untidy proximate solutions which the interaction and accommodation of group and individual purpose and interest can produce.

Doubts concerning conflict in an era of politics and economic development are also expressed by individuals who are profoundly concerned with the maintenance of freedom, of a plural and open society in which the newly enfranchised mass electorate can express its varied aspirations, needs, and circumstances. "Development, in our underdeveloped country," writes Asok Mehta in his brilliant remarks on what he calls the political compulsions of a backward country, "depends on the acceptance of equality, austerity and hard work. The strain involved in such policies is considerable, and opposition basing [*sic*] on such policies has to strive hard to prevent sliding into attitudes and actions that run counter to basic needs. Economic development, for instance, demands higher taxation. An opposition party tends to oppose it, unless it is confined to the top few. Backward economy imposes strains of development and opposition party, to build itself up, decries and resists the strains. . . ."[20]

Under these circumstances, Mehta does not see the conventional role of the opposition in parliamentary democracies as very helpful, since "the axiom of opposition's job to oppose would make economic development difficult." In India, the difficulties of finding a place for opposition parties are compounded by the existence of the Communists and Communalists as parliamentary and political forces. The result can be a governmental timidity which engenders alternating responses of stagnation and disruption.

[19] This is not to suggest that the views of economists and administrators are not rational or objective. Obviously every available means should be used to keep public opinion and government informed of the objective consequences of policies proposed and pursued.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

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What should a responsible opposition do? Ideally, according to Mehta, "a broadbased government holding power on a long-term tenure—in effect not in law" would replace the "frequent changes in government that parliamentary democracy assumes." Such a government would have "the power to move forward, because opposition is driven to the fringes." Public liberties—speech, press, assembly, and association—should not only be cherished but strengthened so that criticism could be clear and effective, but "opposition, as distinct from criticism, would be confined to those irreconcilables who are opposed to the fundamentals of the State (nationalism, secularism, democracy)."[21] So far, it has proved impossible to bring such an arrangement to fruition. Short of it, Mehta advocates the delimitation of areas of agreement and disagreement so that "nation-building activities" and partisan politics are clearly demarcated. This is a difficult path for any opposition to discern, much less to follow.

IV

As sources of Indian opposition to the conflict inherent in adversary politics, the values of the traditional culture as they are expressed in village life and epic literature, aspects of the Indian character, the legacy of the nationalist struggle for independence, and the problems of fostering national consciousness, authority, and economic development all play a part. Are the resultant attitudes, as they affect political life in India today, wise or foolish, practical or quixotic?

The nostalgia for traditional village consensus is neither morally consistent nor practical if at the same time change in the material and moral order of the village is thought desirable. Modern transport, communications, and market conditions are fast destroying the cultural innocence of village life; what was self-evident to the fathers is becoming one alternative among many to the sons. Prescription minimizes conflict; freedom enhances it. The nostalgic commitment to traditional village consensus is not compatible with the utopias of planned economic development and social justice. Yet both are held simultaneously by many Indians.

Even if the nostalgia for traditional harmony is a hopeless one, Indians are justified in believing that there is a need for consensus capable of accommodating both conflict and common action. If conflict is to be handled in a controlled way, if individuals are to disagree without losing the capacity for working together, they must, under conditions of democratic authority and public liberty, build a consensus

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

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concerning who and what is legitimate in politics. On the evidence available, the destruction of the traditional moral order has not typically been followed by the establishment of a political community capable of such a new consensus. Instead, a pervasive factionalism incapable of creating common purpose or leadership seems more characteristic.[22] In villages where democratic rule has replaced traditional, it has often had to operate in the absence of consensus concerning legitimate authority. Dominant castes, ritually, socially, and economically superior in the traditional hierarchical order, have failed to accept as legitimate the political and legal equality of their late inferiors, while the inferiors, now constitutionally equal in some respects, have been encouraged to challenge these pretensions of their late superiors. Under these circumstances neither side is prepared to act responsibly toward the other in the political arena, since neither is prepared to accept as legitimate the claims to inequality or equality of the other. The problem of creating a new consensus concerning what is legitimate in politics in the village is compounded by the scarcity economy in which change occurs, where shifts in authority mean taking from one to give to another rather than allocating expanding wealth to those who have been without. If men are to rule and be ruled in turn on the basis of democratic authority, the material and moral grounds on which inequality rests must be accepted as fitting and proper by most men.

These conditions create an inhospitable environment for joint village creativeness and action in economic development. Two development processes—the political and the economic—to some extent clash. Political awareness and the contentiousness arising from it conflict with co-operation by all villagers in the improvement of their common and several economic conditions. This anomaly cannot be avoided by a romantic evocation of traditional consensus. Perhaps, as some have suggested, the village should not be asked to increase its powers of self-government or to assume development responsibilities until it has its own house in order—i.e., until it has learned to manage conflict. But I suspect that this too may turn out to be an evasion, because villagers will learn to manage their affairs on a new basis only if there are meaningful decisions to be made and resources to allocate, although the

[22] Factionalism is obviously an ancient feature of many Indian villages, based on caste and kin relationships. But it has been intensified and has found new expressions as a result of forces associated with technological and social change. Oscar Lewis relates the increase partly to the breakdown of *jajmani* (economic patron-client) relationships and of older kinship units. See his *Group Dynamics in a North Indian Village,* Delhi, Programme Evaluation Organization, Planning Commission, Government of India Press, 1954, especially pp. 11, 30, and 31. Some new factions are traced to Arya Samaj teachings in the early 1930's (*ibid.*, p. 25). This material is also available in Lewis' *Village Life in Northern India,* Urbana, Ill., 1958, ch. 11.

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amount of responsibility to be assumed can be debated. It is doubtful that men can become capable of freedom other than by experiencing it, or of politics other than by practicing it. An acceptance by Indian administrators and politicians of the likelihood of conflict in the process of establishing liberty, democracy, and social justice, recognition of the fact that conflict heralds creative as well as destructive trends in the society, may persuade them to think about real rather than romantic ways of managing it.

What of the simple moral dichotomy which persuades many Indians that only men untempted by power can be moral, while those who seek it, as men must in partisan politics, cannot help but be degraded and corrupted? What are its consequences for the standards of Indian political criticism and judgment?

The moral capacities of a few individuals may make it possible for them to realize exceptional moral heights, and for them an uncompromising idealism may be appropriate. But public morality, unlike private, must take into account the moral capacities of most men. If they are to perform normative functions, public standards should be higher than most are able to reach. But the standards must also bear a sufficient relationship to ordinary human capacities for someone less than a saint to presume to approximate them. These considerations apply to the Indian view of conflict in politics. Institutionalized political conflict makes for moral ambiguities which would not be necessary if most political rulers were philosopher kings or saints. But it offers a means, compatible with the fallible nature of most men, through which community purposes can be explored and approximated, and power can be criticized and overturned.

What of the opposition to conflict which rests on the claim that a government capable of nation-building takes precedence over all other considerations and that conflict, partisan politics, hinders rather than helps in such an effort? This is a position with considerable substance, but it should be judged in the context of history and available alternatives. These are not always persuasive.

Proposals of the type that Asok Mehta has made for a national government could achieve two goals: such an arrangement could add to the government's support and it could diminish criticism directed against the government. But Congress has a very comfortable majority in the national legislature and no one seriously questions the legitimacy of its mandate to rule. Whether it is wise to reduce *independent* sources of criticism when governmental responsibility, wisdom, and efficiency depend so heavily upon its existence is questionable. Mehta's proposal

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would leave independent political criticism in the hands of what he calls the fringe opposition, the irreconcilables. In many ways the role of governing and the role of criticizing are incompatible; in opposition, a party is free and independent, able to see the facts and press the arguments as its sense of responsibility and strategy dictate. It may be that a more rather than a less effective opposition is required, an opposition which can keep government responsible and effective and maintain freedom by providing democratic alternatives to the party in power. There is some question then whether a national government is either necessary or desirable.

The other alternative to that suggested by Asok Mehta would be some kind of authoritarian state, managed at best by a benign combination of bureaucrats and popular national leaders. Generally, when Indian critics of conflict contemplate such an alternative, they imagine an efficient but mild and responsive authoritarianism performing the tasks necessary for building the country. How does such a regime remain benign and responsive? To maintain its stability, an authoritarianism would either have to take very substantial account of various popular demands which make planning a complex task for constitutional democracy, or have to repress and control these demands by increased coercion. To the extent that an authoritarianism is responsive to significant popular pressures—and a number of authoritarianisms have achieved stability through accommodations similar to those of a democratic regime—it sacrifices the freedom of the "experts" to pursue nation-building unhampered which is one of its main justifications as against a constitutional regime. If the regime means to ensure its stability and effectiveness by coercion so that it can pursue its program for the most part without regard to popular demands, it is possible that Indians have learned too much in the last ten years for half-hearted coercive measures to do the job; such an authoritarianism would almost certainly have to resort to thorough and systematic repression.

Those who fear the conflict inherent in partisan politics because it jeopardizes national unity, order, and economic development should consider the alternatives to partisan politics: national representative government of the type Asok Mehta has suggested, a popular authoritarianism, or a rigid authoritarianism leaning toward totalitarianism. The first two would not, so long as the Congress or some other party can command a clear majority, represent an improvement over the present arrangement, and in some ways already touched upon they would be less desirable. Most critics of conflict in India are not willing to embrace the third alternative if it is clearly put to them.

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SECURITY OF SUPPLY AND ENERGY POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE

By HAROLD LUBELL

I. Introduction

THE point of view from which this article is written is that the world-wide trend toward increased use of oil involves Western Europe in greater risks of interruption of supplies than it does the other major world consumers (the United States and the USSR), who produce most of their own oil; and that the implications of permitting the trend to continue to develop at its present rate should be seriously reconsidered. The trend toward increased use of oil in Western Europe has been clear for some years, as it was for the United States a bit earlier and has become for the USSR more recently. What is somewhat alarming at the present time is that the process is speeding up in Western Europe and that resistance to it is weakening.

The reasons for the trend are obvious. In the world at large, coal has been an industry of rising real costs and prices, while oil has been one of stable or declining costs and prices,[1] thus causing a "natural" tendency to shift to the form of energy which has shown diminishing costs. This has been reinforced by the fact that the black oils, which compete directly with coal, are priced as a by-product of gasoline in the United States, and may well be underpriced in terms of the European refinery product breakdown.[2] The competitive pressure of the black oils on European coal has been further intensified by the closing of the United States oil market to foreign oil beyond the presently imposed 15 per cent quota. At the same time, oil has acquired a reputation for convenience of use, thereby improving its competitive position vis-à-vis the coal industry, which has been laggard in devising clean and mechanized methods for consumers to handle its output. In addition, the successful weathering of the Suez crisis by Western Europe in 1957 (due in part to a concurrence of fortunate accidents which painlessly reduced energy demand during the period of the closure of the Suez Canal), a

[1] In the United States, where oil production costs are highest, there was no increase in crude oil prices in real terms over the first half of the twentieth century. For the newer oil-producing areas of the world outside the United States, taken as a whole, unit production costs of oil have probably fallen.

[2] This problem has been discussed at length by the Economic Commission for Europe in *Relationship Between Coal and Black Oils in the Western European Fuel Market*, Geneva, August 1954; and *The Price of Oil in Western Europe*, Geneva, March 1955.

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demand crisis for European coal, a current excess of oil supply in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean, and the opening-up of North Africa as a source for oil and gas have all combined to give Europe the illusion that oil no longer presents it with a security problem. As a result, the incentive both to maintain indigenous coal production at maximum levels and to build up a nuclear power base in Western Europe has been significantly lessened.

If one were concerned only with economic considerations under normal conditions of international trade, there could be little objection to permitting the trend toward use of oil to develop. The special problem of Europe's oil supply is that the cheapest sources are in the Middle East and North Africa, so that most of it, except for Iranian production, is actually or potentially Arab oil, and hence subject to particularly unstable and hostile political control. At the time of the Suez crisis, the threat of Arab interference with the flow of oil from the Middle East was made an actuality by the closing of the Suez Canal and the blowing-up of the pumping stations on the pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). At the present time the threat to Europe's oil supply that the occurrence of a similar situation would pose is greatly reduced both by the availability of a large tanker surplus beyond requirements for normal world oil movements (which could carry Persian Gulf oil around Africa to Europe) and by the discovery and production of oil in North Africa (hence "west of Suez"). Serious disruption of Europe's oil supply could nevertheless be brought about, at the present time or in the coming years, by the simultaneous cessation of shipments by all or most of the oil producers of the Middle East.

Europe's relaxed attitude toward the security of its oil supply at present stems from three considerations: the unlikelihood of concerted political action by the various Middle East producers; the presumption that the oil producers would be unwilling to lose oil revenues by shutting down production for political reasons (particularly if such an action were likely to be rendered ineffective by an increase in a neighbor's output by an equivalent amount); and the experience of past emergencies in which Venezuela and the United States could be called upon to fill any gap in supply with Western Hemisphere oil. However, each of these entails greater risks than appear at first sight. In the first place, a successful pan-Arab movement (led by Nasser or by somebody else) would pose a threat not only to such unstable places as Saudi Arabia and Iraq but to such apparently safe areas as Kuwait as well. Even in the new oil areas of North Africa, European control of the oil is not likely to outlast the end of the British occupation of Libya and

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French military control of Algeria; and once the occupation forces are gone, the threat from Nasser (particularly to Libya) will become intense.

Secondly, the attribution to any of the oil producers (and especially to the Arab world) of economic rationality at a time of political disturbance is an unjustified one, sufficient examples of economic irrationality being the Mossadeq experience in Iran and the restriction on sales of oil by Saudi Arabia to France and the United Kingdom during the Suez crisis (which subsequently cost the Saudis expansion of their markets). The oil producers are perfectly capable of shutting off the flow of oil even if it hurts themselves more than their customers.

Thirdly, it is becoming clear that the present Venezuelan regime (or any likely successor) would be much more reluctant than previous governments to permit use of Venezuela as an emergency balance wheel for the world's oil consumers, possibly to the point of refusing to play along with the West's desire to expand production during a crisis only to contract it thereafter. Furthermore, even the United States turned out to be a politically unreliable source for Europe at one critical historical moment, in November 1956, when the United States government refused to put oil supply plans into operation after the British and the French attack on Suez until the latter countries agreed to withdraw from the Canal.

These risks are relevant as long as Europe is a heavy importer of oil. The effective gap between domestic energy supply and domestic energy demand can be reduced by maintaining coal production and capacity at maximum levels, by pushing ahead with nuclear power development, and by stockpiling coal and oil. But the remaining gap which would exist in a crisis could be dealt with only by depending on alternative overseas sources of supply and maintaining the present surplus of tankers. Reliance on external sources, including the United States, entails some political uncertainty for Europe. The opportunity to reduce the gap, by maintaining the marginal capacity to produce an additional 100 million T of coal guaranteed by keeping domestic production at an appropriately high level, is one that Europe should not throw away.

II. The Switch from Coal to Oil

The switch from coal to oil has involved a rapid increase in the share of imported oil in the pattern of energy consumption of Western Europe. Initially, the increases in oil imports were the result of the inability of the coal mines of Western Europe to keep up with in-

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creases in the volumes demanded without rapid increases in real costs. In these circumstances, the availability of oil from overseas was considered a boon, although dependence on politically uncertain sources of supply could be deplored, and the principle of freedom of choice for consumers in filling their energy needs was enunciated a number of times, notably by the Ridley Committee in the United Kingdom.[3]

It was this over-all shortage which also led to the intensive programs for the development of nuclear power in the United Kingdom and the setting-up of Euratom on the Continent. In the United Kingdom the official intent has been expressed most clearly for electricity production in the following terms: "It was also apparent that nuclear power offered the best long-term means of meeting the expected fuel shortage. In the meantime, pending the development and construction of nuclear stations, [it was] agreed that the short-term fuel gap should be filled by burning imported oil. . . ."[4]

Since then, the Western European coal industry has found itself with excess capacity, relative to the effective demand for energy not absorbed by imported oil or by long-term commitments to import United States coal, which has been intensified by its limited ability to reduce prices for lack of the financial cushion which might have been built up during the years of excess demand when prices were fixed below what the market could bear. The result has been a cutback in planned output levels for coal by all the major producers of Western Europe, as well as a postponement of deadlines for achieving previously stated nuclear energy goals. Thus the hysteria over energy shortages which accompanied (and to some extent led to) the Suez crisis has been replaced by a euphoria with regard to Europe's energy position that stems in part from the coal glut which appeared during the two recession years following the Suez crisis.

The decision to go along with the switch has been taken by the governments of the three big coal-producing countries (West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), with Belgium being dragged unwillingly behind, and is reflected in the attitudes of the groups working on energy problems in the European regional international agencies, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the OEEC Energy Commission. The ECSC, for example, seems convinced that coal is fighting a losing battle, and is mainly concerned with organizing an orderly retreat for Western Europe's coal industry. A recent

[3] *Report of the Committee on National Policy for the Use of Fuel and Power Resources*, Cmd. 8647, London, 1952.

[4] Central Electricity Generating Board, *First Report and Accounts*, London, 1959, p. 5.

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change in attitude in this direction on the part of the OEEC Energy Commission is indicated by comparison of its two reports, the Hartley Commission Report of 1956[5] and the Robinson Commission Report of 1960.[6]

III. The Extent of the Switch

RECENT CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION

The magnitudes involved in the switch from coal to oil are made clear by a look at three aspects of the pattern of energy consumption in Western Europe over the past few years: the sources of primary energy consumed, the consumers of energy, and the share of secondary energy forms in total energy consumption.

With respect to the sources of primary energy consumed, there has been a continuous decline from pre-World War II in the share of coal in total energy consumption in Western Europe, from 81 per cent in 1938 to 58 per cent in 1958.[7] In absolute quantities, coal consumption was below its 1938 level from the end of the war until 1951, largely because of manpower shortages and of the damage caused during the war by direct military destruction and by lack of maintenance and new investment, and below its 1929 level until 1955. The percentage share of coal declined steadily through 1956, despite increases in absolute levels of coal production, since consumption of hydro-electric power and of petroleum products rose significantly faster; since 1957, the decline in the percentage share has been magnified by an absolute decline in coal consumption to a level only a trifle higher than that of 1938. Consumption of hydro-power and of petroleum products increased throughout the period, with oil consumption reaching two and a half times its 1950 level by 1958 and hydro-electricity production (and consumption) rising by 75 per cent over the period.

That almost all the consumers of coal have participated in the switch to oil showed up particularly clearly during the recession years 1957 and 1958, when considerably more than the entire decline in total energy demand was concentrated in coal. The breakdown of final consumption of energy[8] presented in the detailed statistics published by the OEEC

[5] OEEC, *Europe's Growing Needs of Energy: How Can They Be Met?* Paris, 1956.
[6] OEEC, *Towards a New Energy Pattern in Europe*, Paris, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as *Robinson Report*).
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 18.
[8] The energy products entering final consumption include both primary energy forms directly consumed without further significant transformation (e.g., coal in home or industrial furnaces; natural gas piped into a city distribution system; hydro-electricity in any use, with electricity consumed in an electricity plant itself defined in the OEEC energy-balance statistics as final consumption by the energy sector rather than as trans-

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Secretariat[9] for 1955 and 1958 points up the contrast between the decline in final consumption of solid fuels—coal, products directly identifiable with coal (patent fuels and coke), and lignite—as compared with the increase in total energy consumption and in each of the other components of the total. The share in total final consumption provided by hard coal, patent fuels, and coke fell between 1955 and 1958 for each of the broad sectors of final consumption (the energy sector itself, including losses; transportation; iron and steel; other industries; and other sectors), showing a decline from 48 per cent in 1955 to 40 per cent in 1958 for all consumers combined.[10] The sector showing the smallest decline in coal's share in total consumption was iron and steel, where coke is required for carbonization purposes; but, even in iron and steel, coal has been losing out to other energy forms where the requirement has been for heat rather than for particular chemical properties.

One of the important developments in the pattern of energy consumption has been the growing use of secondary forms of energy in final consumption. However, the share of total energy consumption provided by secondary energy forms other than petroleum products has risen only slightly from 1950 (38 per cent) to 1955 and 1958 (40 per cent). The increased use of secondary energy forms is not by itself a factor inhibiting the aggregate consumption of coal, to the extent that coal itself is the primary energy source transformed into such secondary forms as manufactured gas or thermal electricity. What is happening, however, is that the share of coal in the total of energy products consumed for transformation into these secondary energy forms is also declining, with the share of petroleum products in total fuel consumed rising in both thermo-electric plants and in gas works in the OEEC area. In the field of manufactured gas in general, the primacy of coal is being further eroded (although still only to a small extent) by the availability of waste gases from oil refineries, which are now being captured and utilized. The real competition in this area comes, however, from natural gas, which offers the only example of a primary displacing a secondary energy form in Western Europe at the present time.

The security problem for energy consumption arises from the fact

formed energy), and secondary energy forms (coke; patent fuels; manufactured gas, including by-product gas from coking plants, blast furnace gas, and oil refinery tail gases; lignite briquettes; electricity produced in thermal plants). It is impossible to trace the course of primary energy sources through to final consumers without imputing consumption of secondary energy forms by specific users back to the primary energy sources of these secondary energy forms.

[9] OEEC, *Basic Statistics of Energy, 1950-1958*, Paris, 1959, pp. 34, 37.

[10] *Ibid.*, with data in original units converted to metric tons hard coal equivalent (T HCE), using factors derived from OEEC, *Robinson Report*, p. 16.

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that most of the oil entering the Western European energy balance originates overseas, so that the increase in the share of oil in total energy consumption has meant a continuous increase in the import component of total energy consumption, from 6 per cent before World War II to 23 per cent in 1955 and 29 per cent in 1958.[11] One of the concerns of the following discussion centers on the fact that the estimates now current in Western Europe project an increase in the import component to the neighborhood of 40 per cent of total energy consumption by 1975.

REVISED ENERGY PROJECTIONS FOR WESTERN EUROPE

The importance of the switch to oil consumption lies in its expected extent in the years to come rather than in the experience of the past several years. The expected extent of the switch is most clearly reflected in the differences in the projections to 1965 and 1975 for the OEEC area made by the Hartley Commission in 1956 and by the Robinson Commission in 1960. The Hartley Commission carried out its study in an atmosphere characterized by coal shortages in Europe, the threat of difficulties in supplying oil caused by the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the complete nonexistence of nuclear power facilities on the Continent. The Robinson Commission completed its review of Western Europe's energy situation in the context of an apparent surplus of energy, growing stocks of coal in Europe, and a world oil market "weakened" by enormous immediate overcapacity in the Middle East and Venezuela and the prospect of sizable new production in North Africa, both from the French Sahara and (by the time the report was published) from Libya.

The two Energy Advisory Commissions came up with projections of total demand of the same order of magnitude for 1956, while the Robinson Commission's projection for 1975 was slightly higher than the Hartley Commission's. However, their projections differed markedly for the product pattern of primary energy sources supplying total demand. The Hartley Commission arrived at its breakdown by estimating the gap between total demand for energy and the maximum level, consistent with some reasonable assumptions as to cost, of indigenous production of all forms of energy. The Robinson Commission, on the other hand, abandoned the concept of an energy gap and tried to put into its projection some estimate of the competitive position of indigenous energy production, particularly of coal but also of nuclear energy, in the demand schedules of consumers with free choice. The Robinson Commission therefore set up its supply table in ranges, with

[11] OEEC, *Robinson Report*, p. 19.

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a grand total of potential energy supplies comfortably in excess of demand.[12] Table 1 presents a simplified version of the two sets of estimates for 1965 and 1975, with a set of balancing supply-and-demand figures selected from the Robinson Commission's ranges and the Hartley Commission figures adjusted for comparability with those of the

TABLE 1. ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY PROJECTIONS FOR WESTERN EUROPE, 1955, 1958, 1965, 1975
(in millions of T HCE)

	ACTUAL		PROJECTED					
			Hartley Commission		*Robinson Commission*		*Change in estimates*	
	1955	*1958*	*1965*	*1975*	*1965*	*1975*	*1965*	*1975*
Total demand	777	811	1060	1360	1050	1425	—10	75
Indigenous production	603	621	720	860	675	790	—45	—70
Coal	477	472	520	520	445[a]	430[a]	—75	—90
Other	126	149	200	340	230	360	30	20
Lignite	(30)	(32)	(35)	(35)	(45)	(60)	(10)	(25)
Crude oil	(13)	(18)	(30)	(50)	(30)	(50)	(—)	(—)
Natural gas	(7)	(10)	(15)	(25)	(25)	(60)[b]	(10)	(35)
Hydro-power	(56)	(69)	(90)	(130)	(95)	(140)	(5)	(10)
Nuclear energy	(—)	(—)	(10)	(80)	(15)[a]	(30)[a]	(5)	(—50)
Other forms	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(—)	(—)
Import requirements[c]	174	190	340	500	375	635	35	145
Coal	28	7	40	50	60[b]	60[b]	20	20
Oil	146	183	300	450	310[b]	500[b]	10	50
Natural gas	—	—	—	—	5	75	5	75

SOURCE: OEEC, *Robinson Report*, pp. 19, 59, 114.

NOTES: a. Minimum estimate in *Robinson Report*.
b. Maximum estimate in *Robinson Report*.
c. Net imports, less increase in stocks.
( ) Figures in parentheses add up to unbracketed figure above.

Robinson Commission. The figures selected include the *minimum* estimates for domestic production of coal and nuclear power.

Comparison of the two sets of figures shows a small upward revision in the production expected for lignite and natural gas in Western Europe, but a downward revision of almost 20 per cent in expected coal production—a reduction of 90 million T—in the "minimum" estimate of the Robinson Commission. Where the Hartley Commission projected an increase from the 1955 level to 520 million T in 1965 and stabilization at that level to 1975, the Robinson Commission projects a decrease to

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 59, 114.

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440 million T in 1965 and a further decrease to 430 million T in 1975. The estimates for nuclear power production for 1975 have also been scaled down, by about the amount of the combined increase in indigenous production of lignite and natural gas, indicating a stretching-out of nuclear power development programs.

The implication intended by the Robinson Commission's table is that the ranges for the various commodities are interrelated, so that, for example, the level of coal production depends on the availability of natural gas as well as the competitive position of oil. In this context, the maximum oil import requirements in the Robinson Commission projections come to 310 million T HCE for 1965 and 500 million T HCE for 1975, an increase over the Hartley Commission estimates of 10 million T HCE for 1965 and 50 million T HCE for 1975. Imports of natural gas are projected at a maximum of 75 million T HCE for 1975. However, the minimum and maximum estimates for various items in the Robinson Commission's projections can be combined to produce considerably larger oil-import requirements than those that they present. For example, if indigenous production in 1975 were at the levels specified in Table 1 (with coal production and nuclear power production at the bottom of the Robinson Commission's ranges and indigenous production of natural gas at the top), but imports of natural gas were at the minimum of 10 instead of 75 million T HCE, the oil-import requirement figure would come to 565 instead of 500 million T HCE, or an increase of 115 (instead of 50) million T HCE over the earlier projections made by the Hartley Commission. Alternatively, a further reduction in coal production, which the OEEC report hints is in the offing for the ECSC countries,[13] could also result in an increase of oil imports: a decrease in coal production to 400 million T by 1975 would add an additional 30 million T HCE to oil imports.

INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

The switch from coal has also been reflected in the composition of the investment programs of the countries of Western Europe, although this is difficult to demonstrate because of the unavailability of detailed estimates of capital formation by sector of installation.[14] In France, for which figures are readily available, this is particularly true, since the

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[14] An incomplete set of estimates for 1954 may be derived from ECE, *Economic Survey for Europe in 1955*, Geneva, 1956, pp. 57-63; ECSC, *Les investissements dans les industries du charbon et de l'acier de la Communauté*, Luxembourg, September 1957, p. 15; Central Statistical Office, *National Income and Expenditure, 1959*, London, 1959, p. 54.

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effort by the French to supplement their relatively meager indigenous coal resources by discovering and exploiting petroleum and natural gas in the Metropole and in Africa has been one of the forces leading to the recent acceleration of the switch. Investment expenditure on coal was at the same level (in depreciated current francs) in 1959 as it was in 1950, while total investment expenditure for energy in 1959 had reached more than two and a half times its 1950 level. Coal thus fell as a proportion of total energy investment expenditures in Metropolitan France from 28 per cent in 1950 to 10 per cent in 1959. Investment expenditure in 1959 for oil exploration and for processing of oil in France considerably exceeded the level for coal, as did investment expenditure for gas, which rose as a proportion of total energy investment expenditure from 3 per cent in 1950 to 15 per cent in 1959. In addition, investment expenditure for the production and transport of Sahara oil in 1959 was over one-quarter the size of the entire investment outlay for energy in Metropolitan France.[15]

IV. Coal

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

One event which was important in persuading the energy authorities of Western Europe to think in terms of a "new energy pattern" rather than of an "energy gap" was the demand crisis for coal through which Europe passed between mid-1957 and the end of 1959. After the years of shortage following World War II, during which the major coal-producing countries of Europe made every effort to increase capacity and productivity in the coal mines, the demand for coal took a mild downturn in 1957 and a sharp one in 1958 which resulted in a cutback in production and a massive piling-up of coal stocks. The importance of these stocks varied from country to country, the most severely affected being Belgium, whose pit-head stocks at the end of 1958 amounted to 26 per cent of annual output.[16] In 1959, production was again curtailed and stocks rose further as demand hit its low point, while 1960 was

[15] Data derived from the following documents:
Metropolitan France: *1950*—Commissariat Général au Plan, *4 ans d'exécution du Plan*, Paris, 1951; *1955, 1958*—Commissariat Général du Plan, *Rapport annuel sur l'exécution du Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement, 1959*, Vol. I, p. 17; *1959* (except for oil)—Ministère des Finances, "4e rapport du Fonds de Développement Economique et Social," *Statistiques et études financières* (Paris), Supplement No. 124 (April 1959), pp. 512-20.
French OT's and totals for oil: *1958, 1959*—Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole/SNIP, *Informations mensuelles* (Paris), No. 4 (July 1959), p. 4; Conseil Economique et Social, Section de l'Energie, "Etude de la politique petrolière et des problèmes posés par les pétroles et les gaz sahariens," Rapport présenté par M. René Richard, Paris, August 11, 1959, p. 22 (mimeographed) (hereinafter referred to as *Rapport Richard*).

[16] ECE, *The Coal Situation and Prospects in Europe in 1958/1959*, Geneva, 1959, p. 2.

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expected to see a further decline in production in order to permit a reduction in stocks as consumption started once again to rise.[17]

The decline in demand for coal from 1957 to 1959 was due to several factors, which were unfortunately all operating in the same direction (downward) at the same time.[18] On the one hand, there have been several structural changes at work reducing the demand for coal, one of them being a continuing improvement in efficiency of use of fuels (particularly in steel plants and in thermal electric plants, but elsewhere as well), another being the growing tendency to substitute other fuels for coal, in some cases because they are clearly cheaper and more efficient (as in railroad dieselization), in others because they are more convenient, and in many cases because it is the fashion. In 1957-1959, the structural changes were reinforced by the general economic recession, with its exaggerated impact on heavy coal users such as the steel industry, and by a succession of mild winters, combined (in 1958/59) with exceptionally heavy rainfall which increased the availability of hydro-electric power, thereby reducing the amount of coal required for thermal electricity production.

The effect on European production of the decline in demand for coal was reinforced during 1957-1959 by the size of imports of U.S. coal secured under long-term contracts during and after the Suez crisis. Imports of U.S. coal to Western Europe rose from 24 million T in 1955 to a peak of 45 million T in 1957, declining to 31 million T in 1958.[19] (An additional 7 million T in 1957 and 8 million T in 1958 were imported from Poland.) The first of these two sets of long-term contracts for U.S. coal were made in 1957 at freight rates influenced by the astronomical spot rates brought about by the Suez crisis, in an effort to secure steady supplies in what looked like a tight market. When freight rates collapsed at the end of the Suez crisis, another wave of new contracts followed because, at the new rates, the delivered price of U.S. coal was lower than that of domestic coal, even in the Ruhr. In 1958, Belgium and Germany reimposed a general import-licensing system for coal, and negotiated with American exporters for a reduction in the annual rate at which the contracts would be filled, while the United Kingdom suspended the issue of any new import licenses. In 1959, West Germany imposed a prohibitive import duty on coal beyond an import quota of some 5 million T. The principle of freedom of consumer choice in the

[17] ECSC High Authority, "Premier rapport sur la portée et les effets des mésures prises dans le domaine de la politique énergétique," Luxembourg, November 30, 1959, pp. 9, 10 (mimeographed).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[19] ECE, *The Coal Situation . . .*, p. 9.

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energy field for the time being seems to mean restricting the import of foreign coal in order to permit the import of overseas oil.

The demand crisis for the coal industry has had some positive as well as negative effects. On the positive side, coal sellers have been forced by the buyers' market to provide better service, promises of better quality, and assurance of regularity of supply to consumers of coal, particularly in the United Kingdom, where the National Coal Board has undertaken a concerted campaign to compete with oil's appeal of greater convenience of use and greater regularity and ease of supply to individual consumers. The economy as a whole will benefit from the competitive pressure on the coal industry to engage in research into new uses for coal, including the prospects for a carbo-chemical industry as a competitor to petro-chemicals. Another positive result, of the dieselization of the railways in particular, has been the liberation of the domestic output of coking coal, which has been and continues to be in short supply within Europe, for higher-quality uses than burning in railway locomotives or in the home. This has, however, meant a concentration of the fall in demand in the lower-quality grades of coal. On the negative side, the demand crisis has resulted in curtailment of future capacity for production of coal in Western Europe.

THE QUESTION OF CAPACITY

The question of the proper level of Western Europe's capacity for coal production is a much debated one. Capacity is, obviously, measured with some cost limitations in mind. In the United Kingdom, the problem has been looked into with some precision by parliamentary inquiry commissions and others, but it has not yet been resolved. As stated in the National Coal Board's 1950 *Plan for Coal*, determination of future capacity is confronted with "a series of circular arguments. . . . The future demand for coal depends on prices . . . ; price turns on cost of production and delivery; costs on how much coal has to be produced, of what kinds, and where, which in turn depends on the demand. The circle is complete,"[20] and, one might add, particularly difficult to break out of in a system of administered pricing.

The ECSC calculates technical capacity for coal (from 250 to 300 million T for the ECSC countries) in terms of the level beyond which "cost of investment and production become prohibitive,"[21] but it is coming around to the view that the circle can be broken out of by

[20] National Coal Board, *Plan for Coal*, London, October 1950, p. 33.

[21] ECSC, *Premier rapport sur une politique coordonnée dans le domaine de l'énergie* (by Pierre Uri), Luxembourg, April 1959, p. 43 and Annexe B.

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determining coal production capacity in Europe in terms of investments justified by a long-run marginal cost equal to normal import costs of coal[22] (hence, essentially of the landed price of U.S. coal). Although the principle is a good one, there are at least two objections to it. One is the range of possible vagaries in the U.S. coal price. In a report for the ECSC on a co-ordinated energy policy for Europe, Pierre Uri discusses Atlantic freight rates as the major area for fluctuation in the delivered price of U.S. coal.[23] One might well ask what would happen to the effective use of the import price of U.S. coal as the basis for making investments in European coal capacity when that price fluctuated in response to competition from changing supplies of oil and gas within the United States, or in response to an administrative change in its oil import policy on the part of the United States government. The other obvious objection is that European coal will still have to face price competition from oil one way or another. Unless the price of oil imports is pegged by an "artificial" tariff to something like the calorie parity price of imported coal, domestic coal capacity determined by the import price of coal will still be partially redundant in uncontrolled competition with oil.

One of the dominant factors in the coal picture in Western Europe is its rigidity of supply, both upward (for physical reasons) and downward (for social reasons). Ever since World War II, Western Europe has found it extremely difficult even to maintain (much less increase) the labor force in coal mining, so that its ability to deal with short-run fluctuations by laying off and rehiring miners has been severely restricted. At the same time, the degree of mechanization has been limited by the age and depths of the mines (with average depths of 600-700 meters in some countries of Western Europe, compared with 40-60 meters in the United States). Unlike the coal industry in the United States, which is referred to in Europe half-envyingly and half-contemptuously as a mechanical excavation operation rather than a mining operation, the coal mines of Western Europe have a short-run expansibility of 5 per cent or less.[24] Given the difficult mining conditions in Europe, coal production can be increased beyond this only at the cost of considerable investment and only over a considerable period of time, so that within the lead-time for investments and labor force recruitment in coal, there is little upward flexibility in coal production. Any increase in demand would, therefore, have to be met by energy sources other than European coal, unless the increase in demand is foreseen far

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 49. [23] *Ibid.*, pp. 47ff.
[24] According to the coal experts of the ECE Secretariat.

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enough in advance to carry out the necessary investments and to recruit the necessary labor force, the difficulties of both of which have been well illustrated by the experience of the coal industries of Western Europe between the end of World War II and 1957.

FUTURE CAPACITY

In the light of this, the extent of the recent reductions in coal production planned for Western Europe, cutbacks not only from previous plans to increase production but also from actual current levels of output, is rather startling. For the OEEC countries as a whole, projections of the Robinson Commission (which reflect the plans of the National Coal Board of the United Kingdom and the High Authority of the ECSC) indicate a cut in projected coal output of 80 million T per year for 1965 and 90 million T per year for 1975 compared with the estimates made three years ago by the Hartley Commission. This reduction includes the recent cut of 30-40 million T by the National Coal Board in its plans for coal capacity in 1965 in the United Kingdom.[25] Since the writing of the Robinson Report, the ECSC countries have reduced their plans for coal production even further.

The uncomfortable aspect of the planned cutbacks in coal production is that they are irreversible in several respects. On the production side, some of the capacity closed down will be abandoned, and by physical necessity abandoned permanently. In addition, attrition of the labor force in the coal mines threatens to be severe and irreversible, with the past difficulties of obtaining replacements for retiring miners intensified by reluctance of young people to enter what appears to be a dying industry. On the consumption side, there is every likelihood that markets which are abandoned by coal will not be retrieved, since new equipment purchased to handle other forms of fuel will not be reconverted to handle coal, except in the case of a few really large-scale consumers.

V. Other Indigenous Energy Sources

For the purpose at hand, only a few words need be said about indigenous energy sources other than coal. Hydro-electric power is gradually being expanded toward maximum exploitation of the waterpower resources of Europe. Oil production in Western Europe itself is expanding rather faster than would have been expected several years ago, but the small volumes of oil involved will continue to weigh rather lightly in the Western European energy balance. Natural gas in Italy and from the Lacq fields in southwestern France has become a factor to be reck-

[25] National Coal Board, *Revised Plan for Coal*, London, October 1959.

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oned with rather seriously as a competitor to coal in some areas; but the amounts involved, even from Lacq, are small compared with potential supplies of Sahara gas once a trans-Mediterranean pipeline is built. It is likely that the role of indigenous natural gas supplies will be to stake a claim to markets which will later be exploited by natural gas imported from across the Mediterranean and overseas.[26]

Although nuclear power will eventually supply a good part of the electricity consumed in Western Europe, the day when it does so is still a long way off. At the moment, the enthusiasms which set up Euratom have been somewhat dampened by the economics of electricity production, which indicate a spread of some 30 per cent between nuclear and conventional power costs.[27] While it is expected that nuclear power costs will fall, technological improvements in conventional thermal plants (burning coal, oil, or gas) are causing conventional power costs to fall just as fast, so that the relative cost advantage of conventional over nuclear power is likely to be maintained for another decade or two.[28] As a consequence of the relatively high cost of nuclear power and (once again) of the current surplus on the energy markets of the world, the programs for nuclear power development have been spread out over a longer period than planned several years ago. Euratom itself has taken the view that its role is still experimental rather than commercial,[29] and that it should concentrate on building new prototypes rather than on duplicating existing nuclear plants only for the sake of building up capacity to turn out electricity at an uncompetitively high cost per KWH.

VI. Oil and Gas from North Africa

The primary factor leading to the acceptance of cutbacks in Western European coal capacity and some retardation in nuclear power development has been the discovery and imminent exploitation of the oil and gas of the French Sahara. In the last two years, the oil fields of Hassi Messaoud and Edjele and the gas field of Hassi R'Mel have become as much a part of the popular picture of Europe's energy resources as the coal fields of the Ruhr and Lorraine. The prospective availability of oil and gas from North Africa has permitted Europe to avoid thinking

[26] Michel Hincker, "L'énergie en Europe et en France (II)," *Economie et politique* (November-December 1959), p. 13.

[27] OEEC, *Robinson Report*, p. 51.

[28] If the prices of conventional fuels were to fall further, owing to competitive pressure from oil and gas, the relative cost advantage of conventional over nuclear power would be even greater.

[29] "Slow Euratom Pace Is Held Temporary," *New York Times*, November 5, 1959 (quoting Etienne Hirsch, President of Euratom); "Atom Power Lags in East and West," *ibid.*, November 8, 1959.

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about its dependence on sources of oil supply east of Suez. Meanwhile the possession by the French, for the first time in history, of a large source of oil which they control completely has shaken the old competitive pattern in which Germany was the beneficiary of the cheapest and most plentiful source of energy (Ruhr coal) on the Continent.

The prospective volume of oil and gas from the Sahara is estimated in the Robinson Report as high as a total of 225 million T HCE for 1975, with oil imports of 100 million T (150 million T HCE) and gas imports of 50 billion m^3 (75 million T HCE), once the technical problems of trans-Mediterranean transport by refrigerated tanker and pipeline are solved. This is considerably larger than the cutback (of 90 million T HCE) in coal output included in the Robinson Report. Indeed, the minimum figure for Sahara oil in 1975 is set at 90 million T HCE, so that the displacement of European coal by Sahara oil may be considered quite direct. On the other hand, the expected volume of Sahara oil is considerably greater than the difference between the oil import projections of the Hartley Commission and the Robinson Commission, implying a cut in the estimate of future imports from other overseas sources of oil supply, so that both indigenous coal production and imports of oil from overseas will be affected by Sahara oil (and gas). Since the writing of the Robinson Report, Libya has appeared as a supplement (or a rival) to the French Sahara as a major source of oil. The Libyan oil boom may, in fact, produce amounts equal to Sahara production in the near future, so that oil production to the south of the Mediterranean may amount to as much as 100 million T (150 million T HCE) by 1965 and 200 million T (300 million T HCE) by 1975. These amounts evidently exceed to an even greater degree the cutbacks in projected coal production as estimated by the Robinson Commission.

The supply of energy from North Africa will therefore arrive in Western Europe by displacing some of the increase in oil imports from "traditional" suppliers as well as by displacing domestic coal production. To the extent that it displaces Middle Eastern oil, there will be a net increase in security of supply to Western Europe, since the Persian Gulf is presumably less subject to direct European pressure than are Libya and Algeria, and since the additional risk explicit in control of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians is not relevant for oil brought directly to the Mediterranean seaboard. However, if the supply of energy from North Africa results in the displacement of Caribbean oil rather than Middle Eastern oil, the result may well be little improvement of the total security of supply. That this process has already started at the production level is implied by the announcement of Standard Oil of

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New Jersey that ESSO is cutting its investments in Venezuela because of the availability of new oil in Libya.[30]

In the meantime, arrival of Sahara (and the prospective arrival of Libyan) crude on the European market has led to a chain reaction of competitiveness and to a rash of plans to construct pipelines from the seas surrounding the continent into the heart of Western Europe. The Germans argue that they do not want to be put at a cost disadvantage by using "expensive" coal while the French use "cheap" oil. On the other hand, the French argue for the sacrifice of part of the Lorraine coal-mining industry as a result of building a refinery complex at Strasbourg, on the ground that if they do not build a refinery the Germans will.[31]

Sahara production of oil and gas will amount by 1961 to almost a quarter (23 per cent) of total energy consumption and to over four-fifths (82 per cent) of total oil and gas consumption in Metropolitan France. By 1965, Sahara production will be considerably (63 per cent) in excess of consumption in Metropolitan France.[32] Hence the French will be exporters of Sahara crude to third countries, and they are at the present time making strong efforts to persuade the international oil companies to market Sahara oil and the authorities of the European Community to give Sahara oil a preferred position in the Common Market. By 1965, Sahara oil production will supply 22 per cent of Western Europe's total oil consumption—if it can be sold.

However, the French have one serious problem with Sahara oil, namely, its high quality. The composition of Sahara crude is almost identical with the range of hydrocarbons included in JP-4 jet fuel (gas-oil, kerosene, gasoline, and high octane gasoline)[33] and lacks the heavier hydrocarbons which make up fuel oil and other "black oils." One of the odd results of the French oil discoveries in the Sahara is, therefore, that pressure to *increase* petroleum consumption is building up in order to ensure markets for Sahara crude. With the existing pattern of energy demand in Europe, the gap is primarily in black oils (or coal or gas) for firing under boilers. The quest for oil in North Africa, carried out in part at the expense of investment in coal-mining, was originally justified as a solution to the shortage of heavy fuels. The light crudes so far found in the Sahara do not produce black oils nor is the present market for gasoline large enough to absorb the Sahara crudes. The air

[30] *Oil and Gas Journal* (October 19, 1959), p. 86.
[31] CES, *Rapport Richard*, pp. 62-63.
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 13, 20, 22, 44; and Bureau de Recherches de Pétrole/SNIP, *Informations mensuelles*, No. 3 (June 1959), p. 1.
[33] This was pointed out to me by Paul R. de Ryckere, of Caltex in Brussels.

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is, therefore, now full of schemes to increase gasoline consumption in France and in Europe—primarily by reducing taxes on gasoline[34]—in order to provide Sahara crudes with a market. Thus what started out as an effort to bridge the gap between energy demand and supply is turning into an attempt to increase both demand and supply, leaving the gap unaffected.

At present, black oils are virtually a by-product of gasoline production in petroleum refining and they are priced as such, thus exerting intense competitive pressure on coal. One effect of a successful French effort to force Sahara crude into the European market could be a reduction in the black oil output per barrel of crude refined, which might result in an increase in the relative price of black oils. An increase in the price of black oils might in turn serve to reduce the competitive pressure on coal.

VII. Conclusion: Objections to the Switch

The economic argument for going along with the switch to oil is that it is cheaper for the economy to obtain its energy from abroad than to produce it at home. The political argument against it is that of security of supply. Although oil supplies are vulnerable to disruption because of political action by the producing country, many of the energy experts in Europe (including most of those on the OEEC's Robinson Commission) are convinced that increased diversification of overseas sources of supply provides sufficient security of supply. The main criticisms that one may make of the views of the experts are that the cost argument is overplayed (with freedom of consumer choice only a catchword) and that the security aspect is underplayed.

The problem of cost

The point has been made by Pierre Uri[35] in discussing the investment requirements for European coal production that investments in export industries whose outputs would allow for the payment of increased energy imports would be less costly than direct investment in energy production in Europe. A similar argument is made by others in slightly different terms: that Western Europe's economic future in the last resort depends on the productivity of its manufacturing industry, which in turn depends (to some degree) on the cost of the power that it consumes. As stated by J. A. van den Heuvel, head of the Energy Section of the OEEC Secretariat: "If the security argument alone is taken into account, there is a consequent risk of saddling the whole national econ-

[34] Cf. Uri, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

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omy with a heavy burden which may seriously impair its competitive position in the world."[36] For the French, the argument takes on a more nationalistic flavor, with considerable concern evinced over the proper use of France's "national resources," a term extended (albeit somewhat shamefacedly) to the French share of the Iraq Petroleum Company.[37]

Against the cost argument, the point may be made that with respect to the producing sector of the economy, little is known about the importance of energy relative to other product costs in industry specifically or in the economy as a whole.[38] At best, energy costs are a quite small proportion of total costs in most industries; while the aggregate saving involved in switching from coal for a small price advantage is partly offset by other costs incurred by the economy when curtailing coal capacity, such as the cost of redeploying an immobile labor force and its dependents.[39]

Autarky would be more expensive in terms of domestic resource use than a multilateral trading system in an untroubled world. However, in the specific case in question, where the costs of ensuring overseas energy supplies against political losses are great, a greater degree of autarky than is now planned might not be so uneconomic after all. If, for example, one includes in Western Europe's oil bill part of the cost of maintaining the French Army in Algeria, the relative costs of the various sources of energy to the European economy might appear more favorable to coal.

From the point of view of the consumer, there is a touch of disingenuousness in the claims that the switch from coal to oil is being carried out in the name of freedom of consumer choice, since the various governments interfere with the energy market to a considerable extent when they consider it desirable to do so. However, the interference has recently been with the other coal producers, as the direct competitor once the market for coal starts contracting, rather than with imported oil, which is the real competitor. Thus Belgium, with its coal industry in serious straits, has imposed restrictions on the import of ECSC (mainly German) coal, while all of the coal-producing countries have imposed restrictions on U.S. coal, but (apparently) not on oil. In the

[36] J. A. van den Heuvel, "Integrated Energy for Europe," paper prepared for the Round Table Conference on European Problems, London, November 3 and 4, 1959, p. 32 (mimeographed).

[37] CES, *Rapport Richard*, p. 20.

[38] Even van den Heuvel argues that "the inflationary effect of an increase in coal prices has never been proved" (*op.cit.*, p. 10).

[39] This is particularly important under European conditions, where labor is often immobile because of lack of housing in areas of alternative employment and because of the sometimes violent opposition to change on the part of the coal miners.

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United Kingdom, when the pressure on coal became too severe the government curtailed imports of American coal (from the beginning of 1958), but there was no apparent public attempt to limit oil imports (although control of the oil industry by the international oil companies probably permits them to restrict imports quietly when government pressure is applied). Only in Germany, where attempts to restrict oil imports by establishing a cartel with representatives of the coal industry and of the oil majors were thwarted by underselling on the part of independent oil merchants, was temporary protection to coal carried out by the imposition of a special tariff on oil products.

"Competition" between the coal industry and the international oil companies in Europe is something of a euphemism. In the United Kingdom, there can obviously be no competition in coal, for example, between U.S. or Polish coal and U.K. coal, since the National Coal Board is the sole producer as well as the importer; and it is only to the extent that the government abstains from interfering with oil imports that there is effective competition between oil and coal. In France, the situation is similar but even more clearly non-competitive. The coal industry is nationalized, and most of the oil is imported from the Middle East by companies controlled to varying degrees by the French government (although the Cie. Française des Pétroles usually acts as if it were not controlled). Even more obviously, it is the French government which has financed and pushed the development of the Sahara oil fields, and which is effectively in control of the marketing of the Sahara oil. Only in Germany has there been some reality to the struggle for market shares between coal and oil, since the coal industry is privately owned and control of it is fairly scattered. The German government is nevertheless in a position to restrict oil imports directly if it wants to. The number of oil pipelines being built into Germany from the Mediterranean and from the North Sea indicates that the German government does not want to, and hence that an active decision to permit (or to back) the switch to oil has been taken.

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY

The perils of dependence on the whims of the sovereign governments of the underdeveloped countries with regard to economic units physically within their geographical confines are obvious, particularly in light of the post-World War II history of expropriation of "foreign"-owned capital. Although relying on North African supplies is undoubtedly safer than relying on Arabian oil from the Persian Gulf and from Iraq, there are a number of risks in depending even on North African oil.

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In the first place, there are the political uncertainties involved in dealing with the governments of places like Libya and Tunis (which is likely to become much less responsible when Bourgiba is replaced for one reason or another). In the second place, whatever the political outcome in the immediate future in Algeria, there is little doubt that within a few years the Algerians will control the transit routes of the oil pipelines from the Sahara just as the Syrians controlled the route from Iraq in 1956. Even if France ostensibly continues in control of the Sahara, Western Europe will be at the mercy of the new transit countries of the southern Mediterranean.

The smaller degree of physical insecurity of North African oil as compared with Persian Gulf oil is due partly to the shorter distances to be traversed from Europe and the greater distance from the Soviet Union (hence a reduction in any direct Soviet threat to the oil supply in question), and partly to the fact that the Suez Canal does not lie in between the sources of oil and Western Europe. However, once one accepts the fact that fear of losing their royalties will not necessarily govern the policies of the underdeveloped countries (who are more than likely to act on the presumption that they can hurt the other side at least as much as they hurt themselves), it is clear that the susceptibility of the governments of North Africa to persuasion by Western European consumers depends to a considerable extent on the threat of military intervention which Europe is willing and able to apply. At the moment, the French are obviously willing to carry out any threats against their weaker antagonists—to the point of calling Soviet bluffs about launching missiles on London and Paris. But the British, who control Libya for the time being, are not likely to act in such an ungentlemanly fashion any more. Hence the threat of force scarcely exists.

Western Europe's main bargaining counter, once direct military control of North Africa is given up, will be the availability of other geographical sources of supply of oil if the flow from one or another of the overseas oil producers is cut off for political reasons. A serious threat to Western Europe's energy position would arise only if a number of the oil producers stopped shipping oil at the same time. This is, however, not entirely out of the question, since North African oil is still potentially subject to the control of a pan-Arab movement (with Libyan oil under a much nearer threat of control by Nasser's Egypt), and there have already been some beginnings of a *rapprochement* between Venezuela and the Arab oil producers.

The undependability of the sources of Europe's oil would seem to argue for a greater amount of autarky in Western Europe's energy

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policies than Europe is now striving for. Since it is obvious at the start that Western Europe's energy demands far exceed its possibilities of indigenous supply, there is considerable virtue in maintaining domestic production as close to the highest level as is technically possible within "reasonable" cost limitations, in order to limit Europe's dependence on politically uncertain sources of supply as far as possible. The economies of Western Europe are in any event becoming increasingly dependent on the cheapest source of fuel—overseas oil; to intensify the process by encouraging this trend is to invite future political crises.[40]

If the switch to overseas sources of energy supply were accompanied by the creation of sufficient physical elasticity of domestic supply to substitute for a good part of any probable shutdown of overseas supplies, increased dependence on the cheapest source would be safer than it is. The risk would be smaller if, for example, contraction of European coal-mining were to have the same result that contraction of U.S. coal-mining has had, in increasing marginal productivity and short-period expansibility as a result of intensive mechanization, so that, in effect, the main resource limitation, skilled manpower, would not exist. But this is not what is happening (or would happen) in Western Europe. It would not happen because of the difference in the conditions of coal-mining in Europe and the United States: in Europe, the mines are old and deep; in the United States, the seams are younger and shallower, hence more accessible and more amenable to mechanization. In addition, it is not happening, even where the technical possibility exists, because of the attitudes ingrained in European coal producers, the best example being the recent decision of the U.K. National Coal Board to eliminate open-cast mining almost entirely, in order to minimize the impact of a contraction in total output on the labor force in coal-mining. The actual amount of coal involved in the contraction of open-cast mining in the United Kingdom is marginal (10 million tons/year out of a total output of over 200 million tons/year), but this is in part due to previous reluctance to expand this kind of mining.

Maintaining coal capacity is only one way to reduce the gap in energy supply which would occur in the event of a future shutdown of Middle East oil. Stockpiles of coal and oil can be built up against a shutdown of limited duration, while the building-up of nuclear capacity would have the same effect (in this respect) as maintaining coal capacity. In the coming years, however, even the combination of these measures

[40] There is a significant difference between Europe's dependence on overseas sources for foodstuffs and that for oil. The former come largely from the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth; the latter comes largely from the unstable Middle East.

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would leave Western Europe dependent on alternative sources of overseas supply of varying degrees of reliability. Sacrificing part of domestic energy production by permitting the growing switch to imported oil involves Western Europe in greater political risks than it need bear.

The switch to oil in the countries which initially industrialized themselves on an energy base of coal is world-wide, and both the United States (where the trend has been set for some time) and the USSR (where the latest plans for energy production call for a rapid development of oil and gas rather than coal) are held up as models for the future pattern of energy consumption in Western Europe. What is overlooked is the obvious fact that both the United States and the USSR have a choice among energy sources available within their borders and directly under their own control. Western Europe does not have the same choice.

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A CASE STUDY IN THE DIPLOMACY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION

By DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD

AMERICAN experience with the ill-fated governments of the newer nations—most recently Turkey, South Korea, and Cuba—raises the question whether we can ever select a policy generally suited to the growth of stable, effective government among the developing nations. In all three of the cases mentioned, the United States followed the canons of conventional diplomacy while contributing substantially to monumental economic and social changes. Our commitment meant reliance on and support for the regime in office, although our own actions were gradually creating forces and sentiments favoring radical change in the internal political system. Whenever the pressures for political change were sufficient, adjustments were made with an abruptness that may well have left the United States in a worse position than if we had done little or nothing to assist long-term development.

The preparation of policy guidelines that we hope will prove advantageous to American interests in both the immediate and the distant future is particularly hazardous. Continuing efforts must be made in existing situations to use conventional diplomacy to relieve crises and resolve problems, while we simultaneously engage in a long-term program to revolutionize the social and economic structure of new nations. The diplomatic game of national recognition, discreet favors, and effusive expression of good intentions will no doubt continue, but it was fashioned in and for another place and time. Its embarrassments and contradictions cannot be avoided, if only because of the way in which the political process is apt to operate in new nations. Where governments are fragile, they often respond to new political demands simply by collapsing, a phenomenon that is by no means confined to Asia and Africa. Where governments are built on force, they respond only to an equal or greater counterforce, usually manifested in violence. These are the short-term pitfalls, but what of the long-term ones? Since we have accepted continued, massive foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy, is there any way in which we might use it with assurance of greater long-term benefit?

To engage in international politics among the developing nations on a long-term basis means accepting two hazards. First, the United States must be prepared to bear as gracefully as possible the repercussions

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of its own and others' efforts to promote the development of Africa and Asia. This means more diplomatic headaches of the sort described above, but—it is to be hoped—the kind of difficulties that can be anticipated and perhaps even welcomed as the prelude to a period of more fruitful and constructive diplomacy.[1] Such problems are best solved by diplomats, but the second feature of rapid social change leaves room for the speculations of social science. Once engaged in long-term, rapid development, foreign policy must be attuned to the complexities of a newly developing country. Our long-term effort cannot be based, like conventional diplomacy, on a recurrence of situations already familiar, in already familiar kinds of contexts. While social science is certainly not prepared to offer the detailed predictions that policy-makers would like, it can begin to analyze the way in which personal characteristics and opinions combine in rapidly changing countries.

In the subsequent illustration, which is based on survey research conducted in Morocco, it should be understood that we have only tenuous and fragmentary insights into the kind of world being created in Africa and Asia. The present inquiry is at best a preliminary attempt to reach somewhat farther into the social structure of a new nation than we have previously been able to do[2] and evaluate how the citizens of a new nation relate foreign policy to their own lives. There are no simple explanations, any more than we have been able to find simple explanations for our own national development. There are, however, combinations of demographic characteristics, attitudes, and foreign policy views that shed some light on what kind of a world is being created in the non-West. Complex as this may be, it is open to systematic observation and eventually to accommodation by Western diplomacy.

I

With the co-operation of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, a questionnaire was sent in 1958 to local party secretaries, of whom there were about

[1] As may be apparent here, the author does not subscribe to the view that the United States is under a particular handicap by virtue of its European and, hence, colonialist associations. On the diplomatic front the Communists, both Russian and Chinese, have probably had as many setbacks as the United States. For the long run we have two distinct advantages: more surplus wealth and industrial capacity for social and economic aid, and a form of government to which nearly all new nations aspire. That we have been on the whole more interested in adapting the former rather than the latter to the needs of developing nations is, in the author's view, additional evidence that we are neglecting our most vital long-run interests.

[2] To date, most survey research in developing nations has concentrated on groups of known immediate importance in the power structure and also of high levels of articulation. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Free, *Six Allies and a Neutral*, Glencoe, Ill., 1957; George V. Callho, *Changing Images of America*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958; and particularly the special issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII, No. 3 (February 1958), *passim*.

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1,200.[3] About a fourth returned the questionnaires, although only slightly less than 100 were able to complete the more difficult questions used in this analysis. There were, of course, immeasurable factors of illiteracy, indecision, and disinterest as well which make it impossible to formulate statistically valid generalizations for the entire party or for the country. However, in addition to the general scarcity of precise information concerning political thinking in developing countries, there are two considerations that compensate for the statistical shortcomings of the data. On the whole, the secretaries who responded were largely from rural areas and from more recently organized segments of the Istiqlal. They were, in short, persons who have only recently become aware of national and international affairs. Knowledge of their background, their conception of national politics, and their international opinions contributes to understanding how the rapidly growing segments of less sophisticated, less experienced citizens of new countries think.

In the questionnaire the party secretaries were asked to rank the success of the postwar foreign policy and of the modernization effort of five Muslim countries—the United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Pakistan, Turkey, and the now-dissolved United Arab Federation. Turkey ranked second in over-all score in both frames of reference and has been used here as the focal point of the analysis.[4] As a well-known ally of the United States and one whose forced modernization has been largely supported by the United States alone, Turkey is an especially appropriate focus of analysis. On the basis of their evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy and modernization program, the party secretaries were divided into three major groups: those (33) who thought highly of Turkey's foreign policy and modernization; those (31) who approved her modernization effort, but ranked her foreign policy very low in relation to that of the other choices; and those (26) who felt that neither her

[3] An analysis of the party organization itself appears in the author's *Political Change in Morocco*, Princeton, N.J., 1961. For more detail on the assessment and processing of the data, see "The Political Usage of 'Islam' and 'Arab Culture,'" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXV, No. 1 (Spring 1961), pp. 106-14.

[4] The same total rank-score in both judgments does not mean that the *same* persons gave the *same* preferences in both instances. By making a simple matrix, those giving the same score or different scores in the two frames of reference can be distinguished. The five-by-five matrix has been arbitrarily reduced to a two-by-two matrix so as to have only four groups. Those giving first or second preference to Turkey in *both* frames of reference (33) constitute the "sympathetic." Those giving third, fourth, or fifth preference to Turkey in *both* frameworks (26) are labeled the "unsympathetic." The intermediates giving high preference on the modernization ordinate and low preference on the foreign policy ordinate (31) are the "less sympathetic." The other intermediate quadrant, high preference on foreign policy and low preference on modernization, is a "nonsense" result, which was selected by only three persons and will be omitted here.

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foreign policy nor her modernization effort ranked highly compared with the other countries.

By examining the background and attitudes of each of these groups, one arrives at an estimate of the views of persons taking positions generally favorable to the United States, positions favorable only to our foreign aid goal (assuming that the United States finds a palatable form of distribution), and positions that may be totally opposed to United States interests. Complete disapproval, of course, may be based on factors such as Turkey's laicist reforms, and may be partially avoided in any future policy implementation. In judging what future repercussions American policy might have within a country such as Morocco, the modernization dimension is probably much more important. There are many indications that our efforts to assist in the social revolution of the developing countries will increase, while the kind of foreign policy commitments that were asked of Turkey will be of much less value. Nevertheless, the foreign policy factor is of interest in order to see what kinds of people do approve of the additional pro-Western burdens that Turkey has shouldered. In short, the Moroccan party secretaries have been divided into groups that might be thought of as very sympathetic, less sympathetic, and unsympathetic with two major aspects of our policy in developing nations.

Dealing with demographic variables first, we may find some comfort in noting that the group disapproving of both modernization and foreign policy on the Turkish model was generally the least cosmopolitan and least informed of all three groups. Roughly half its members were from the more retarded provinces of Morocco, which was also true of the less sympathetic group. The unsympathetic also had the largest proportion of party secretaries with traditional or religious occupations of any of the three groups. Their traditional occupational background was also reflected in their linguistic skills, for a relatively high proportion indicated a knowledge of classical Arabic, a low proportion knew only a Berber dialect, and very few knew French. Compared with the other groups, the unsympathetic had a slight tendency to read fewer publications and a much more pronounced tendency to join fewer organizations outside the party. Their more isolated circumstances were probably partially ameliorated by the frequent visits they received from high party officials of the region, even though these visits do not seem to have informed the local party officials of the modernized status of Turkey. Indeed, the party's reliance on personal contact in these cases no doubt evidences the secretaries' relative isolation.

A restricted educational background is the most marked characteristic

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of the unsympathetic.Whereas at least half of the other two groups had some education beyond the village Koranic school, three-fifths of the unsympathetic secretaries had not gone beyond the *musiid*. They were apparently aware of their lack of modern education, for nearly one-half admitted not feeling prepared for their present office or for higher office. Their feeling of inadequacy was most strikingly manifested in their lack of aspiration to promotion in the Istiqlal. Almost four-fifths said they did not wish higher office. The secretaries who ranked Turkey low on both counts were, then, generally persons of traditional, Arabic background. Though by no means excluded from modern communications, their sources were less varied and their past experience less enlightening than those of the other two groups. Very probably aware that the modern world was passing them by, they appeared to withdraw, possibly because they realized that modernization would threaten values deeply ingrained in their traditional way of life.

The less sympathetic party secretaries, those who approved Turkey's modernization but had reservations regarding her foreign policy, might be characterized as the most advanced of the three groups. Geographically they were divided roughly equally between the more and the less advanced regions of the country. The less sympathetic were in an intermediate position in respect to frequency of visits from high party officials, but they had several additional sources of information. Their more sophisticated outlook was built on several factors. Of all the groups the less sympathetic had the highest proportion—roughly half—in modern occupations. They encountered the highest incidence of opposition-party activity in the places where they worked, a factor demanding special skills and familiarity with several viewpoints. Their higher level of social interaction was particularly evident in their memberships outside the party, which were more numerous than those of any other group. The less sympathetic secretaries averaged nearly two non-party memberships, with nearly a third in youth groups and over two-thirds active in pre-independence resistance organizations.

There is little question but what the less sympathetic represent the crucial, most influential segment of contemporary Morocco at their level of society. Their occupational accomplishment was fortified by their being older—nearly two-thirds of them were over 30—and having more linguistic skills than the other groups, approximately two-thirds indicating some knowledge of classical Arabic. Most of them also knew the language of the countryside, for two-thirds spoke a Berber dialect as well. With the fully sympathetic they shared an impressive educational record, slightly more than half having some advanced education, but

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they appeared to be less reliant than the sympathetic on the party itself. Approximately two-thirds considered themselves sufficiently trained for their present party office and also for a higher office, but only a third aspired to promotion within the Istiqlal. This is important supporting evidence of their individuality and confidence, which they seem to have acquired in moving into more advanced positions in the society. In short, the more experienced Moroccan seems to accept his country's stand for "non-dependence";[5] he approves of social revolution, but is hesitant to make the additional diplomatic and military commitments that Turkey has made.

The members of the fully sympathetic group, which comes closest to favoring American interests in Turkey, are possibly best identified as the *nouveaux arrivées*. Of all the groups, they were most recently recruited into the Istiqlal and most recently took office. Although well over three-fourths of them worked in the more advanced provinces, they appeared to be in rather inaccessible places and received the least attention from party officials. The remoteness of their party offices was also indicated by the presence of less opposition-party activity. These factors should be weighed in evaluating the fact that they were also the youngest age group. Urban Moroccan youth has frequently come out in strong terms for a pronounced neutralist foreign policy and probably would shrink from the prospect of following Turkey's path. The youth of the sympathetic group, however, did not share either the wealth or the sophistication of the articulate Moroccan college student. The young sympathizers, two-thirds of whom were under 30, were probably not as secure as either of the two other groups being studied and seemed to be seeking a place in the new Morocco.

They were the heaviest readers of all the groups, considerably surpassing the record of the less sympathetic. Although their educational qualifications nearly equaled those of the less sympathetic, they did not have a comparable occupational background. They were divided approximately in thirds among modern jobs, traditional jobs, and unemployment,[6] which was twice as prevalent as among the less sympathetic. Their linguistic skills also denoted their more remote location, for two-thirds had some knowledge of a Berber dialect and only one-third

[5] "Non-dependence" is the Moroccan version of neutrality. It was originally urged by more progressive groups and has now been adopted by all shades of opinion.

[6] The unemployed third consists of both those actually indicating unemployment in the occupational choices and those inserting "no" for occupation. Nearly half of all the "no" respondents were sympathetic. They may well be the only party cadre available in the more remote villages and be supported by small stipends from the Istiqlal. The occupational differentiations will be studied in more detail in subsequent analysis.

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knew classical Arabic. The sympathetic appeared to be closely tied to the party in several respects. Like the less sympathetic, two-thirds considered themselves prepared for their present party jobs, but a smaller proportion was confident of being prepared for a higher party post. The striking fact, however, is that, preparation notwithstanding, half of the sympathetic, the largest proportion in this category of all the groups, aspired to higher office. Their strong party association was also apparent in their other memberships. Though nearly as active outside the party as the less sympathetic, the sympathetic were more concentrated in youth groups—in particular, in the "Builders of Independence," an organization of militant rural youth. The group, then, that was prepared to give full approval to Turkey's course of action was generally less well established in either the modern or the traditional sector of Moroccan life. As a more malleable, more dependent group, it is likely that their opinions were more easily shaped and their loyalty more easily won by those promising immediate, tangible results. How the sympathetic acquired their views on Turkey is not clear,[7] though they may simply have resulted from less direct contact with the party. They did seem to be a stable or influential group.

The findings indicate that each long-term policy alternative tends to associate the United States with a distinguishable group within the country concerned. While there is no reason to assume that similar differentiations in other countries will be associated with similar views, study along such lines can make our impact on any country more intelligible. If the United States is determined to support the social revolutions of the developing countries, it will be unavoidably associating itself with various groups in these countries. Insofar as the groups involved can be identified, our chances of success will be enhanced and, given some estimate as to the influence of the various groups, our chances of affecting the internal political development of new nations will be multiplied. Having chosen or having been chosen, as the case may be, to be the major sponsor of societal upheavals over the next generation, there is no reason why we should not try to increase our knowledge of how such upheavals take place and possibly even try to use them to the ultimate advantage of the free world.

[7] Many of the less sympathetic worked in the Moroccan version of the Peace Corps, called the *Banaat al-Istiqlali* or Builders of Independence. While participating in summer work projects, the Builders of Independence may have received indoctrination on Turkey's progress. In any event, it is entirely possible that their high approval of Turkey's material progress has carried over to produce approval in the foreign policy field, of which they may know less. This is similar to the situation of the unsympathetic, whose background suggests that their possible disapproval of Turkey's laicism may have carried over to influence their judgment of foreign policy.

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II

Having found that policy alternatives may correspond with demographic variables, we may next ask whether the groups here distinguished hold different views on subjects other than foreign affairs. Such findings would indicate what additional complications might arise from association with any particular group and what internal political trends might be encouraged. For this purpose the questionnaires asked the respondents to state preferences on the past and future interests of the country and also on the future of the party, both locally and nationally.[8] Nearly the same rank order of preferences was shown by each group when considering both the past and the future of Morocco, but there were notable differences in the emphasis given to certain of the choices. The emphasis assigned to some choices harmonized with the background of the group concerned, a fact which supports the reliability of the data.

In regard to the nation's past interests, all groups considered the formation of the police and Royal Army of primary importance, but the less-accomplished sympathetic group gave the forces of order much less emphasis. Land reform and the experimental National Assembly received roughly similar support in third and fourth place, but here the sympathetic revealed their rural background by giving land reform considerably more priority than did the other two groups. The courts were considered of second importance by all groups, but the less sympathetic group, generally more modern in attitude, gave much less emphasis to such traditional concerns as judicial reform. Thus, the groups demonstrated general agreement, but with occasional major differences in emphasis that accorded with the interests one might anticipate.

The future of the nation is, of course, more important from a policy point of view, and all groups agreed that reducing unemployment was of prime importance. Their susceptibility to the irredentist campaign of the Istiqlal was revealed in their placing recovery of Morocco's historic frontiers second, although the unsympathetic showed much less

[8] A percentage score has been calculated for each group for each of the four arrays of five choices. First choices give five points, second choices four points, etc., providing a quotient whose divider is the highest maximum score—e.g., for 33 responses, the highest score possible would be 165. The subsequent impressions are based on both differences in rank order of preferences among the three groups and differences in magnitude of preference where rank order is alike. It should be made explicit that an arbitrary numbering system for expressing preference does not indicate the intensity or conviction with which any group holds any of the particular views expressed—i.e., the less sympathetic's third preference may represent a view held with relatively more intensity than, say, even the first choice of the same group.

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interest in this goal than the other two groups.[9] It is also noteworthy that all three groups considered development of technical and administrative skills of least importance. Thus, a mixed pattern of preferences emerged, which suggests that no single policy on the part of the United States would be likely to produce action totally appropriate to our long-term goals.

As might be expected, the more immediate, more familiar party affairs elicited greater differences of opinion from the secretaries. Thus, the sympathetic continued to stress their material needs by rating economic matters as of primary importance to the future of the party nationally. The less sympathetic gave primary importance to party unity, which the sympathetic rated second in importance. The unsympathetic gave primary emphasis to problems of party recruitment and indoctrination, which were thought to be of only tertiary importance by the other two groups. Again it is interesting to note that all three groups felt that social reforms were of least importance to the party as well as to the nation's future. From these findings a pattern may be tentatively constructed in which the sympathetic show themselves most concerned with material progress and least concerned with reform of political institutions. The unsympathetic seemed on the whole less vulnerable to emotional appeals, ranking party unity lower and de-emphasizing the frontiers issue, but they were less favorable to social change. The less sympathetic seemed the most interested in abstract, volatile problems, and also gave more attention to the development of a legislative assembly.

These patterns were further elaborated in the preferences for local party action in the future. All agreed that work in conjunction with national reforms was the most important, thereby revealing uniform lack of confidence in the local party organization. The unsympathetic displayed a much greater sense of local inefficacy, however, as might be inferred from their previous self-evaluations. Solidarity vis-à-vis the opposition was given secondary importance by all save the sympathetic, who may have been influenced by the relatively smaller degree of opposition activity in their regions. The outlook of the unsympathetic was further revealed in their evaluation of village projects as a form of future local party action, to which they gave much less emphasis than

[9] The disinterest of the unsympathetic group is particularly noteworthy in another context. As the more traditional group, one would expect that they would give stronger support to the leader of the irredentist campaign, Allal Al-Fasi, who is a revered leader of traditional origins. The unsympathetic may be devoted to Allal, but for reasons more related to his piety than his foreign policy, while the modern elements give preference to his views on recovering former frontiers for motives related to their nationalism.

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did the other groups. The less sympathetic thus continued to stress their more militant, and generally more emotional, orientation by emphasizing party unity nationally and party solidarity locally. In reference to party affairs, the sympathetic and less sympathetic groups expressed similar views, as one might expect from their more recent and probably more disciplined introduction to party and national politics.

Though the alternatives are complex, it is worth reflecting for a moment on what courses of action the United States might encourage by policies that would support any one of these groups. The unsympathetic are of less concern, since their way of life and their own sense of inadequacy strongly suggest that they must either themselves change or be replaced. In some ways this is unfortunate, for they show less tendency to capitalize on the more volatile and more controversial issues in Moroccan politics, which are stressed by the less sympathetic. The interest of the less sympathetic in political institutional reform, however, is by no means disadvantageous to a country wishing to encourage broader forms of self-government—which is, one assumes, the form of government the United States favors. The views of the sympathetic represent a mixture of the more emotional and more traditional in national affairs, and tend to approve positions taken by party leaders. The opinions of the sympathetic group are on the whole more confused and more determined by immediate necessity than those of other groups. Any foreign power that promised to relieve the physical hardships of rural life in Morocco and received the endorsement of the party elders would probably be welcomed by the sympathetic group as well.

III

Without more research it would be misleading to use the clusters of opinions and characteristics described above as typical of new countries in general. The available evidence, however, does suggest that military obligations and economic aid may not mix well, and that together they may work against our long-run interests. Even where existing governments are friendly, the association of the two may result in new internal strains that an otherwise sympathetic government would not need to undergo. The combination may also arouse suspicion, if not active rejection, of American interest. For the future it seems much more likely that our problem will be to anticipate shifts in public opinion and balancing of new political forces as we contribute to new social revolutions. Thus, the groups discussed provide some insight for the diplomat, but they are more important in isolating questions important to policy formation for more intense, empirical study.

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First, the unsympathetic group is an example of how those with a traditionalistic culture may resent modernization.[10] It is not clear whether such persons are motivated by hostility toward a materially superior society or by fear of losing their present social positions, but they are certainly the most isolated, though not the most retarded, group. Their relative lack of political experience suggests that efforts to win their approval will need the support of legitimate authority in the country in question. Their resistance to social change may be more obstinate than that of the less-privileged members of the society, and also more dangerous since they can often exercise greater influence in the existing political system than more remote groups. Opinion may vary from country to country, but it should also be noted that in Morocco the unsympathetic have not blindly accepted all appeal based on historical authority—e.g., the irredentist campaign—nor have they rejected many reforms that contribute to the construction of a viable political system.

In terms of influence in the foreseeable future, the less sympathetic group is certainly the most important. While they accept modernization and are undoubtedly essential to social reform, their opinions raise some controversial questions. They espouse national unity and party solidarity with enthusiasm, but they also suggest that a *dirigiste* regime might be the most suitable to their purpose. There is still much research to be done, but it is already clear that those with the more modern political views are not necessarily the most sophisticated politically. Depending on the priority we place on the encouragement of increased popular participation, the support of the less sympathetic group may or may not be constructive. The United States has seldom been concerned with this question, at least openly, although the repercussions of our support for undemocratic regimes in the Caribbean and the emergence of a left-wing group in Africa will no doubt stimulate reconsideration.[11] If we decide to accept the risks of propagating our own way of life more aggressively (and it is difficult to imagine a program of more aggressive economic aid that would not raise such problems),[12]

[10] The findings are systematic empirical evidence for the ambivalence and rejection sometimes manifested by new nations. See, e.g., Dankwart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1956, pp. 10-15.

[11] Lest this seem too harsh a criticism of the Department of State, it should be pointed out that we had little choice in this matter so long as the development of the dependent portion of the world was under the control of European colonial powers. But while this may provide an excuse, it remains hard to approve of the ease with which we apparently made some of our concessions to colonial powers in the past.

[12] Without meaning to single out any one document or agency, a person interested in following this question further would be well advised to scan *A Proposed Outline*

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a considerable reappraisal of our strategy vis-à-vis the developing nations would be in order.

A third conclusion emerges from the findings for the sympathetic group. Unlike the unsympathetic group, the sympathetic appear to have few qualms about shedding their traditional heritage. Many of them appear to be of tribal background, and their history does not have the religious and cultural richness that the unsympathetic probably admire. The sympathetic associate their personal destiny with the party more than the other groups do, and their high expectations seem to lead them to share the lack of concern for political reform manifested by the less sympathetic group. In many ways they provide the basis for some optimism, since they are still impressionable persons and show that youth in new countries is not unalterably associated with anti-American feelings. Taking it altogether, the youth of the new nations is far from being "won over" by undemocratic forces. Confidence in our ability to help this group, plus more knowledge of how they think, would do much toward preserving political freedom in the midst of social revolution.

The main points to be made from this inquiry are two: the United States cannot engage in the diplomacy of social revolution without making important choices in regard to the internal affairs of the countries concerned; and, secondly, we cannot expect any single alternative to have wholly desirable internal or international repercussions. Although we are ill-equipped for the kind of inquiry that is needed,[13] it is becoming increasingly urgent that we consider as systematically as possible the impact of the rapid social and economic change that we support. The United States has found itself increasingly involved with unfamiliar political systems in even less familiar social settings. As we take more responsibility for the progress and well-being of the less-privileged portion of the world, it may be fair to ask that we follow the repercussions of our policy with more precision. If we can learn from our experience, there may be fewer humpty-dumpty governments and larger, more rapid returns from our policy of social revolution.

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for the Study of Technical Assistance to Less Developed Countries, Washington, D.C., ICA, 1960. The author of this document may have been only too well aware of the problems and obstacles involved in policy formation rather than negligent of them. Nevertheless, the carefully constructed research outline gives only the barest recognition to the over-all political impact of technical aid, and the values we wish to foster.

[13] The author cannot stress too heavily the importance of co-operation from authorities in the new countries. Much could be done by means of existing organizational structures that would help maximize the new nations' chances of success and also add to their fund of knowledge. There is an unfortunate, but understandable, way in which information is power in a country where very little precise knowledge exists.

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Research Note

SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

By LOUIS MORTON

THE student of World War II, even if he confines his study to a limited period or a narrow aspect of the purely military side of the war, is confronted with an enormous body of records and an imposing array of published works and official documents. The testimony, exhibits, and other data assembled by the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack, for example, filled 39 thick volumes; the published record of the Nürnberg Trials, 56 volumes. For the World War II years alone, the Army, it has been estimated, retained more than 17,000 tons of records, and also possesses an undetermined but large quantity of prewar records essential to an understanding of the wartime period. When to this total is added the extant records of the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the result is a truly staggering mass of paper calculated to dismay rather than hearten the historian.

The situation is not as hopeless as it might seem. Obviously a large part of this material is of a purely routine nature, important for accounting purposes and orderly administration but of little interest to the historian. He can further reduce the total appreciably by eliminating the records of housekeeping activities of the numerous military installations established during the war at home and abroad. The scope of the historian's inquiry and his own interests serve also to eliminate large bodies of records from consideration. If his research is focused on matters of strategy and organization, he can safely ignore the records and reports of all units but those on the highest level; if it is focused on military operations, then the records and reports of the units involved become his primary sources.[1]

I. Introduction: Guide to the Records

Though the largest part of the total body of military records can be safely eliminated by the historian so far as his purposes are concerned,

[1] An excellent brief account of the problems involved in the use of military records is Paul P. Van Riper, "A Survey of Materials for the Study of Military Management," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 828-50.

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the remainder constitutes a body of considerable magnitude. Fortunately, there are a number of archival aids to enable him to identify the materials he needs and locate them in the various records depositories. The most valuable of these aids is the two-volume *Federal Records of World War II* (Washington, D.C., 1951) prepared by the National Archives. The second volume of this work deals exclusively with military agencies, including the overseas commands, and contains not only descriptions of the records and their location as of 1950, but also brief histories of the organizations that created them. It is the indispensable guide for all those entering for the first time the strange world of military archives, as well as a useful signpost for the seasoned traveler.[2]

But this is merely the beginning of the journey, for *Federal Records of World War II* provides only the most general description of the vast body of records it surveys. For more specific descriptions, the student must turn to the inventories and guides prepared from time to time by the National Archives. These are listed in *Guide to the Records in the National Archives* (Washington, D.C., 1948) and the latest edition of *Publications of the National Archives and Records Service* (Washington, D.C., 1958). Among these inventories and guides, he will find many dealing with the prewar period. Such records are organized quite differently from those of the war years, and the student interested in them would do well to familiarize himself first with the filing procedures of the time.[3]

The Army and Navy have their own guides to the records, prepared in the former case by the Departmental Records Branch of the Adjutant General's Office—since transferred to the National Archives—and in the latter by the Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These are not listed in any single publication as are those of the National Archives, but can ordinarily be obtained without difficulty from the originating agencies, both of which make provision for assistance, within the limits of existing laws and regulations, to students of military affairs.[4]

[2] For a general description of the problems involved in the use of federal records, see Philip C. Brooks, "The Historian's Stake in Federal Records," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIII, No. 2 (September 1956), pp. 259-74.

[3] Useful in this connection are Elizabeth Bethel, "Early Records of the War Department General Staff," *American Archivist*, XVIII (October 1945), pp. 241-47; and E. L. Huber, "War Department Records in the National Archives," *Military Affairs*, VI, No. 4 (Winter 1942), pp. 247-54.

[4] Among the Army's publications are *Guide to Records of the Adjutant General's Department, 1940-1945* (1950); *Guide to the Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, 1939-1946* (1949); *Descriptive List of Studies of the USAF Historical Division* (1956); *Inventory of Certain Records of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and U.S. Forces in the Philippines, July 1941—May 1942* (1952). The Navy's contribution is a

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The major depository of military records for the World War II period, in addition to the services themselves, which still hold some of the most important records of the war, is the World War II Records Division of the National Archives in Alexandria, Virginia. Formerly the Departmental Records Branch of the Army's Adjutant General's Office, the World War II Records Division was transferred with its records to the National Archives in 1958. At the time of its transfer, the Departmental Records Branch was a joint records depository serving headquarters agencies of both the Army and the Air Force, as well as the earlier War Department and, more recently, the Office, Secretary of Defense. This new division of the National Archives, still located temporarily in Alexandria, administers all permanent records of World War II and the postwar period transferred to the National Archives.[5]

Records for the period before World War II are located in the Archives Building in Washington and are administered by the War Records Division of the National Archives.[6] Each of the services has its own depositories of prewar and World War II records, largely unit and operational records. For the Army, these are held by the Kansas City Records Center; for the Navy, by the Naval Records Management Centers, the most important of which are those in Alexandria, Virginia, and in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, both transferred to General Services Administration (GSA) in July 1958. The Naval History Division retains control of the Navy's Operational Archives Branch in Arlington, Virginia; the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, also in Arlington, maintains the archives for the Marine Corps. Records dating from about 1920, including the operational material for World War II, are retained by the Historical Branch, located at Marine Headquarters in Arlington; the rest are in the National Archives and in the Federal Records Center, GSA, in Alexandria.

II. Prewar Records

The sources for the study of strategy in the prewar period are best considered separately, since they are maintained and organized somewhat differently from those dealing with World War II. It is useful

short pamphlet entitled *Brief Guide to U.S. Naval History Sources in the Washington, D.C., Area* (1957). On the question of access to the records, see *Army Regulation 345-230*, Hqs., Department of the Army, 5 November 1958 (with changes), which outlines the procedure to be followed in requesting permission to use classified records.

[5] Present plans call for moving the World War II Records Division to the Old Pension Building in Washington, D.C.

[6] The War Records Division is organized into various branches, including the World War I Branch, the Civil War Branch, and the Navy Branch, each of which maintains indices and files for its holdings.

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also, because of the reorganization of the General Staff after World War I, to divide these records into two general categories: (a) those for the period 1900 to 1919, and (b) those covering the years 1919 to 1942. During the earlier period, strategic planning was the function mainly of the Army and Navy War Colleges, the General Board of the Navy, and the Joint Army-Navy Board; in the latter period, the General Board played a minor role and the responsibility of the War Plans Divisions of the two services, and of the reorganized Joint Board and its Joint Planning Committee, increased greatly.

The role of the Joint Board in strategic planning has been consistently underrated. A pioneer in joint planning, the Board was responsible for the series of war plans known as the "color plans," as well as the RAINBOW 5 plan with which the United States went to war. But in the early period the Board was still imperfectly organized and had virtually no staff. As a result, it kept few records. Those for the years 1903 to 1919 occupy altogether about half a file drawer in the National Archives, where they can be used without restriction. Sparse as they are, these records, including correspondence, minutes of meetings, memoranda, strategic studies and plans, contain valuable nuggets and are well worth the time spent with them.

Perhaps no planning group was more influential in this early period than the General Board of the Navy, whose membership overlapped the Joint Board. Organized in 1900, three years before the Joint Board, the General Board consisted of senior admirals reporting to the Secretary on matters of naval policy and strategy. Its deliberations cover a wide range of matters of the first importance and its records constitute an indispensable source for the study of strategy during these years. Still classified, these records are located in the Navy's Operational Archives Branch.

The Army had no agency comparable to the General Board. The General Staff had been established in 1903, with the small group of planning officers assigned to the War College as part of the War College Division of the General Staff. Thus, the records of the early planning activities of the War Department General Staff became part of the records of the Army War College. These, as well as the records of the Office of the Chief of Staff and other general staff divisions, altogether over 4,000 cubic feet of records, constitute Record Group 165 of the National Archives holdings.[7] Frequently overlooked by the

[7] This collection is described in "Preliminary Checklist, Records of the War Department General Staff," prepared by Elizabeth Bethel (mimeographed).

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student of military affairs, this collection contains the Army's plans for a variety of situations, strategic studies, comments on plans developed by other agencies, memoranda, and other documents of interest and value in any survey of policy and strategy in the period 1903 to 1919.

The reorganization of the War and Navy Departments after World War I greatly increased the effectiveness of the organization for planning. A War Plans Division was established for each of the services, in the War Department on the General Staff level and in the Navy in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Joint Board, which had become inactive, was revived and given a Joint Planning Committee consisting of officers from the two War Plans Divisions. As a result, the role of the General Board in strategic planning declined, though it remained an important force in matters of naval policy, while that of the two war colleges virtually ceased.

The records of the prewar years, especially those immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, are essential to an understanding of World War II. Fortunately, with the passage of time, the records become more complete. The files of the Joint Board from 1919 to 1941, for example, are fully ten times more voluminous than those for 1903 to 1919. A large part of this material has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives, where it may be used freely. The same material, with the valuable addition of supporting memoranda and background studies reflecting the points of view of the Army and Navy, can be found in the World War II Records Division of the National Archives in Alexandria. Though not the official record of the Board, this collection represents the file of the Army members of the Joint Planning Committee and is in some ways a more valuable source than the original.

The records of the Army War Plans Division constitute the best single collection for the prewar period. Located in the World War II Records Division (NA Record Group 319) and carefully indexed by subject with cross references, this large body of material throws light on every major issue facing the Army during these years. The files are organized on a numerical system (*not* the Army decimal system) in which each number designates a particular subject. For identification the numbers are preceded by the symbol WPD, and within each file the documents are arranged by case number. The War Plans Division also maintained a full set of joint and Army plans, supported by "Development Files." Most of these are now in a special "Obsolete War Plans" collection in the World War II Records Division.

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III. Wartime Records

With the entry of the United States into war, existing agencies for planning were reorganized and greatly enlarged and new agencies established. Strategic planning was concentrated in the Army in the War Plans Division (redesignated the Operations Division in March 1942), which maintained excellent records not only of its own activities but also of those of joint and combined committees. Still classified, these records contain virtually a complete set of Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff papers, radio messages to and from the theater commanders, official correspondence, memoranda, strategic studies and plans, together with background and supporting documents.

The records of the Operations Division (OPD), practically all of which have been retired to the World War II Records Division of the National Archives, are maintained in separate groups. The radio messages, the largest and most complete collection outside the permanent central file (microfilmed) of the Department of the Army, form the OPD Message Center File. In this file are the incoming and outgoing messages, arranged by number, for the entire period of the war. In many ways, this collection is more convenient to use than the official file of the Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, which in addition maintained a Chief of Staff Log of messages between General Marshall and the theater commanders. This Log also contains the records of radio-telephone conversations (telecons) as well as the daily reports from the theaters.

The OPD Central File is the largest and most valuable of the Operations Division's wartime records, probably the most important single collection of World War II Army records dealing with strategy and policy. It is organized into two groups based on classification, and within each by subject under the Army decimal system, and by case number.[8] In each case the number is preceded by the identifying symbol OPD. Joint and combined records, including those of the subordinate committees and of the wartime meetings with the Allies, together with the studies and memoranda prepared by officers in the Operations Division, form still another separate collection of the wartime OPD records—perhaps the most important outside the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was collected by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD, and unlike other records of OPD is identified by the symbol ABC, combined with

[8] For a description of the system, see *War Department Decimal File System*, compiled under the direction of the Adjutant General, rev. ed., Washington, D.C., 1943, and supplements.

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a number assigned according to the Army decimal system. The Executive Office of OPD maintained an informal collection of records on matters of a particularly sensitive nature that required special handling. These were not organized in any systematic way, but there exists an index of the files in the collection, which was recently transferred to the World War II Records Division in Alexandria.

There is no convenient collection of records for the overseas commands comparable to that of the Operations Division. Some of them are in the Washington area, some in records centers in different parts of the country, and some remain in the theater under control of successor commands. The records of the overseas commands were further scattered by distribution among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The main Army collections are in the Kansas City Records Center. The records of Admiral Nimitz's headquarters are divided between the naval depository in Arlington, which holds the records of the Pacific Fleet, and the one in Mechanicsburg, where the records of the area and type commands are located. Some operational records are also located at the GSA Center in Alexandria. Marine Corps records, as indicated earlier, are retained for the most part in the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

IV. Manuscript Histories

Even when his subject and interests are limited, the student of World War II will in most cases be faced with an overabundance of records that on the surface meet every test of relevance and reliability. But as the researcher acquires familiarity with the record, he will develop an ability to distinguish quickly between the important and unimportant. Also, the speed with which he can screen a given number of feet of files will increase at a rapid rate. There is no substitute for this knowledge of the record, but the student should not ignore the signposts left by those who have traveled the road before him. Many of these, of course, will be found in published works, but for his purpose the unpublished manuscripts may prove even more valuable. Often these works were prepared by highly qualified scholars as part of an official program that was never intended for publication. Even when their authors were not so qualified, these manuscripts represent a careful survey of a large body of records, backed by official sanction, and often with the co-operation of participants in the events described. Thus, they not only may prove valuable as a guide to the records, but may supplement the records themselves.

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The number of manuscript histories dealing with World War II is very large indeed. Virtually every major agency in the War Department and every major command in the United States and overseas prepared a history of its activities during World War II. The Naval History Division alone has almost 300 such unpublished histories. The Army's Office of Military History has many more, and has eased the task of the researcher by preparing a series of Historical Manuscript Accession Lists which can be obtained on request. The Air Force, too, has a large number of these manuscripts, and, like the Office of Military History, publishes periodically a guide to these and other studies.

By far the most valuable and, professionally, among the most competent of the unpublished histories are those prepared by the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of particular interest are the two volumes of Lt. Grace P. Hayes on Pacific strategy; the projected three-volume work of Vernon E. Davis on the organization of the Joint Chiefs, two volumes of which are completed; and the unfinished manuscript of the late Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USN, titled "Evolution of Global Strategy." These are still classified, but there is some hope they may eventually be published.

Histories were prepared also in the overseas commands, very often by historians in uniform, and these constitute a primary source for the student of the war, since they are based on theater records and represent the theater point of view. The program in General MacArthur's area was perhaps the most ambitious, though the results in terms of quality are disappointing. In addition to a two-volume over-all history covering Allied and Japanese operations in the Southwest Pacific, it produced administrative histories of subordinate commands and intelligence activities as well as a number of monographs, all on file in the Army's Office of Military History. Greatest interest, perhaps, attaches to the two over-all volumes known as the "MacArthur History." Prepared after the war under the direction of Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, these volumes are based on extensive research in Allied and Japanese records. A very limited number of copies—five, in all—were printed in Japan, and one of these, with 32 foot-lockers of supporting material, is on file in the World War II Records Division in Alexandria.

In a separate category from manuscripts prepared by historians in uniform are those written by senior commanders as a record of their contribution to victory. In a sense, these are not histories at all, though they are cast in historical form, but primary sources. Their value, however, is undeniable. For the Pacific, there are three such narratives—one by General Barnes, first commander of Army forces in Australia,

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one by General Harmon, and one by Admiral Halsey;[9] for Europe, there is General Eisenhower's report, covering his command in the Mediterranean. All are on file in the Office of Military History.

V. The Enemy

Among the richest spoils of Allied victory were the archival remnants of the Axis powers. These archives included not only military records but also those of the Foreign Office and civilian agencies of the German and Japanese governments. They provide a particularly fruitful source for both diplomatic and military historians, as well as students of the political, social, and economic life of Germany and Japan during the decade of the 1930's. For the history of World War II, in its military and political aspects, these records are as indispensable as the records of the Allied powers, and often more accessible.

The German records seized by British and American authorities were divided between the two countries and by agreement remained under joint control for classification and disposition. The former retained the German Foreign Office, Admiralty, and Air Force operational records; the latter, Air Force technical documents and the records of the German Army, SS, the Nazi Party, and various civilian agencies.[10] The bulk of the American holdings, about 21,000 linear feet, were deposited with the World War II Records Division, but significant portions found their way to other depositories such as the Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution at Stanford, and the Air University.[11] Some of the documents were used for the Nürnberg Trials and some in the State Department's *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*. But in general the German records were not available to scholars and their contents were known only in broadest outline until 1954. Since that time, under the impetus of a group of American historians interested

[9] Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, "The Organization and Activities of the U.S. Army Forces in Australia"; Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, "The Army in the South Pacific"; Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., "Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, 20 April 1942–15 June 1944" (typescripts).

[10] For a description of these records, see Dagmar Horna Perman, "Microfilming of German Records in the National Archives," *American Archivist*, XXII (October 1959), pp. 433-43, and the article immediately following by Francis Lowenheim, surveying the existing guides to the microfilmed German records. See also Fritz T. Epstein, "Washington Research Opportunities in the Period of World War II," *ibid.*, XVII (July 1954), pp. 223-37.

[11] Captured German Army documents are generally above the division level; most of the records for units below division fell into Soviet hands and are probably in the possession of the East Germans. The German Air Force collection—the so-called von Rohden Collection—was brought together at the Air University for use in writing a history of German Air Force operations. A microfilm copy is in the Library of Congress. German Air Force technical documents are located in Akron, Ohio.

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in German history, the American Historical Association, working jointly with the National Archives, has been microfilming these records as well as the British collection of Foreign Office records before they are returned to the German government. This microfilm program is still in progress and the records, with the guides and data sheets prepared during the filming, are available to all interested scholars in the National Archives, which also holds the rich collection of exhibits prepared for the Nürnberg Trials.

The Japanese side of the war, though not as fully documented as the German, can be reconstructed from a variety of sources. The chief of these, in the absence of records destroyed by the air raids over Japan and by the Japanese themselves, is the series of monographs known as *Japanese Studies in World War II*. Prepared by former Japanese Army and Navy officers in Tokyo after the war, working under the direction of the Historical Section, G-2, of the Far East Command, these monographs cover almost every aspect of the war in considerable detail. Where available, records were used in their preparation, but more frequently the studies are based on recollections of the officers involved, on personal diaries, and on information furnished the authors. The subjects covered range widely and include politico-military matters as well as strategy, logistics, administration and operations of Japanese ground, air, and naval forces.[12]

In addition to these studies, the Far East Command assembled from a variety of sources a unique collection of Imperial General Headquarters directives and orders for the wartime period. Altogether, there are 17 volumes in the collection, nine of which contain directives of the Army Section and Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters, while the rest consist of Army and Navy orders. In addition, the Historical Section of the Far East Command prepared another eight volumes of interrogations and statements of Japanese wartime officials.[13] All in all, the contribution of the Far East Command to the study of the Japanese side of the war represents the most valuable single collection of Japanese material in existence.

Another major contribution to the study of the war is the work of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). The result of this survey,

[12] For a list of these monographs, see the Accession List prepared by the Office of Military History, which has on file copies of both the Japanese and the English version. There are about 180 volumes in the series, a number of which have been reproduced for limited distribution. The series is unclassified and available for use in the Office of Military History.

[13] *Personal History Statements*, 2 vols.; *Interrogations of Japanese Officials on World War II*, 2 vols.; *Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II*, 4 vols.

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undertaken after the war in both Germany and Japan to measure the effect of strategic bombardment, was a series of published reports dealing with all aspects of the enemy's war effort.

For the prewar period, the best single source for the study of the steps by which Japan entered the war is the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The testimony and exhibits of the Tribunal, stored in the World War II Records Division, represent an invaluable collection of primary source material for almost every phase of Japanese history in the decade preceding Pearl Harbor. The judgment of the Tribunal issued in November 1948, itself a multi-volume work, is an additional source of considerable value.

One further collection of Japanese records should be noted, though these were not examined by the author. This is a collection seized by U.S. authorities after the war and containing records of the Japanese Army and Navy Ministries dating from the turn of the century. Before these records were returned to Japan in the fall of 1958, microfilm copies of certain documents were made by the Naval History Division and of others by a group of scholars under a grant from the Ford Foundation. These, like the German microfilm records, are on file in the National Archives.[14]

VI. Reference Works

There exist a number of works of reference that can greatly lighten the labors of research and the student should be aware of them at an early stage in his work. The most useful are chronologies and collections of statistical data. Most of the chronologies of the World War II period are of limited usefulness for military purposes. There are, however, several important exceptions: a recent publication of the Office of Military History entitled *Chronology, 1941-1945*, compiled by Mary H. Williams (Washington, D.C., GPO, 1960); *Naval Chronology, World War II*, prepared by the Naval History Division (Washington, D.C., 1955); and *Chronology of World War II*, prepared by the Air War College at Maxwell Field, Alabama.

Statistical data on a variety of subjects have been compiled but are not yet consolidated in any single work. Army strength and casualty figures can be found in *Strength of the Army (STM-30)*, prepared in the Adjutant General's Office (Washington, D.C., 1948); and in *Army Battle Casualties and Non-Battle Deaths in World War II, Final Report*,

[14] The original collection, comprising 7,000 linear feet, is described by James W. Morley, "Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IX, No. 3 (May 1950), pp. 306-33.

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prepared under the direction of the Office of the Comptroller, Department of the Army. Naval casualties, including Marines, can be obtained from *The History of the Medical Department of the U.S. Navy Department in World War II*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1953-1954). Other statistical collections are *Statistical Review, World War II* (1946), prepared by the Control Division, Army Service Forces, and a volume in preparation for the Army series and available in incomplete form in the Office of Military History, as are the other references noted above. This last work is tentatively titled "U.S. Army in World War II: Statistics" and is being prepared under the direction of Theodore E. Whiting in the Office of the Comptroller.

VII. Official Publications

Official publications dealing with the war include the published histories of each of the services and of the Allies (which alone constitute a formidable library), the reports of the wartime chiefs and major commanders, and, finally, official collections of documents. The most ambitious of the official series is *U.S. Army in World War II*, prepared in the Office of Military History (OCMH) under the general editorship of Kent Roberts Greenfield (and more recently Stetson Conn) and published by the Government Printing Office. Of the more than 80 volumes projected, about 50 have been published to date and at least a dozen more are in the process of publication. Detailed descriptions of them can be found in *Reader's Guide to the U.S. Army in World War II Series*, published by OCMH and available from that office, which has a well-deserved reputation for giving excellent assistance to scholars who wish to work in the Army's records.

The historical program of the U.S. Air Force produced seven volumes dealing with World War II when the Air Forces were a part of the Army. Unlike the Army series, of which it was a part, *Army Air Forces in World War II* was published by the University of Chicago Press. Each volume in the series is the product of many hands, working under the editorship of Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate.

The Navy's historical program for World War II did not contemplate the publication of a series, but by arrangement with Samuel Eliot Morison, Professor of History at Harvard and a Rear Admiral in the Naval Reserve, a semi-official *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* was undertaken, to be published by Little, Brown and Company in Boston. The final and fourteenth volume in this series, *Victory in the Pacific*, was published at the close of 1960.

The Historical Branch of the Marine Corps has to its credit a long list

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of publications on World War II. Its program was envisaged as consisting of two phases—first, the preparation of monographs on each campaign in which the Marines participated; and, second, a five-volume series entitled *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, all to be published by the Government Printing Office. The first phase, which produced 15 monographs, has been completed and an excellent start was made on the second phase with the publication in 1958 of the first volume of the series, which carries the Marine story through the Guadalcanal campaign.

The official historical programs of our allies during World War II have produced a number of volumes to date. Of first importance is the British series, *History of the Second World War*, edited by J. R. M. Butler and published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Four of a projected six volumes on grand strategy have already appeared. Though undocumented, these volumes are among the best yet published on the war.[15] The Australian series, like the British, is organized into separate subseries by service but does not include a series on strategy. Two of the Army volumes, one on air operations, and one on the Navy have been published thus far in Canberra, with a total of three more still to come. New Zealand, Canada, and the Union of South Africa have their own official histories of the war, as do the Dutch and others.

The number of official publications issued by the services and other agencies of the government during and immediately after the war is enormous. These cover such a wide variety of subjects and are so uneven in quality and reliability that it would be impractical to discuss them here. But no survey of the sources for the prewar period would be complete without noting the contributions of the State Department in its *Foreign Relations* volumes, and the projected series on the wartime conferences, of which only the Malta-Yalta volume has thus far been published. Nor should the student overlook the reports of Generals Marshall and Arnold to the Secretary of War, and of Admiral King to the Secretary of the Navy. These were published in several forms and were widely distributed, appearing finally in a single volume, edited by Walter Millis, as *The War Reports of . . . Marshall . . . Arnold . . . and King* (New York, 1947). Finally, there are the reports of the wartime commanders, such as those of General Eisenhower for the Euro-

[15] The most useful of the strategy volumes are J. R. M. Butler, *Grand Strategy: September 1939—June 1941* (1957), and John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy: August 1943—September 1944* (1956). One other study in the British series that should be consulted is S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea*, projected in three volumes, of which two have been published.

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pean theater, of General Wilson, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, General Wavell, and others.

VIII. Memoirs and Biography

Among the most useful material on World War II, second only to the records themselves, are the memoirs and the authorized biographies, which are often only thinly disguised memoirs. The list of such books is large, and only the most important need be noted here. For the highest levels of policy and strategy, there is *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 13 vols. (New York, 1938-1950), as well as the numerous biographies of Roosevelt and the Roosevelt era, easily obtainable in any large library. The leading historians of the Roosevelt period, Frank Freidel, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and James McG. Burns, have not yet reached the war period in their multi-volume works, but will undoubtedly cover them during the next few years. The most valuable of the biographies is Robert E. Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York, 1948). The volumes of Winston Churchill's *The Second World War*, perhaps the finest single account of the war, are essential to an understanding of the conduct of the war, as are the volumes of General de Gaulle.

An unparalleled glimpse of the workings of the War Department and of the leading figures of the high command can be found in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), and in the Stimson Papers at the Yale University Library. Though Stimson did not figure prominently in the shaping of strategy, he was very close to those who did. *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), edited by Walter Millis, is most valuable for the last year of the war and for the postwar period an indispensable source. On the political level, somewhat removed from the center of the stage, the student can consult *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. (New York, 1948); the two works of Joseph C. Grew: *Ten Years in Japan, 1932-1942* (New York, 1944), especially useful for the prewar period, and *Turbulent Era*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1952), edited by Walter Johnson; and the works of Stettinius, Byrnes, Sumner Welles, and various other diplomats and officials.

On the military side of the high command, we are fortunate in having the memoirs of three of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold.[16] All of these are,

[16] Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York, 1950; E. J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*, New York, 1952; H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission*, New York, 1949.

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of course, crucial for the study of strategy and command. General Marshall never wrote his memoirs, but a definitive three-volume biography, undertaken with Marshall's consent and co-operation, is in preparation by Forrest C. Pogue, Research Director of the George C. Marshall Research Foundation. Until it appears, the student will have to rely on two journalistic biographies: William Frye, *Marshall, Citizen Soldier* (Indianapolis, 1947), and Robert Payne, *The Marshall Story* (New York, 1951). A British view of U.S. strategy and the high command can be found in the provocative memoir-biography of Lord Alanbrooke, *The Turn of the Tide* (New York, 1957), and *Triumph in the West* (New York, 1960) by Arthur Bryant.

IX. Unit Histories

The histories of units, ranging in size from separate regiments and lower to field armies and army groups, are most useful for operational and administrative history, but in some cases they may prove of value for other purposes. Virtually every separate unit prepared a history of one kind or another during the war, since regulations required them to do so. These are on file in the Records Administration Center in Kansas City, where they can be consulted readily.

In addition to these unpublished histories, there are a great number of published histories of units and, for the Navy, of ships of all types. To list them would be a tedious and unrewarding exercise, and there is no need to do so for there are several excellent bibliographies to these histories. The student can consult these for any unit or vessel in which he may be interested. Major credit for the preparation of the bibliographies belongs to C. E. Dornbusch of the New York Public Library, who has made a specialty of unit histories and gathered for the Library the largest collection of such histories outside Washington.[17]

X. General Works and Special Studies

Books and articles on all aspects of World War II already represent a library of considerable size. And if the output continues at the present pace, as there is every indication that it will, in volume alone this material will present the student of the war with a real problem. There is

[17] For Army units, see *Unit Histories of World War II* (1950), issued by the Office of Military History; *Unit Histories of World War II and After: U.S. Army* (1953), issued by the Adjutant General; and C. E. Dornbusch, compiler, *Histories of American Army Units, World Wars I and II and Korean Conflict* (1956). For Navy and Marine units, see *Post-War Souvenir Books and Unit Histories of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Construction Battalions, World War II* (1953), compiled by Mr. Dornbusch and issued by the Naval History Division.

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no over-all bibliography of World War II, nor, so far as the author knows, is one in preparation. The task of the student is made more difficult by the fact that much of the most useful material appears in article form in journals that are not indexed in the standard periodical guides. How can he find these articles, therefore, except by examining every issue of a fairly large number of journals, some of them difficult to obtain, for almost a twenty-year period?[18] There is, unfortunately, no single reliable guide to this material, but the task of the researcher is lightened somewhat by the existence of two publications: the *National Defense Review*, issued by the Army Library from 1947 to 1955, and the *Periodical Index* of the Air University Library. The first, a classified publication, was published monthly and abstracted articles from about 800 periodicals from all countries as well as a large variety of other publications on military matters not normally catalogued elsewhere. The Air University *Periodical Index* is published quarterly and screens more than 50 periodicals. For articles and books published during the war years, there are two useful guides, one compiled by Henry O. Spier entitled *World War II in Our Magazines and Books, September 1939 to September 1945* (New York, 1945), and one by Donald H. Mugridge of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, *Bibliographies of the World at War*, January 1946.

Perhaps the most valuable guides to the periodical literature as well as to books dealing with World War II are the bibliographical sections appearing as regular features in various military journals. The most detailed of these is the bibliography in the *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, published quarterly in Paris by the Historical Committee of the Second World War, Society for the History of War. Each issue of *Military Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the American Military Institute with headquarters in Washington, contains a section entitled "Military Library," and *Military Review*, the monthly journal of the Command and General Staff College, abstracts the leading articles from military journals throughout the world. Naval literature is covered in the *American Neptune* under the title "Recent Writings in Maritime History," prepared by Professor Robert G. Albion of Harvard. Begun in 1952, this section summarized in its first two issues the books and articles (screened from over 350 periodicals) published between 1945 and 1951.

For general works on World War II, including the background of

[18] See Max L. Marshall, "A Survey of Military Periodicals," an M. A. thesis prepared at the University of Missouri, 1952, which describes 89 military periodicals; a copy is in the Army Library in the Pentagon.

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the war, the student will find useful the *Harvard Guide to American History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), the World War II portion of which was prepared by Professor Morison. *Writings on American History*, published annually by the American Historical Association as a volume of its annual report, contains a fairly full listing of works on military subjects, and its editor, James R. Masterson, worked in the Army historical program before he assumed his present position. There are several naval bibliographies which list background materials for World War II, especially the Pacific area,[19] and the excellent *Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952* (New York, 1954), prepared under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, contains many helpful leads for the student of the war.

Despite the volume of writing on World War II, there is no scholarly brief history based on research in the records and only a few general histories that provide an over-all view and an introduction to the more detailed and specialized works on the war. The two best such volumes are by English military historians of considerable experience and ability, J. F. C. Fuller, and Cyril Falls. The two-volume text and atlas prepared by Cols. T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito for use at the U.S. Military Academy, *A Military History of World War II* (West Point, 1953), is a more detailed work, accurate and reliable, emphasizing, as its title implies, military operations. Two other general histories worth mentioning are R. W. Shugg and H. A. DeWeerd, *World War II: A Concise History* (Washington, D.C., 1946), and H. C. O'Neill (Strategicus), *A Short History of the Second World War* (New York, 1950).

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war have produced probably a larger literature than any other aspect of World War II, much of it partisan and controversial in nature. For those who wish to investigate the problems associated with the Pearl Harbor attack, there are two surveys of the literature in the field, one by the present author, "Pearl Harbor in Perspective," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (April 1955), and the other by Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (March 1957). The basic documents for the study of the attack have been noted above under official publications and Japanese records—the Pearl Harbor hearings and the records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The best

[19] *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on U.S. Naval History, Naval Biography, Naval Strategy and Tactics*, prepared by the Naval History Division, Washington, D.C., 1956; Robert G. Albion, *Maritime and Naval History: An Annotated Bibliography*, published by the author, 1951; W. B. Ellinger and H. Rosinski, *Sea Power in the Pacific, 1936-1941*, Princeton, N.J., 1942.

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account of American foreign policy in the years immediately preceding the Japanese attack is the two-volume work of William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation* (New York, 1952) and *The Undeclared War* (New York, 1953). On the Japanese side, Herbert Feis's *Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, N.J., 1950) provides the best summary of the available Japanese evidence. The so-called "revisionist" school is represented by Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War* (New Haven, 1948), and Charles C. Tansill, *Back-door to War* (Chicago, 1952). Admiral Kimmel has registered a vehement protest against the verdict of the investigating committee in *Admiral Kimmel's Story* (Chicago, 1955), with strong support from Admiral Theobald's *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (New York, 1954). The story of the attack itself is dramatically presented by Walter Lord in his *Day of Infamy* (New York, 1957).[20]

The grand strategy of the war, like the question of war guilt, has come under the close scrutiny of many military critics and scholars and is the subject of continued controversy. The close of the war, including the role of the Soviet Union, the use of the atomic bomb, and unconditional surrender, has also received considerable attention and generated a literature of its own. These and similar questions are discussed in the official histories, general histories of the war, and memoirs noted above, but other works dealing specifically with grand strategy and war aims should be mentioned. An excellent introduction to the subject can be found in three small books, all of them readable and based on wide knowledge—one by the former Chief Historian of the Army, Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The Historian and the Army* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1954), one by Professor Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Boston, 1958), and the third by the British military historian, Alfred H. Burne, *Strategy in World War II* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1947). More detailed but equally readable and informed is Herbert Feis's *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin* (Princeton, N.J., 1957). Somewhat along the same line, but more general and useful largely for background, is William Hardy McNeill's *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, 1953). The student will also find useful several of the essays in Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New

[20] Among the many other books on Pearl Harbor are several that deserve particular note for a variety of reasons: Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, New York, 1950; Walter Millis, *This Is Pearl! The United States and Japan*, New York, 1947; George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War*, New York, 1947; William H. Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade*, Chicago, 1950; Frederick C. Sanborn, *Design for War*, New York, 1951; Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, *How War Came*, New York, 1942; and Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, Caldwell, Idaho, 1953.

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York, 1950). More provocative and more directly related to the subject of grand strategy is Hanson W. Baldwin's *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York, 1950), like the volumes by Greenfield and Morison a small book but one that every student of the war should know, and Chester Wilmot's *Struggle for Europe* (New York, 1952).

No doubt, each student will have his own list of the most important books on World War II, many of which have probably not been mentioned here. No one is more aware of these omissions than the present writer, but every attempt to meet such criticism produced a lengthy bibliography. If this research note stimulates the preparation of such a bibliography, it will have served a very useful purpose indeed.

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Review Articles

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE MILITARY DECISION

By ROBERT E. KUENNE

Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960. 405 pp. $9.50.

A PRACTITIONER of the social sciences may be forgiven his moments of Parkinsonian cynicism. At such times it seems that "research" in his field consists in the derivation of ponderous solutions to problems concocted solely to exhaust the time available from a growing body of print-minded confreres. Rare or plentiful as such moments may be—and in economics they are not unknown—they do inspire an enhanced appreciation of skillful applications of fundamental techniques to current and important social problems. In the case in point, Hitch and McKean have produced a work whose analytics are basic but imaginative and whose problem area is vital indeed.

In no other applied field are the contributions of economists more diverse than in the study of national security. They range from the geo-economic catalogues found in the typical economics-of-defense textbook, to the discussion of governmental control machinery and techniques, considerations of political economy in the grander style, and, more recently, the application of a broadening spectrum of formal decision-making schemata to defense problems at all levels. It is in a restricted portion of this last area—perhaps the phrase "defense management economics" is as accurate as any in defining the limits of this subarea—that Hitch and McKean have devoted their major efforts, although they have dealt to some extent with more traditional topics as well.

The authors' major thesis is this: most national security decision-making contains the elements of the classic economic problem, in that it involves the application of scarce, non-specific resources to the attainment of a set of alternative ends with differential worths. While there are probably insurmountable obstacles in the way of quantitative application of the economist's tools to most of these strategic problems, the use of economic frameworks of analysis for organizing one's thinking

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in qualitative terms about them is invaluable. Therefore, the techniques of welfare economics, by which the economist seeks to measure "best" or "better" resource allocation and "more" or "most" welfare, may be applied with fruitful, if limited, results to national security problems.

The core concept in welfare economics is that of "Paretian optimality," through the use of which "efficient" allocations may be isolated from "non-efficient" alternatives. An allocation is "Pareto optimal" if, and only if, no other feasible allocation can fulfill one or more ends to a more-preferred extent without leaving at least one other end satisfied in a less-preferred manner. For example, if fixed amounts of lemon drops and caramels are distributed in some manner to a group of children, the distribution will be optimal in the sense of Pareto if, and only if, it is impossible to make exchanges among the children which leave every child feeling at least as well satisfied as he was with the pre-exchange distribution and one or more better satisfied.

Efficiency in this sense is a "weak" criterion of welfare optimality, because in the general case it yields a fairly large set of "better" solutions rather than a small subset of "best" answers. Its use in an analysis reflects a lack of power over the allocation problem which could be obtained by a stronger index of welfare. The inability to specify such an index springs most frequently from one of two groups of difficulties: (1) an inability to measure—either in any manner or with sufficient uniqueness to satisfy the analytical framework—the manifestations of welfare (Hitch and McKean term this the intangibility problem); or, (2) given satisfactory measurement of such phenomena, an inability to combine such measurements into a single index of welfare which can be maximized or minimized (the authors term this the problem of incommensurables).

Hitch and McKean might well have put greater and more frequent stress upon the difficulties of measuring "military effectiveness" in most strategic situations. In an exhortatory work of this nature there exists the danger that both authors and reader will be pulled by the inertia of the argument into a forgetfulness of fundamental limitations which brief, periodic qualifications will not obviate. In the authors' concentrated discussion of these problems, the emphasis is placed upon the incommensurability problem, while the problems of intangibility are slighted (Chapter 10). In addition to the recommendation that "proximate criteria" be sought to replace some unattainable index of welfare, extended consideration of the problems of measurement of "utility" in a cardinal and ordinal fashion, as well as a discussion of the degree of

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uniqueness required by the techniques denoted, would have been welcome.

Does the introduction of the concept of "efficiency" in the Paretian sense produce a greater facility in reaching intuitive solutions to defense problems? Drawing from their fund of experience, the authors are quite persuasive in demonstrating the limits to undisciplined intuition in the field. In some respects it is comforting to see that the simplest lessons are the most valuable after all, and, therefore, that Paretian optimality has a contribution to make to operational decision-making. Yet, in a deeper sense, it is disappointing that after fifty years of post-Pareto theorizing the economist is largely limited to weak criteria for allocation to achieve static ends in a certain world.

The slighting of uncertainty is a damaging restriction to the application of the analysis in the field of national security. In their one extensive quantitative demonstration of these decision-making techniques, Hitch and McKean apply a "dynamic" programming approach to a hypothetical problem of determining optimal inventories of transport aircraft for two consecutive periods of time. The objective is to obtain a minimum-cost fleet-sequence of transport aircraft which yields *exactly* (a canonical minimum problem) a specified transport capability in each of the two periods. It is an interesting application of managerial economics to a defense problem, with a simple index of welfare (dollars) and a Paretian optimal criterion (least cost). The most troublesome problem is assumed to have a predetermined solution: how much transport capacity is optimal?

The answer to this question is taken to involve two contingencies: (1) a "stationary state" tonnage flow to overseas bases in peacetime and (2) the tonnage needs springing from a specifically defined brushfire war which might erupt. Tonnage requirements for the peacetime stationary flow and for the hypothetical brushfire war are weighted equally, so that for all practical purposes the latter is considered a certainty equivalent. But if one were to object to this procedure and wish to discount for the lower likelihood of the war, what techniques could he use? Is a .1 likelihood of a war which would require 10,000 tons of transport capacity equivalent to 1,000 tons of capacity required with certainty? This is not an intuitively plausible projection of "expected utility" reasoning. What are the proper likelihood discounts over the components of the welfare index? One is tempted to the heretical position that it is best to let the sleeping dogs of Pentagon intuition lie undisturbed.

The one point where potential negative implications of the authors'

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principal thesis are revealed is their treatment of time. To this reviewer, Chapter 11 is the most unsatisfactory portion of the book, revealing the possibility that straightforward application of some economic frameworks to national security problems may misguide the decision-maker. In this regard, two distinct questions may be raised.

First, in the typical economic problem involving the investment of a stream of inputs over time and the receipt therefrom of a stream of receipts over time, under conditions of certainty it is legitimate to discount costs and receipts of the same time period at the same rate. Receipts and costs are measured in a homogeneous unit—the dollar—and, more importantly, the discounting process reflects a common implication of time for both receipts and costs. That is, in an economy with a positive interest rate which reflects an identifiable marginal productivity of invested resources, money may be viewed as having a propensity to multiply by virtue of time itself, and, therefore, its current value either as cost or revenue is greater than its future value. If we were to leave the world of certainty, however, and if differential risks affected the stream of revenues and costs, it would be necessary to discount revenues and costs for identical periods at different rates.

When we approach the problem of "investing" a stream of dollar inputs to obtain a stream of "military worth" outputs over time, this homogeneity of costs and revenues disappears. Quite apart from the problem of the intangibility of "military worth"—let us assume heroically that we have succeeded in measuring it in dollar units which are meaningful and commensurable with costs—the purposes of discounting both sides of the ledger are now distinctly different. In a world of certainty, the rate at which we discount costs reflects as before the sacrifice of feasible self-multiplying alternatives at the margin (a magnitude which is not self-evidently the free market interest rate, as we shall discuss below). On the other hand, the pattern of discount rates applicable to the stream of military worth outputs will be determined by the dates (in our case, foreseen with certainty) at which wars will occur, the relative depth and breadth of enemy preparation for war, the technological nature of the "military worth" obtainable from specific investment projects, and like considerations.

If a decision-maker were absolutely certain that effective disarmament would become a reality in 1965, and that the problem of "investment" he faced was to deter the Soviet Union until that date, he would discount military returns in 1966 and thereafter at a rate approaching infinity, while the costs of phasing-out in the post-disarmament period would be discounted at the appropriate rate defined in the

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previous paragraph. More realistic cases, where no discrete cutoff point is involved and where uncertainty bedevils the decision-making, complicate but do not upset the reasoning.

Hitch and McKean speak consistently of costs and returns in the same breath, and discuss their discounting as if a common rate were appropriate. This is an unwarranted projection of economic reasoning into a situation which has only a surface resemblance to a classic economic problem. Indeed, one could form the hypothesis that even where an appropriate discount rate for costs could be agreed upon, its practical impact upon the selection of an optimal program would be swamped by the much different discount patterns applicable to benefit streams under existing military technology and world conditions. Some (admittedly qualified) evidence for this is furnished by the quantitative analysis in the fleet-sequence problem: for a time-stream of transport capabilities fixed in amounts and time-shape, discounting costs at rates up to 25 per cent had neutral effects upon the minimum-cost ranking of alternative fleet-sequences.

The second question is concerned with the determination of a meaningful pattern of discount rates for the cost streams of national security investment. Hitch and McKean are properly undogmatic as to the method of determining the rate pattern to be used. They argue, however, that for the medium run, since the government might repay debt, reduce its borrowing, or even lower taxes as alternatives to increased defense spending, a proper basic rate might be the government security rate of return plus a risk premium (p. 210). According to this argument, when new weapons systems are being considered for which budgetary provision has not yet been sought, the alternative might be to allow the resources to remain in the private investment sector of the economy, in which case the rate of return on investment in the private sector would be appropriate (p. 214). The authors stress the essential rule-of-thumb nature of any such estimates, and suggest that 6 or 8 per cent might be adequate (pp. 213-14).

It may be that the problems which Hitch and McKean raise are merely interesting, not important. Yet they reflect a neglect of an indisputably important general problem: relating economic magnitudes which emerge from the free market mechanism to the decision-making of the governmental mechanism. The interest rate in the former may be taken to reflect the community's marginal time preference and marginal return on investment (as well as its marginal attitudes to risk, the marginal attractions of liquidity, and all the rest). But the theoretical ability of the government to enter free capital markets does

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not argue that the realistic operation of the governmental mechanism makes borrowing a feasible alternative to taxation in the financing of national security expenditures. It follows that the free market premium on current resources would not be compellingly relevant to decisions about collective goods.

A bold theorist might argue in this fashion: government decision-makers effect a division of resources between private and public uses over the longer pull by equating to unity the "community's marginal rate of substitution" (a *very* bold theorist!) of dollars used for individualistic goods (including future goods) for dollars employed for collective goods. Were this done, the theorist might well be able to abstract from the complications of time as they affect the free market and turn his attention (with an acceptable amount of *ceteris paribus*) to the peculiar problems of governmental resource allocation. If the number of government "investment" projects which have an easily identified marginal productivity is negligible and/or if they are not effective alternatives to national security expenditure in the actual operation of the governmental system, he may well be able to discount benefits alone. The "interest rate" applicable to the stream of costs may be zero under this interpretation, reflecting a mechanism and a set of goods which are qualitatively different from the mechanism and goods which have shaped the economist's vision of the free market process.

In demonstrating the insights derivable from economic frameworks in other areas, Hitch and McKean have been brilliantly successful. Their presentation of the case for the program budget as opposed to the object budget is one example. One question may be raised in the light of their subsequent analysis: if, as they indicate, programs defined in numbers and types of equipment are not acceptable, will not the intangibility-incommensurability problems lead to the vacuous descriptions of programs quoted illustratively by the authors? Might not those Congressional bodies concerned with military budget matters then proceed as Hitch and McKean have done, by assuming the qualities and quantities of programs as given? Might they not then be concerned with a check on the "efficiency" of the given programs—i.e., least cost? And, then, might not Congressman Taber's preference for an object budget make a good deal of sense, if, indeed, it affords clearer insights into inordinate expenditures? In all other areas of consideration, however, the authors' recommendations of the program budget have a powerful force.

The presentation of the interdependence of decision-making arising from spillover effects from one program on others, of the matter of

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joint costs, of the problems and role of suboptimization, and of the applicability of market-type institutions or procedures to security decisions is of similarly fine quality.

In those portions of the book which do not have an immediate bearing upon the major theme, the reader tends to hold the discussion somewhat unfairly up to the standards of originality set in the discussion of welfare economics. The comparison of the economic strength of the United States, Russia, and other major powers in Chapter 6 manifests eminent good sense; and the discussion of the broader economics of military research and development, based on Klein's and Meckling's work, is sparkling in its insights and contains the finest material written on the subject. Since Wohlstetter's "Balance of Terror" piece has become a "current classic," readily available in the original and already reprinted, one may question the decision to include it, particularly because it is not commandingly germane to the economics of national defense.

One may also question the initial assumption that the nation need not prepare for limited wars on a large scale or long in duration. The authors argue that since this type of war is "least likely," insuring against it is not sensible (pp. 14, 313). It might be pointed out that "least likely" is not "unlikely," and that one may indeed (and usually does) insure himself against unlikely contingencies if the stakes are great. Nor does it tax the imagination to see the possibility of a limited war absorbing 30 per cent or more of our resources over long periods without providing overpowering incentives for mutual suicide on either side.

The appendix by Alain Enthoven contains a presentation of the general theory of maximization, embracing the cases of an internal maximum for continuous, differentiable functions, linear and nonlinear programming, and the zero-sum, two-person game. The discussion of quasi-concave, concave, and convex functions in their relation to maximization is extremely good, and should be recommended to economists on its own merits.

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POLITICAL REALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

By ROBERT W. TUCKER

Kenneth W. Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960. 261 pp. $5.00.

I

A FULL understanding of political realism is needed, Kenneth Thompson writes in the preface of his recent study, "if American statesmen and scholars are to advance public understanding and awareness of the realities of international life and close the gap between what leaders feel and do and what the people imagine they do. Therefore the central aim I have had in mind is a careful explication, first, of the origins of political realism as an approach to American foreign policy, and, secondly, of its implications for the major unsolved problems of America's relations with the rest of the world" (p. vii).

What is political realism? No doubt, it implies a commitment to get at the truth about matters political, to see political life as it really is. The first realist in modern political thought, Machiavelli, considered it "more proper to go to the real truth of the matter than to its imagination," unlike "many [who] have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known. . . ."[1] Among contemporary writers, Hans Morgenthau, in elaborating a realist theory of international politics, emphasizes the "theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take place. . . ."[2] A similar emphasis marks Mr. Thompson's study of political realism.

If a concern with reality, a commitment to see things as they actually are, is the principal mark of political realism, it is hardly a very distinctive one. With rare exceptions, the political observer and, even more, the political actor have always professed a similar commitment. From this point of view, there are very few who would not qualify as realists. If political realism represents a distinctive theory of politics, its distinction must be found in the way it conceives of political reality, in the

[1] Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Modern Library ed., New York, 1940. chap. xv, p. 56.

[2] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 3rd ed., New York, 1960, p. 4.

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assumptions and generalizations it makes about the behavior of collectives, and in the prescriptions it addresses to the statesman. Mr. Thompson is aware of this. In examining the ideas of contemporary "philosophers, columnists, and policy planners" regarded as perhaps most representative of political realism, his intent is to distill "a body of common principles or a core of residual truths reflecting the essence of their approach" (p. 8). Among the characteristics common to these contemporary realists are a sense of history which promotes an awareness that collectives "tend within broad limits to react in similar ways to similar situations," the assumption that an understanding of politics is "inseparable from a clear picture of human nature," the rejection of a simple rationalistic faith in the inevitability of human progress, and a "viable, workable, concept of politics" which presupposes that "success in politics . . . is contingent on an understanding of its principles or laws" (pp. 8-14).

These are very general characteristics. Nowhere in his analysis, though, does Mr. Thompson seriously attempt to narrow them further and to give them a more specific and precise meaning. This reluctance is understandable, since the nature of the difficulties that such an attempt might well encounter is suggested by the realists who are considered. If a clear view of human nature and the rejection of a simple rationalistic faith are essential ingredients of political realism, it is not easy to reconcile the views expressed by Hans J. Morgenthau in *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* with the convictions reflected in Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*. Nor is it a simple task to juxtapose the realism of an E. H. Carr with the realism of a Reinhold Niebuhr. And among the policy planners, how are we to account for the differences between a George Kennan and a Paul Nitze[3] on the critical issue of the role that military power must play in diplomacy?

Further examples might be given from among those "self-conscious realists" who Mr. Thompson declares share common assumptions and operate within a common framework, but the point need not be labored. Unless one is to insist upon identifying realism with the ideas of a particular realist, self-conscious or otherwise, what is commonly—and in the main correctly—understood as the realist view is indicative only of a very general disposition toward politics. As a general disposition realism insists that politics neither follows nor reflects a simple rational scheme, that statecraft must always proceed from a given situation

[3] I will not strain the point by adding "or a Dean Acheson." Mr. Thompson does not include Mr. Acheson among his list of contemporary realists.

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which may gradually be altered but which cannot suddenly be transformed either by an act of will or by an appeal to reason, that grandiose attempts to transform society underrate the forces resistant to change and consequently the repressive measures necessary to overcome resistance, and that whatever the professions of those who wield power, men seldom if ever act for reasons as disinterested as they invariably allege. The realist view warns that perfectionism is perhaps the most dangerous, and one of the most recurrent, of political diseases. Its temper is generally skeptical both of men and of the possibilities of political action, hence its emphasis on the limitations attending the conduct of statecraft. Its prescription is prudence.

Whether one chooses to term this general disposition a theory, a doctrine, or a philosophy of politics is of little importance. What is important is that the realist view, in the sense sketched out above, is compatible with rather varying assumptions about human nature and the "meaning" of history. Mr. Thompson admits as much in casting so wide a net. There are, of course, limits to the assumptions that may be reconciled with the realist view. But these limits are quite broad.

It is also necessary to insist that the immediate relevance for policy of the insights provided by political realism must prove limited. The realist view deals with the perennial conditions that attend the conduct of statecraft, not with the specific conditions that confront the statesman. Realism is addressed to the general limitations on statecraft, not to the specific limitations on policy. It does not tell the political actor what he can do in a concrete situation but what he cannot expect to do in almost any situation. To be sure, realism warns that successful policy can no more afford to ignore the contingent than it can afford to ignore the invariable. But it cannot deduce the contingencies and thus the specific requirements of successful policy from those necessities alleged to be independent of time and place.

These considerations form one reason why agreement on the general principles that roughly comprise the realist view may go hand in hand with disagreement, even marked disagreement, over policy. On this point Mr. Thompson writes of the realists: "While they share common assumptions about the nature of reality, they have, of course, differed widely in their prescriptions and judgments of courses of action, because in every event there is a multitude of contingencies calling for assessment and prediction" (p. 61). Perhaps a more revealing way of making the same point is to say that despite sharing "common assumptions about the nature of reality," the realists nevertheless entertain different visions of the "reality" with which policy must deal and, consequently,

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frequently subscribe to disparate views on the requirements of successful policy. It may be true, as Mr. Thompson insists, that bad theory must eventually lead to unsuccessful practice. The converse does not follow, however.[4] Good theory—presumably realist theory—may form an essential prerequisite of good—that is, successful—policy, but it does not and cannot insure good policy.

II

There is a further reason why realists may differ and have "differed widely in their prescriptions and judgments of courses of action," a reason Mr. Thompson does not acknowledge. He seems to accept almost as self-evident the assumption that if the contingencies attending the conduct of statecraft could be accurately assessed, if "reality" could be perfectly known, policy differences among realists would then disappear. But this follows only if it is further assumed that the values or purposes which realists entertain are the same, that certain values are inherent in the very nature of the realist view, and that these values must be acknowledged by all true realists. Realism, he writes in one of many passages reflecting this assumption, "strives unceasingly through every means at its disposal to contain and limit concentrations of power and to compose and relieve tensions that could lead to a situation of war" (p. 70). The morality of realism, he declares in another passage, "looks for the point of concurrence between the particular and the general value or interest, rather than calling for the sacrifice of the part to the whole" (p. 220).

These are admirable sentiments, but do they follow from the realist view? The policy that realism counsels is policy that conforms to the requirements which presumably determine political success. Good policy may be defined, then, simply as policy calculated to preserve or to enhance the security and power of the state, whatever else may be its consequences. To be sure, realism prescribes prudence; it insists that the political actor must concern himself above all with the probable consequences of action. But prudence cannot in itself provide the purposes for which political action is undertaken; it cannot constitute the whole of a political ethic or even the basis of such an ethic. Prudence places no restraints on political action other than caution and circum-

[4] The implication that it does follow, that realist theory leads to successful policy, may be seen in the following statement: ". . . liberal or conservative leaders whose foreign policies have been most successful can more accurately be termed realists. They have succeeded because their liberal or conservative policies were founded on a realistic estimate of the perennial factors in the historical and political situation" (p. 88).

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spection; it sets no limits to self-interest other than those limits imposed by the situation in which policy must be conducted; it is compatible with any and all purposes which hold out the prospect of success. If Churchill was prudent, so was Stalin. Before the statesman can be prudent, there must be something for him to be prudent about.

Mr. Thompson assumes that this something is given, that it is implicit in the realist view, and that it finds its objective expression in the concept of "national interest." As the basic norm of statecraft, the concept of national interest enjoins the statesman to consider that the preservation and security of the nation—its territorial integrity and continued political independence—take precedence over all other purposes. It is the nation-state, Mr. Thompson remarks, that provides the "highest effective expression of a genuine moral consensus in large communities" and affords the most hopeful prospect of "creating freedom and order and opportunities for the individual" (p. 167). At the same time, he declares, "states, while asserting the moral integrity of their interests, ought never to see them too exclusively as ends in themselves" (p. 168). Thus nations must recognize that there are other nations with equally legitimate interests. "The one thing which saves the idea of national interest from itself is its essential reciprocity. To the extent that nations are in earnest not alone about their own self-interests but in their recognition of the application of similar criteria by others, the national interest as a guide escapes any temptation to conceal real designs for world aggrandizement"[5] (p. 169). Consequently, among nations with "decent intentions" there must be a "reciprocal process of recognizing each other's vital interests and avoiding collisions and conflicts *insofar as* it is possible through the compromise of divergent interests" (p. 169).

It is, of course, the merest truism that if the interests of others must be as legitimate as similar interests of the self, if the actions of the self and of others are always to be judged by the same criteria, there can be no justification for self-aggrandizement.[6] It is not at all clear, how-

[5] It is rather difficult to see either the logical or the psychological basis for this assertion. Logically, there is no incompatibility between the recognition that other nations judge their self-interests by similar criteria and the desire to pursue a course of action which nevertheless denies the self-interests of others. Psychologically it may be precisely the awareness that others apply similar criteria in determining their interests which accentuates the temptation to conceal real designs for aggrandizement.

[6] This is a purely hypothetical statement. It does not follow that nations have essentially similar interests or that they apply similar criteria in determining those interests. And even if this condition were to obtain, it does not follow that conflict among nations would be avoided. Nations might still believe that in certain circumstances the preservation of their vital interests is incompatible with the vital interests of others.

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ever, why the concept of the national interest must be essentially reciprocal. It is essentially reciprocal if one so defines it. But this definition surely does not follow from the realist view. There is no apparent reason why realism may not prove as compatible with a concept of national interest that leads to aggrandizement as with a concept of national interest that is restrained by the limitations Mr. Thompson would impose on it. These limitations may be desirable, but they do not follow from the realist view for the simple reason that realism does not prescribe how we ought to respond to the "realities" of political life.[7] Some realists may embrace the position that reality—the reality of power—must determine our purposes, that value is inherent in reality, and that the historic must be accepted as the normative. Among the realists whom Mr. Thompson discusses, E. H. Carr has perhaps come closest to this position. Mr. Thompson clearly does not accept it. Moreover, the frequent charge that the realist view necessarily leads in the end to the equation of value and reality is altogether unfounded. The point that must be emphasized, though, is that there is nothing in the realist view that precludes acceptance of this position. Policies of the status quo and of aggrandizement may prove equally compatible with political realism.

Nor would acceptance in principle of the restraints on national interest that Mr. Thompson advocates prevent disagreement, occasionally even serious disagreement, over policy. Whatever their merit as general norms, their relevance to the specific situations with which policy must deal is necessarily limited. Whatever their value in creating a moral temper that remains aware of the dangers of self-righteousness and moral pretension, they are too general to provide a relevant guide to the concrete problems of policy. They do not tell us whether the use of nuclear weapons should be threatened in a specific situation. Indeed, they do not even tell us whether their use should ever be threatened, if the threat carries with it the possibility of failure and of subsequent

[7] A vivid example of this may be seen in the varied response Mr. Thompson's realists have given to the imposing dilemmas presented by nuclear-missile weapons. Thus George Kennan and Herbert Butterfield have endorsed a position that is tantamount to one of nuclear self-abnegation. Professor Butterfield has gone so far as to urge that we "declare that the hydrogen bomb is an unspeakable atrocity, not to be used in any war, and not even to be the basis of any form of threat" (*International Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, New York, 1960, p. 95). On the other side, Reinhold Niebuhr has assailed the "nuclear pacifists" and has insisted that although the use of the hydrogen bomb might well mean our "moral annihilation," its employment as a deterrent threat against aggression—and consequently its *possible* use—is nevertheless justified. This controversy is not due simply to a failure of one side to comprehend the current realities of international life. It has arisen largely because men—professed realists—have responded differently to these realities.

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indiscriminate destruction. Nor do they tell us whether and to what extent an interest considered vital to security should be compromised. These are the choices—in part they are inescapably moral choices—the statesman must make. They are the choices over which reasonable —and realistic—observers will differ.[8]

III

A distinction must be drawn between Mr. Thompson's criticism of American thought on foreign policy and his evaluation of the substantive policy this nation has pursued in the postwar period. If thought continues to draw from the wellsprings of "rationalism and perfectionism," if the justification of policy remains tied to a sterile legalism and pretentious idealism, and if policy-makers still insist upon explaining their actions in terms of outworn and irrelevant slogans, American policy nevertheless comes off rather well. Not only has it evolved a "relatively consistent course of action," but "taken as a whole, postwar American foreign policy has been moderately prudent and realistic" (p. 126). This distinction that Mr. Thompson draws is reminiscent of the judgment frequently made of one of the principal architects of postwar American policy, John Foster Dulles, whose actions through some mysterious good fortune nearly always appeared superior to his thought.

Why all the bother then? If persisting illusions about the nature of foreign policy have had little influence on policy itself, what harm is done by continuing to indulge in them? In part, Mr. Thompson's answer is that this disparity between thought and action, between policy and its justification, is conducive to misunderstandings with other nations. Words may never be as significant as acts, but they are nevertheless significant. Mr. Thompson points to the recent history of Anglo-American relations, and the misunderstandings that have occasionally marred these relations, to illustrate his point. Much more important, however, is his conviction that the disparity between thought and action works to widen dangerously the gap that exists between the leaders and the led, with the result that those who must provide the necessary support for policy are increasingly alienated. "If the hiatus grows too wide between the leaders who speak in one language to one another and in a different way to those who are led, foreign policy or

[8] Arnold Wolfers has examined and clarified the general issues raised by the above remarks in his articles, "Statesmanship and Moral Choice," *World Politics*, I, No. 2 (January 1949), pp. 175-95, and "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXVII, No. 4 (December 1952), pp. 481-502.

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democracy or both must perish, victims of a challenge that proved greater than human resources" (p. 127).

The essence of the American dilemma in foreign policy is therefore seen in our failure as a nation to recognize the realities of international politics and to make the necessary intellectual and moral adjustment to these realities. In turn, this failure to lay the necessary intellectual and moral foundations for policy forms a continuing threat to the integrity of policy itself. At the very least, it forces us to oscillate between the threat of political failure if conforming in our actions to assumptions which bear little resemblance to reality, and the promise of political success which can be achieved only by denying these assumptions in action. The diagnosis once made, Mr. Thompson explores its various recent manifestations in a discerning and imaginative manner. If the case he builds in support of his argument is occasionally overdrawn, it remains, on the whole, very persuasive.

Mr. Thompson believes that the hiatus between the leaders and the led might be largely overcome if only those responsible for policy would speak to the public in the language of political realism, if they would lay bare the realities of foreign policy, and if they would admit to the moral compromises and shortcomings that mark the conduct of statecraft. This belief reflects a curious optimism, not the least element of which is the assumption that the public would listen to the language of political realism and, if listening, could understand what it had heard. It does not seriously consider Walter Lippmann's argument that the "public opinion of masses cannot be counted upon to apprehend regularly and promptly the reality of things."[9] Nor does it seriously consider those limitations on public understanding that stem neither from the statesman's failure to communicate in the language of political realism nor from the public's invincible ignorance, but from the very nature of the environment in which foreign policy must be conducted. It is, after all, this external environment and the limitations it imposes on the statesman that more than any other factor make the task of reconciling democratic processes and effective foreign policy so difficult.

At any rate, Mr. Thompson is convinced that the most useful service political realism can perform at the present juncture is to demonstrate the value of traditional diplomacy and to stress the need of its return. Throughout his study it is this theme that is consistently sounded. In his epilogue Mr. Thompson writes: "Diplomacy, which for a generation

[9] Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, Boston, 1955, p. 25.

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or more is certain to be the historic instrument by which mutual annihilation must be forestalled, has an ancient tradition compounded of wisdom and folly, success and failure. The chief virtue of political realism and its main contribution to peace lies in the unqualified emphasis it would place on these techniques and methods" (p. 251).

This same emphasis on the need for a "return to diplomacy" has been characteristic of a number of contemporary realists, at times amounting almost to a *mystique*. Since the inception of the cold war they have argued that nations having conflicting interests must either negotiate their differences through use of the traditional methods of diplomacy or resolve them through war. It seems almost redundant to observe that the history of the past fifteen years does not bear out this view. Apart from certain limited exceptions, we have neither negotiated nor gone to war. There is good reason to expect that this experience will continue into the indefinite future. For the manner in which states seek to resolve their conflicting interests is determined, apart from self-imposed restraints, by the nature of these interests and by the environment in which the struggle takes place. Neither the interests of the principal participants in the present struggle nor the environment in which the struggle takes place favors the traditional alternatives of negotiation or war.

In view of the exorbitant risks, it is obvious that war has become an increasingly unacceptable method for resolving the conflicts of interest separating the Communist world from the West. The factors inhibiting negotiation may be less obvious but they are no less real. Negotiation, if it is to prove more than a limited device sporadically resorted to for purely tactical purposes, presupposes that the participants share the same view of the minimum requirements of international order. The negotiation of conflicting interests may be undertaken within the framework of an international order that the parties recognize as legitimate, but the nature of the order itself cannot form the object of negotiation. Even if this essential condition is met, however, the adjustment and compromise of differences will follow only if the nations involved are persuaded that they have as much to gain through negotiation as through other methods. There is no point in resolving differences merely for the sake of having them resolved. Negotiation is not an end in itself.[10]

[10] To be sure, it has been asserted that in certain circumstances negotiation may indeed become an end in itself. Given the risks entailed by nuclear war, almost any method of resolving differences is considered preferable to settlement by force of arms and almost any kind of settlement is considered preferable to the alternative of war.

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Mr. Thompson is, of course, aware that neither of these conditions has been present in the rivalry between the Communist bloc and the West. His plea for a return to the techniques and methods of traditional diplomacy reflects the conviction, already noted, that apart from war there is no viable alternative to negotiation. But the cold war has witnessed the development of other alternatives. Adversaries continue to communicate with each other, as they must, though the form this communication takes bears little resemblance to traditional forms. They entertain certain understandings, though these understandings may not be openly acknowledged and cannot be invested with the aura of legitimacy. These novel alternatives may indeed defy past experience. But the processes of history are sometimes more tortuous than even realists assume.

But the persuasiveness of this view largely depends upon acceptance of the alternatives it poses. No solution at all of conflicting interests, and at the same time no resort to force, may still prove preferable to a clearly undesirable solution. Once again, the critical issue is the possibility of a situation that appears to exclude both true negotiation and war.

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ELECTORAL POLITICS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN WESTERN GERMANY

By LEWIS J. EDINGER

Uwe Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960, 365 pp. 45s.

DIVO Institut, *Untersuchung der Wählerschaft und Wahlentscheidung 1957: Arbeitsbericht über Erhebung im Wahljahr*, Frankfurt am Main, 1959, 310 pp. plus 197 pp. of appendices. DM 150.00.

I

VOTING has become truly an interdisciplinary object of investigation in recent years. Historians, statisticians, social psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists have focused their attention on electoral behavior, individually or in teams. Such studies have been principally the work of scholars in the traditional Western democracies—Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, the United States—and fall roughly into three patterns. One approach has been to analyze trends in group voting behavior on the basis of census and election statistics, and frequently poll data as well, in a search for meaningful correlations between voting trends and socio-economic factors. The work of Siegfried and, more recently, Goguel in France, of Heberle in Germany, Tingsten in Sweden, and Gosnell and Key in the United States belongs in this category. A second approach has been descriptive, identified in recent years particularly with Nuffield College at Oxford. The Nuffield studies of elections in Britain, France, Ireland, Poland, Italy, and Africa have focused on the efforts of candidates and parties to influence voters in a particular electoral campaign. They are intended primarily to be contributions to contemporary history and works of reference for future historians. Lastly, we have the investigations associated, in particular, with the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University and the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. These have focused on the political images and electoral behavior of individual voters and, particularly, on changes in their attitudes during a campaign and the reasons for such changes. They have relied, almost exclusively, on survey research methods which involve questioning a panel of representative voters at length before and after an election and, lately, even over a period of several years and elections.

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German scholars have shied away from serious and sophisticated research in this area. With a very few recent exceptions, they have not shown any interest in voting studies beyond the compilation of voting statistics—some of them excellent, others rather tendentious—and commentaries in the press and on radio and television. It is indicative of this situation that, of the two studies under review, one is in English and the other the work of a non-academic organization largely devoted to consumer research.

The reasons for this German academic reticence would seem to go beyond mere conservatism in social science research. The strong influence of traditional approaches in the legal and historical sciences on the orientation and training of scholars not only in these fields, but in political science and sociology as well, and strong prejudices against "behaviorism," quantitative analysis, and Freudian psychology in the social sciences exist in other countries, too. It seems to me that the legacy of the Nazi era has compounded the obstacles to electoral investigations in Germany. For one thing, the Nazi impact on German academic life created an intellectual hiatus. While in many other countries a new generation of social scientists sought out new areas for investigation and experimented with new methods, the social sciences withered in the land of Marx, Weber, and Mannheim. The one exception was the area of manipulation of mass opinion and behavior, in which methods that may seem crude in retrospect proved quite effective. However, there was certainly no demand for electoral research. Since 1945, while Germany has rapidly caught up with the Western democracies in many other respects, the public in general and the intellectual leaders in particular have not developed the same interest in the study of electoral politics and voting behavior which has largely been responsible for progress in this area in the older democracies.

Another consequence of the Nazi era has been a shortage of qualified scholars to undertake the task. A number of new chairs in sociology, contemporary history, and political science have been created at German universities—usually without very much encouragement from the academic community—but most of the scholars with the background considered adequate by those charged with filling these positions have been men trained in the traditional legal, historical, or normative-philosophical approaches to the social sciences. Not only have these professors, quite naturally, followed the traditional approaches they are familiar with, but they have been overwhelmed by manifold administrative and advisory tasks, leaving them little time for research—least of all in fields for investigation that require the acquisition of new research

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skills. And the few that are willing and able are confronted by an enormous backlog of studies that need to be done which far exceeds their capacity.

Finally, it would seem that research into electoral politics and voting behavior is particularly handicapped not only by a traditional reluctance of German politicians to publicize their methods, but also by a seemingly widespread sentiment against attempts to study private attitudes—as distinct from "public opinion"—and attempts to manipulate them. Perhaps this is a reaction to the prying and manipulation to which every German felt himself subjected during the Nazi years. Like depth psychology, attitudinal research, in particular, seems to be looked upon as indecent snooping into matters which many Germans prefer to keep to themselves today.

This is not to say that there have been no voting studies in postwar Germany. But many, if not most—and, one suspects, perhaps the most interesting—have never been made public. Both major parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), have relied increasingly on detailed pre- and post-election studies in planning their electoral strategy. The CDU in particular appears to make extensive use of statisticians, computers, and survey research organizations to predict the attitude and behavior of the German voters. The United States government began to make statistical and survey studies of German political preferences as soon as the war ended, first by a staff trained and directed by members of the U.S. High Commission in Germany and later also by private German survey research organizations.

Published studies on voting in Western Germany include a short descriptive and selective study in English of the federal election of 1953, edited by James K. Pollock, which sought to show that German democracy was working well.[1] The Institute of Political Science of the Free University of Berlin has published two studies of local elections,[2] and some German scholars have been inspired by Professor Ferdinand Hermens, now of the University of Cologne, to speculate about the effect of different electoral systems on governmental stability and electoral choice.[3]

[1] *German Democracy at Work: A Selective Study*, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1955.

[2] Stephanie Münke, *Wahlkampf und Machtverschiebung: Geschichte und Analyse der Berliner Wahlen vom 3. Dezember 1950*, Berlin, 1952; Kurt Shell and Nils Diederich. "Die Berliner Wahl vom 7. Dezember 1958," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, VII (1960), pp. 252-81.

[3] See, for example, Helmut Unkelbach, *Grundlagen der Wahlsystematik*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1956.

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II

The first attempt to conduct a comprehensive investigation of a German national election was the study of the federal election of 1953 by Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schütz and their associates at the Institute of Political Science of the Free University of Berlin, which appeared in 1957.[4] In many ways a pioneer venture, this investigation brought together a team that included political scientists, statisticians, sociologists, and historians. One of the authors, Schütz, was also a functionary of the Social Democratic Party and a number of the others were either members or supporters of the SPD. For this reason, perhaps, its objectivity was questioned by some German critics of the work who wondered whether objectivity in the social sciences could be carried beyond the compilation of voting statistics.

The authors of the Berlin study recognized that they had to cast their nets wide to encompass the entire matrix of the electoral process and sought to include in their investigation not only a description of the influence efforts of candidates, parties, and interest groups, but also the voters' reactions to these efforts. An exemplary study for Germany, the work not only described the campaign of 1953 itself, but probed into the question of voting trends and behavior over time. In their attempt to discover who voted for whom and why, the Berlin investigators had to limit themselves to an analysis of census and voting statistics and trend data from two of the major survey research organizations. Such data is of very high quality, not merely due to the fine work of the survey research organizations, but also due to the detailed sample surveys of voting by sex and age in representative districts which the Federal Statistical Office conducted for the first time in 1953. However, much to the regret of the Berlin investigators, their resources did not permit them to round out their study with an attitudinal survey of representative voters.

The excellent beginnings made by this study led one to look forward to an investigation of the following federal election—by this or some other group—which would build upon previous experiences and findings, as well as on advances in the study of elections made by scholars outside Germany. Such an investigation, one hoped, would not only incorporate areas of investigation previously omitted and advances in methodology, but establish a model for future German voting studies

[4] *Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen 1953*, Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, Franz Vahlen, 1959.

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that would permit comparisons over time and with findings in other countries. Unfortunately, these expectations have not been fulfilled.

III

Kitzinger is a fellow of Nuffield College and his book follows the pattern set by other Nuffield studies. It is a detailed description of the campaign preceding the elections of 1957, in which the governing Christian Democrats won an unprecedented absolute majority. The book aspires to be no more than an account of one observer's very personal impressions, Kitzinger assures us, and judged on these terms it is a very good monograph.

The general story is a familiar one, but Kitzinger illuminates some interesting details which have largely gone unobserved. His discussion of pre-campaign maneuvering between and within parties to assure the election of certain candidates points up the impact on electoral politics of that peculiar German electoral system known as "personalized proportional representation."[5] Whatever its theoretical merits, one effect of the system has been to force the minor parties to engage in tortuous negotiations and basically incompatible marriages of convenience with one or the other of the two major parties.

Another effect of the electoral system has been to shift the power to nominate candidates from the hands of central party committees—as had been the common practice before Hitler—to those of local functionaries and interest groups in the various constituencies. For most of the aspirant candidates—but particularly for those in the CDU, which had won three-fourths of its seats in the last election in the constituencies—the approval of the local party notables was the decisive stage in 1957, not the election. No wonder that even the powerful leader of the CDU has thus far failed to induce his party to support the creation of a federal PR list which would give the national leadership a greater voice in the nomination of at least a fraction of the deputies. Nearly a quarter of the incumbent constituent members—most of them Christian Democrats—were not renominated, though more than half, Kitzinger asserts, would have liked to have run again. He maintains that this resulted in a "very healthy improvement in the caliber of Bundestag personnel which countries that give greater security to their sitting members

[5] The 1957 version provided that one-half of all deputies were to be elected by relative majorities in single-member constituencies, while the remaining seats were to be filled from party lists proportionate to the total vote that the parties polled in the country. No party was allowed such list seats unless it won either at least three constituency seats or 5 per cent of the valid votes cast in the election.

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might envy" (p. 79). Perhaps, but a primary contest might temper efficiency in the selection of the most "capable" man (in the opinion of local notables) with a bit more democracy.

Kitzinger makes excellent use of the sample of marked ballots data collected by the Federal Statistical Office in 1,007 representative districts in 1957.[6] Though each voter votes separately for the constituency candidate and the party list of his choice, 88 per cent of the voters in the sample cast their two votes for the same party. Kitzinger concludes that the personality of the constituency candidate thus played only a very minor role in the elector's choice compared with the party label, and that the composition of the parliament was hardly affected by the votes cast for the constituency candidate. Kitzinger's conjectures about the intentions of the voters in the use of their two votes point up the need for a comparative analysis of the interaction between electoral system and voting behavior to test some of the prevalent theoretical assumptions on this subject.

The sample data of the Federal Statistical Office also indicated that, even more dramatically than in 1953, the CDU scored its greatest successes among those over sixty—particularly old ladies—while the SPD was most successful among young voters under thirty. The opposition to conscription among the young and the growing conservatism with advancing years which Kitzinger advances as explanations seem inadequate. The fact that the conservative CDU drew a disproportionate share of votes in former Nazi rural strongholds suggests that advancing age may not have made those who were adults before 1945 more conservative, but simply kept them so. The left-wing SPD, on the other hand, seems to have drawn disproportionate support from young voters in large urban centers who are, in every respect, more mobile and less tied to the past than their elders.

Kitzinger's discussion of a well-known phenomenon—that the CDU does relatively better in federal, the SPD in state elections—like his discussion of many other aspects of the voters' attitudes, is good, but not good enough. Voting statistics suggest to him that the SPD does relatively better, the CDU relatively poorer, in state than federal elections not because the voter oscillates between parties, but because the CDU cannot mobilize the uncommitted and indifferent voters as effectively in state as in federal elections. The evidence we have on this point is by no means conclusive. Moreover, this explanation fails to account

[6] Statistisches Bundesamt, *Die Wahl zum 3. Deutschen Bundestag am 15. September 1957*, Heft 2, "Die Wahlbeteiligung und Stimmabgabe nach Geschlecht und Alter der Wähler: Ergebnisse einer Repräsentativstatistik," Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1958.

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adequately for the fact that the Social Democrats have done remarkably well in local government elections with large voter turnouts and today control, by absolute or relative majorities, practically every large city. Might not many voters hold different images of the same parties on the local, state, and federal level? In the federal election of 1957 the CDU made foreign policy a major issue and apparently succeeded in creating a more favorable image on this score in the minds of a majority of the voters than did the SPD and the smaller parties. However, in local elections—where administrative efficiency, city planning, and similar local issues may seem of paramount importance to the same voter—the image created by the SPD may inspire more trust and votes than that of the CDU.

The excellence of this monograph makes all the more unnecessary Kitzinger's rather labored effort to establish a dichotomy between "classical" and "modern" election studies, an effort which is unfair to his own as well as to other Nuffield studies. The former, he says, "are based primarily on official voting results," while the latter "rely on opinion polls and up-to-date psychological techniques"—whatever they are. Declaring that it would be "pretentious" to call his a "scientific study," Kitzinger labels it as belonging to the "Neanderthal variety," because "its author is innocent of statistical method and sociological techniques, spoke to only a small number of 'men in the street,' and had the assistance of a few colleagues for only a few weeks" (p. vii). Let us ascribe his remarks to an Oxonian sense of humor, for surely Kitzinger does not seriously accept these criteria as valid distinctions between scientific and non-scientific election studies.

Kitzinger frankly admits that he is not particularly interested in "the behavior of the ordinary voters"; it is with the elector's vote "rather than his moods" that he is above all concerned (p. 278). Fair enough, but I would argue that a complete and useful analysis of a campaign warrants consideration of the elector's "moods," of his reaction to the efforts to influence him described in such detail by Kitzinger. The other study under review focuses on the attitude and behavior of the individual voter, thus supplementing Kitzinger's study. If the darker side of the moon seems to hold greater fascination, it is not because it is more appealing, but because we know less about it.

III

The DIVO volume is the work of a group of young social scientists associated with one of the three largest German survey research organ-

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izations. Like the Kitzinger work, its stated purpose is to provide prospective consumers with data for the analysis of political processes and behavior in contemporary Germany society. While Kitzinger focused on the efforts of candidates, parties, and pressure groups to influence the eligible voter's decision, the DIVO group sought to collect data about the voter himself, his attitudes, images, and expectations relevant to his politically expressed response, or lack of response, to these influence efforts. What they have produced is an enormous mass of survey research data—unique for Germany—which demands analysis by the student of German as well as comparative politics.

No doubt, the study suffers from methodological shortcomings, as will any pioneer venture. But its authors, obviously familiar with recent criticism of survey research, have profited from the mistakes of their predecessors in other countries and avoided many of the most frequently stated shortcomings of this instrument. For instance, by focusing on the images and attitudes of individual voters as a basis for electoral behavior, the study does not overemphasize social stratification as a factor in voting. By going beyond mere consideration of the rate of change in political preference and the reasons for it, the study escapes the charge made against some of the earlier American surveys—that preoccupation with this problem alone hardly justifies the money and effort expended, particularly when the rate of change is relatively small. All in all, given the severe obstacles which confronted the instigators of such a survey in Germany, their achievement is most impressive.

Following the example of American and Scandinavian panel surveys, the DIVO group interviewed a representative sample of two thousand eligible voters at the beginning of the campaign, just before the election, and immediately after it. Comparing the responses in the three interviews, DIVO divided those who actually voted—non-voting was minimal—into four groups. By far the largest group (58 per cent) were "constant voters," whose political preference did not change over the three interviews. The second largest group (21 per cent) were "changing voters," whose political preference did not remain the same. The third largest group (14 per cent) consisted of "mobilized voters," who responded to the stimuli of the campaign by moving from attitudes of indecision, indifference, or neutrality to definite preferences. Lastly, there was a small group of "uncertain voters," who wavered in their preferences during the campaign, but in the end claimed to have voted in accordance with their initial choice.

Constant and changing voters were concentrated in urban areas,

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mobilized and uncertain voters in rural areas. The DIVO data suggest that voters in urban areas are politically more engaged—even without a national election campaign to arouse their interests—than those in rural areas, who are generally apathetic. It was the latter who provided the Christian Democrats with most of the votes that gave them an absolute majority, but the chief opposition party, the Social Democrats, also drew their "mobilized" votes almost entirely from the rural areas.[7]

With the help of the DIVO data, we can take a closer look at the bandwagon effect which Kitzinger mentions as one of the consequences of the campaign. Constant voters of all parties became largely convinced during the campaign that the Christian Democrats would win, but this did not induce the faithful supporters of the other parties to change their original preference. On the other hand, a bandwagon effect made itself most strongly felt among respondents who changed their preference to the CDU and who also became more antagonistic toward the Social Democrats than all other CDU voters. Whether change caused antagonism or antagonism caused change is a matter for further analysis. Rather interesting was the reaction of the uncertain voters. The proportion of uncertain CDU voters who came to feel that the SPD would win the election actually increased during the campaign. Uncertain SPD voters, on the other hand, felt in increasing numbers that the CDU would win, but in the end did not join the bandwagon.

The DIVO survey sustains the contention of the CDU campaign managers, reported by Kitzinger, that primary contact with the chief candidates had far greater influence on voting behavior than secondary contact through mass communication media. The popularity not only of Adenauer but also of the far less impressive leader of the opposition increased much more strongly among voters who saw and heard them at election meetings than among voters whose contact was through the mass media. It is regrettable that DIVO failed to refine these findings in terms of the relative effect of primary and secondary contacts on its various categories of respondents. The data do not support Kitzinger's impression that the very expensive and elaborate billboard campaign of the CDU had a significant impact. Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of radio and television appeals in the 1957 campaign, recent controversy among the German parties over control of new radio stations and the creation of a new, federally owned, privately operated, second television "program," seems to imply that they attach

[7] The CDU, which received two-thirds of the mobilized votes, got 79 per cent of them in rural areas; the SPD, with a fourth of the mobilized votes, drew 89 per cent of them from these areas.

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greater importance to the media as an influence device—at least in future campaigns—than the disparaging remarks of the CDU campaign manager after the election, quoted by Kitzinger, might indicate.

While the DIVO data do not necessarily support the findings of British and American surveys that few voters are significantly influenced by a campaign, they also do not support Kitzinger's contention that the CDU saturation campaign scored a decisive breakthrough during the last few weeks. As the major German polling organizations strongly disagreed on this important point—in contrast to their close agreement in predicting the outcome just before the election—it would be most useful for the development of German survey research if an independent analysis could ascertain the reasons for these discrepancies.[8]

IV

One is greatly tempted to cite other findings from the DIVO survey which illuminate or add to previous knowledge about German politics in general and the 1957 campaign in particular—such as fascinating data on the favorable impact of Adenauer's image on voters' attitudes regardless of party preference—but it would lead to an emphasis on events primarily of interest to the area specialist. Rather I shall consider briefly a few findings which invite comparison with the results of similar surveys elsewhere.

A high voting turnout has frequently been associated with high group tensions and intense personal involvement in an election. The increase in voting by low-income and low-status voters in Germany immediately before Hitler's accession—turnout increased from 75 per cent in 1928, before the economic and political crisis, to 83 per cent at its height in July 1932—is usually cited to support this hypothesis.[9] In the 1957 election, 88 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls, a turnout unprecedented in a free German election and not surpassed even in the Nazi-dominated election of March 1933. Yet group tension and personal involvement were apparently exceptionally low.

The general climate of opinion during the 1957 campaign was characterized by an absence of significant conflicts and a sense of optimism

[8] Wide discrepancies in the trend analysis of data of DIVO (using random-probability sampling methods) and EMNID (another major survey organization which relied on quota sampling) in Berlin prior to the election of 1958 further underscored the need for an analysis of the sampling methods and data interpretations of the different polling organizations. On the Berlin polls, see Shell and Diederich, *op.cit.*, p. 271.

[9] See Martin Lipset *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 1163f.; and Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959, pp. 346, 349f.

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and accomplishment. All the respondents questioned by DIVO just before the election judged themselves considerably better off economically than five years earlier and a majority—regardless of political preference—expected to do even better in the future; only 16 per cent were actually pessimistic regarding their future economic well-being. Nor do the data indicate any particular personal dissatisfaction or group conflict involving non-economic interests, such as ideological values. Despite the intensive campaign efforts of the political leaders to persuade them to the contrary, a majority of voters of the two leading parties expressed the belief that nothing much would change even if the opposition Social Democrats should come to power. Less than half of the respondents expressed any interest in the campaign—including 69 per cent of the mobilized voters and 45 per cent of CDU voters. The intensive campaign efforts of the majority party may have brought people to the polls to vote Christian Democrat, but the data do not support the contention that they were any less apathetic or more politically involved for having cast a vote. Rather, they indicate that most Germans voted in 1957 because they believed it their civic duty as good citizens to go to the polls.

The high turnout of 1957 seems to have been due largely to conformity voting in response to general social pressure. Unfortunately, neither Kitzinger nor the DIVO group delved into this problem sufficiently. The former does not tell us whether there was any effort in the campaign to appeal to the "duty to vote," and the latter failed to probe farther into the reasons for conformity voting. We have some evidence from voting in American suburbia that turnout may also rise with income, but this seems to relate to variables such as higher education and occupational status that are absent in the more general German situation.[10] Was conformity voting in 1957 a manifestation of the general conformist patterns in contemporary German society noted by many observers? Was it, perhaps, a response to postwar civic education efforts? Or may it be attributed to the persistence of political values and behavior patterns acquired in the days of coercive voting in Nazi plebiscites? Again, the present data invite further research and analysis.[11]

[10] Lane, *op.cit.*, p. 350. The data also conflict with certain of Duverger's hypotheses concerning the relationship between turnout and the voters' expectations regarding the closeness of the election. Turnout was apparently not significantly affected by the prevalent conviction among most voters that the CDU would win. See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, London, 1954, p. 386.

[11] Some efforts in this direction were indicated by Peter Schmitt, one of the DIVO directors, in a fine paper on "The 'Brand Image' of the German Voter," delivered at the ESOMAR/WAPOR Congress held in Brighton, England, in September 1958.

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Political apathy is, of course, by no means a uniquely German phenomenon. As some recent studies have suggested, it may well be a product of economic growth and welfare-state norms, as well as of international developments which limit possible alternatives in national policies of industrialized states. Most voters not only lack familiarity with specific alternatives offered by different parties, but care little about them because they do not seem to matter.[12]

Intimately related to these problems is the role of ideology in determining voting behavior. In Germany, as in the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, the diminishing importance of ideology appears to favor the party in power.[13] The government leaders have at their disposal numerous means to keep the national train running on the track the voters have become accustomed to, thus greatly complicating the efforts of the opposition to sell the electorate a different route—or at least a different train crew. In Germany, as in many other countries, the opposition suffers from the absence of new dimensions of opinion which it might exploit.[14] Given present dominant attitudes and values, it certainly cannot win an ideological election, as Kitzinger states, though less for reasons of ideological rigidity on the part of the voters than because of their growing indifference toward ideological values. Perhaps the Social Democrats can make some headway by following Kitzinger's prescription for a "more empirical approach, loyal, detailed constructive opposition," "a new and attractive personality" at the head of the ticket, and "quiet, persistent public relations work" concentrating on "changing the guard" (p. 303). However, it would seem that only intense personal dissatisfaction with the governing party in terms of present values or a drastic change in dominant values is likely to turn the CDU out of power.[15]

[12] On this point, see Angus Campbell *et al., The American Voter*, New York and London, 1960, particularly pp. 542f.; and Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Parties, Elections and Political Behavior in the Northern Countries," p. 75 (hectographed manuscript of an article prepared for the 1960 *Jubiläumschrift* of the Institute of Political Science of the Free University of Berlin).

[13] The form of electoral system—plurality in single-member districts in Britain, proportional representation in Scandinavia, and a "mixed" system in Germany—seems to me to be of relatively minor, if any, significance in maintaining governmental stability in these countries.

[14] In this connection, see the observations of Campbell *et al., op.cit.*, p. 550.

[15] Lack of space prevents me from discussing the interesting DIVO data concerning the significance of informal primary contacts—with family members, associates at work, friends—in individual opinion formation during the campaign. Regrettably we lack data on the role of informal opinion leaders and reference groups in the formation of political opinions in the German political system, particularly over extended periods of time.

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V

The two studies under review—and the Berlin study which preceded them—point up the need for more intensive and extensive studies of German elections on the federal, state, and communal level. Apparently we may look forward to another Nuffield study of the forthcoming federal election by Mr. Kitzinger. We should also soon have a statistical descriptive study in the French manner of German election trends since 1945 from the Institute of Political Science at Heidelberg University. What we are not likely to get in the foreseeable future is another panel survey or, better yet, a comprehensive, intensive study of one or more elections. And yet we need a series of such studies if we are ever to make meaningful comparisons in time as well as space.

I need not stress the value of voting studies for the student of comparative politics and foreign policy-making; the intimate relationship has been emphasized repeatedly in recent years—in both the theory and the practice of international relations. Nor need I belabor the need for comparative and parallel studies in this area if we are to learn more about political processes in general.[16] We want more information about long-term development in electoral attitudes and behavior, about the interaction between elite and mass during as well as between campaigns, about differences in perception and expectations of candidates and parties in various political systems. Of course, we cannot rely on any single technique or approach.[17] But there is no theoretical reason why such comparative studies of political communities in different countries and at different levels of government should not seek to encompass a wide range of approaches.

[16] The plea for such studies has come from various "schools." Thus David Butler of Nuffield College, who expressed doubts about the value of a comparative approach in his *Study of Political Behavior* (London, 1958), has written more recently in *Elections Abroad* (London, 1959) that "the whole field of elections is one where the difficulties inherent in all comparative political studies are at a minimum. By looking at the experience of successive countries it is possible to test the usefulness of certain universal questions . . . most of all, about the behaviour of the voter" (p. 9). Among the proponents of the survey research method, the argument that comparative studies are both feasible and necessary has most recently and emphatically come from Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell, both jointly ("Norway and the United States of America," *International Social Science Journal*, XII, No. 1, 1960, pp. 36ff.), and separately (Campbell, *The American Voter*, p. 7, and Rokkan and Valen, "Parties, Elections . . . ," pp. 17, 71-77).

[17] For a recent critique of certain aspects of the survey research method, see V. O. Key, Jr., "The Politically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV, No. 1 (Spring 1960), pp. 54-81. Morris Davis in "French Electoral Sociology" (*ibid.*, XXII, No. 1, Spring 1958, pp. 35-56) questions the adequacy of the Goguel statistical studies and takes a slap at the Nuffield studies as well. See also Butler, *The Study of Political Behavior*, pp. 56-75.

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Let us in conclusion return to the future of electoral studies in Germany. The state of research and analysis, as I have said, is deplorable in a country which in related fields, such as consumer research and public relations, has caught up with or even surpassed developments in other Western countries. Given the obstacles I mentioned at the outset, the most practical solution might be the establishment of an independent research center, such as exist in Britain, Sweden, Norway, and the United States, financed either with public or private funds. The initiative and principal support for such an undertaking should not and cannot come from the outside, but only from the Germans themselves. Let us hope that it will.

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A VIEW OF SOVIET BUSINESS—THROUGH WINDOW OR MIRROR?

By EDWARD AMES

David Granick, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, 1960, 334 pp. $4.50.

IN 1943 a young American naval officer on duty in Moscow was sent to Murmansk to tend to the paper work involved in unloading a Lend-Lease convoy. Afterwards, a party was given by his Soviet counterparts, and by dawn, when it broke up, he was deep in an exchange of "basic fundamentals" with a congenial Red Navy lieutenant. Emerging into the street, they met a long line of men carrying supplies from the docks. The Soviet officer looked, and said with obvious sincerity, "See our happy workers." The American officer looked—and he saw a line of convicts under the guard of police with machine guns. We see, it appears, what we are prepared to see in the USSR.

Frederick Barghoorn, in his *Soviet Image of the United States*, makes a careful study of the Soviet press in the immediate postwar period, and decides that the window through which the Soviet writer looks at the United States is silvered. Looking for bad things to say about us, the Soviet writer reproduces faithfully the features on his side of the pane. The Soviet image of the United States is a picture of the Soviet Union.

May we take Barghoorn's proposition in reverse? Do foreign writers on the USSR basically see their own countries? The Webbs' monumental *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* is a classic case. Confident in the perfectibility of man, trusting in collective decisions, and experienced in the innumerable committees of the British reform movement, they saw in the Soviet Union innumerable committees, issuing streams of decisions aimed at creating a new Soviet Man; their life, not the Soviet Union, is described in the book.

The mainstream of American economic writing on the Soviet Union has dealt with statistics of output. These have been compiled by the government, by quasi-government agencies like RAND, and by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The studies tend to discuss the sources and not the meaning of the data they present. Readers of this extensive literature will have the impression that the USSR is a vast statistics factory like those employing the American authors of these

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studies. It is hard to find people and events in them. The numbers generated by the Soviet economy turn out to look like those generated by the United States—or at least every effort is made to make them comparable. The inevitable differences are considered an unfortunate error of Soviet statistical organization, and not inherent properties of the country itself.

A smallish group of American writers views the Soviet economy as being a collection of factories run by people called "managers." One of these Americans, David Granick, has now published a book called *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry,* the writing of which was supported by the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. If the thesis thus far advanced is true, then this book should be a reflection of the American business school as well as of Soviet business.

Our business schools prepare people for administrative positions in large corporations. Ever since Veblen's time, it has been recognized that ownership and management were different. Berle and Means, in *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, asserted a generation ago that stockholders could seldom effectively influence management in large firms, and that large firms dominated the economy. James Burnham, in *The Managerial Revolution*, asserted that the managers would inherit the earth. J. K. Galbraith has asserted that the tendency toward large-scale organization is not peculiar to corporations alone, but that all forms of economic activity tend to be dominated by large organizations with quasi-professional leadership.

The existence, in this country, of a large group of managers, who operate and sometimes effectively control organizations which they do not own, creates theoretical problems for economists. Marxists must deny the facts; Western economists must seek to determine whether management's motivations differ enough from the owners' profit motive to affect the validity of their models. The student of economic systems will wonder, moreover, whether American managers resemble Soviet managers, who likewise run factories they do not own, and likewise are parts of elaborate administrative hierarchies.

Mr. Granick, in visiting and studying Soviet business management, not surprisingly found himself almost at home. He found managers were of white-collar origin, like their American counterparts; they tended to be more highly educated than Americans, typically with an engineering rather than a liberal arts orientation. Their early experience was mainly in production management rather than in such activities as

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sales, which are so important in the United States. Although more "intellectual," as far as reading and recreation go, they were not trained in analytical problem-solving, and in particular were uncritical of official doctrines. Discussion of their job situations is difficult because Soviet expenditure patterns are very different from American, as of course are job turnover, incentives like bonuses, promotion, and the like. Mr. Granick gives a lively account of his impressions of these matters.

The stable element in Soviet management is at the factory level, while higher-level controls are subject to frequent change. On the one hand, plant management is subservient to the letter of its instructions; the spirit is apt to be forgotten because it is very much easier to do business within a single administrative hierarchy than outside. A sampling is given of the problems which higher management encounters in enforcing its larger policies.

In much of this discussion, the American reader will feel at home, as Mr. Granick did. College administrators find it hard to get their students to work; plant managers have trouble finding out how much their workers can produce; good foremen are hard to come by; the balance between specialized skills and breadth of knowledge is tenuous; quantity, quality, and cost chase each other around in the production manager's head; local initiative can either facilitate or play hob with home office policy, depending on who is involved and what the stakes are; a policy of "putting out fires" may make for trouble in the long run. Armed with knowledge of American business practices, Mr. Granick found many areas where two systems, starting from very different ideological and economic premises, reached results which either were very similar or, where different, were at least comparable.

This much of Mr. Granick's book is a valuable contribution to the general reader's knowledge; and a trained eyewitness should be welcomed by the specialist. It is a view, as the subtitle states, of the "organization man" in the second largest industrial system in the world—a man hemmed in by procedures who is skilled, able, and confident of meeting the daily challenge.

Is the "organization man" in any economy, however, a man who gives the economy its direction? The student of American business management would hesitate to affirm this. Where does technological change originate? Where do the ideas for major investments come from? How does the President or Congress decide what to do about economic issues? Where does organized labor get its impetus for a new wage policy? It is true that at some level and in some way the organiza-

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tion man influences the outcome. He is influential in that, like the massive body in Newton's law, he tends to move at a constant speed in the direction he was already moving. It is impressive that in some systems the movement is "fast" and "upward," in others not. But does the organization man make or merely live in his organization?

The reader of the popular fiction about the Soviet Union will probably feel that something is missing. Where, in all this, does Koestler, or Orwell, or their Soviet counterpart, the *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, find a place? Can all the fascinating, crashingly dull, or apocalyptic discussions of communism have no relevance in Soviet business management today?

The Soviet Constitution gives the Communist Party the role of the "leading core of all organizations, both state and social." The Party itself must be made up of "organization men" at intermediate levels, and at the highest levels Party and government are headed by the same individuals. For economic purposes, says Mr. Granick, it is convenient to think of the Soviet economy as a corporation, whose officers are the heads of the economic councils (formerly economic ministries), and whose board of directors is the Presidium of the Communist Party. Some officers, of course, are board members, and some board members have non-economic interests. At the lower levels, too, the same analogy may be made.

On this basis, a sound policy would dictate that the officers be allowed to run the business, but only within limits of board policy. It is bad management if the board (Party committee) actually intervenes in running a plant; it is also bad management for the officers (plant director, chief engineer, etc.) to violate board policy. In detail, of course, this distinction is extremely difficult to make precise, and Mr. Granick cites cases where trouble has occurred.

This thesis is most interesting to American readers, since there is no other parallel to the Communist Party in our businesses. Since the relative strength of boards and management varies greatly from one firm to the next, it is a flexible enough thesis to meet the known varieties of Soviet practice. But it must be treated as an informed oversimplification. Detailed information about the structure and operations of Soviet management is relatively plentiful. Detailed information about what the Communist Party considers its economic functions is extremely scarce. We do not even know whether the lack of data reflects a desire for secrecy or an absence of Party interest. And so we cannot assess the validity of the "board of directors" analogy at the "organization man" level of the Soviet economy.

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On the other hand, it is hard to assess the role of the Communist Party in high-level economic policy, because coherent policy statements were never published from 1936 until 1954, and seldom have been since. Officially, economic policy consists exclusively of enforcing production goals which have materialized from thin air.

Even if intelligible policy statements existed, the "Great Man" problem would persist. Successful policy is always ascribed to the current Party leader, and policy failures to his opponents. American economists are so accustomed to Adam Smith's Invisible Hand that they shy away from a dictatorial fist in front of their very noses. The explanation they give is usually that the Leader, whoever he may be, influences only fringes of the economy but the basic trends are dictated by objective factors beyond his control. It is odd that no serious study of Soviet economic growth after 1930 has tried to measure the impact of Stalin's personality. He was certainly not an organization man in Granick's sense. Was he, however, insignificant as an economic phenomenon?

Suppose that the "Great Man" thesis is not valid in Soviet economics, that Stalin and Khrushchev, or Kaganovich, Voznesenski, and Kozlov do not provide the force which keeps the organization men going. Shall we then replace them, as the Soviet press has since Stalin's death, by "the Communist Party," or "Leninist ideology"? To answer such a question, we would need to have information we are not apt to get, on the extent and way in which Marxist theory is actually used in making Soviet economic decisions. It is clear that policy is formulated in Marxist terminology, but it is not clear how far beyond the choice of words Soviet Marxism actually goes in economic matters.

Or, finally, we may do as the statisticians do, and project trends, as if the Soviet economy, like Topsy, will just grow as it always has. Elaborate studies have indeed been made, showing that pre-revolutionary Russian industrial development was statistically much like the post-revolutionary. The Revolution, on a chart, looks like a temporary, though violent drop, like the depression of 1929-1932 on an American chart. We might conclude that Czars may go and Stalins come, but industrial growth proceeds at its own pace. Here Mr. Granick's organization men would implement some vast impersonal natural process, and we need seek no farther.

If, then, we peer through Mr. Granick's window, to see men very much like his Carnegie Tech students filling Soviet slots, it may be that his glass reflects but does not transmit light. It may be that although the appearance of the Soviet managers is that of his students, their thinking is really quite different. Even if all those men actually running

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Soviet factories were from Carnegie Tech, however, there might be others we could not see, because they were "captains of industry" or "commissars" rather than organization men. In any of these other cases, we might be more puzzled by the Soviet economy than Mr. Granick leaves us, but we might be correspondingly wiser. This reader was left wondering whether Mr. Granick has not made it too easy for us.

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